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Abstract
The digital era is witnessing a remarkable evolution of digital services. While the prospects
are countless, the e-marketplaces of digital services are encountering inherent game-theoretic
and computational challenges that restrict the rational choices of bidders. Our work examines
the limited bidding scope and the inefficiencies of present exchange e-marketplaces. To meet
challenges, a free exchange e-marketplace is proposed that follows the free market economy.
The free exchange model includes a new bidding language and a double auction mechanism.
The rule-based bidding language enables the flexible expression of preferences and strategic
conduct. The bidding message holds the attribute-valuations and bidding rules of the selected
services. The free exchange deliberates on attributes and logical bidding rules for automatic
deduction and formation of elicited services and bids that result in a more rapid self-managed
multiple exchange trades. The double auction uses forward and reverse generalized second
price auctions for the symmetric matching of multiple digital services of identical attributes
and different quality levels. The proposed double auction uses tractable heuristics that secure
exchange profitability, improve truthful bidding and deliver stable social efficiency. While
the strongest properties of symmetric exchanges are unfeasible game-theoretically, the free
exchange converges rapidly to the social efficiency, Nash truthful stability, and weak budget
balance by multiple quality-levels cross-matching, constant learning and informs at repetitive
thick trades. The empirical findings validate the soundness and viability of the free exchange.

Keywords
rule-based bidding, bidding lifecycle, market economy, free exchange, preference deduction,
bid formation, double auction, quality levels, stable efficiency, market profitability.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

The phenomenal evolution of digital services and smart interactions is empowering a new
culture that is transforming social lifestyles into commodities. The dynamics of mobile
influence, digital engagement, constant learning, smart conduct, and real-time immediacy
are rather disruptive for e-marketplaces. While it reveals massive opportunists, it raises
concerns about restricted bidding choices, inflexible strategic conduct and inefficiencies
of online trading mechanisms. Our work identifies and examines some potential issues of
current exchange e-marketplaces from microeconomic, game-theoretic and computational
perspectives. The work here reflects on our bias to free market economy practices and
presents briefly the proposed free exchange e-marketplace model that follows free market
economy. The problem definition statement outlines the desired exchange e-marketplace
properties with respect to an expressive and flexible rule-based bidding language and
truthfully stable, socially efficient and profitable double auction matching mechanism.

1.1 Exchange e-Marketplaces: Potential Issues
The digital era trends are manifested by the thriving digital services (referred to as eservices) as mobile apps, online advertising (ad), and interactive digital marketing. While
the prospects are countless, the e-marketplaces are encountering inherent game-theoretic
and computational challenges that restrict the rational choices, preferences and strategic
conduct of bidders. The remarkable evolution of interactive digital services is, in fact,
inciting the industry to diligently fetch more viable delivery and revenue trading models
that thrive in the market ecosystem (Moore, 1996). The game-theoretic complexity,
however, impacts the strategic stability of trading mechanisms that dictate the rules of
encounter. At stable equilibrium, a mechanism

implements a social welfare function

with solution concepts that predict strategies rational bidders select with assumptions
about rationality of bidders and knowledge bidders have about other bidders. The
computational complexity, otherwise, relates to the tractable algorithmic efficiency that
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drive

to compute, in polynomial time, a combinatorial allocation problem (CAP)

where number of possible bids is exponential in number of e-services.
Our work identifies and examines, particularly, the potential challenges that initiate from
the restricted bidding conduct and the inefficiencies of present exchange e-marketplaces.
While complexities may justify the restrictive bidding practices, the de facto auctions are
often designed for the strategic benefit of revenue maximizing e-marketplaces. For
instance, in Google AdWords and DoubleClick exchange (Mansour et al., 2012; Google,
2013), the advertisers often bid with restricted number of keyword choices. Bidders
submit single bids that do not adequately convey preferences for various ad positions
while paying for, perhaps, no-sale cost-per-clicks. Google applies, otherwise, a rather
fuzzy cost-per-acquisition pricing model at real conversions. The Facebook FBX
exchange breaches the privacy of online users by using intruding cookies. The cookies
collect and trade user personal profiles on the real-time-bidding exchange and charge
using the revenue-per-page-view pricing rule. The restrictive bidding practices, however,
provokes adverse strategies of bidders that may lead to digital market (referred to as emarket) failures. For instance, bidder agents (referred to as agents) may collude by
submitting untruthful reduced bids for false partial requirements and form coalitions that
act as super-agents to benefit from reduction in competition that harm social welfare.
Collusion can be, even, more problematic in computational settings as bidders unleash
several agents and adopt multiple identities name (i.e., false name bidding).
The inefficiencies of present exchange mechanisms, on the other hand, is understood in
the context of Hurwicz impossibility theorem (Hurwicz, 1975) that states it is impossible
to implement an allocative efficient (AE), strategy proof (SP) and budget balance (BB)
social welfare function in dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) in a simple exchange emarket and quasi-linear preferences even without requiring individual rationality (IR).
(Green & Laffont, 1977) , demonstrates no AE and SP mechanism can be safe from
manipulation by coalitions, even in quasi-linear environments. A simple exchange is one
in which there are buyers and sellers selling single units of the same good (Parkes, 2001).
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It is useful at this point to briefly define some of the related economic and computational
concepts. The elaborate definitions are found in later chapters. A mechanism

of each agent and the outcome rule

holds the rules of interaction that define strategies
:

…

,

→ . The social choice function maps the profile of preferences to an

outcome, while the social welfare function maps preferences to an efficient outcome. The
social allocative efficiency (AE) maximizes the sum of utilities or valuations of bidders.
An incentive compatible (IC) mechanism

is the one in which agent best max utilities

is at truthful (direct) revelation of private information. A direct-revelation mechanism
(DRM)

is strategy-proof if its truth-revelation is a DSE, a useful game-theoretic and

computational property. A stronger solution concept is DSE at which every agent has the
same utility-maximizing strategy, for all strategies of other agents. A Strategy
dominant strategy if it (weakly) maximizes the agent's expected utility
strategies of other agents

,

,

,

,

,

,

,∀

,

,

is a

for all possible
∈ Σ . Agent

can compute its optimal strategy without modeling the preferences and strategies of other
agents. At weak budget balance (BB) the

total utility transfers is positive (No deficit).

The BB propriety maps to e-marketplace profitability. The individual rationality (IR)
relates to voluntary participation in a trade at which an agent can achieve as much
expected utility from participation using
efficiency means that,

as without participation. The computational

is computed in polynomial time (i.e., tractable algorithms). The

strategic (game-theoretic) stability means that

implement a social welfare function at

equilibrium with solution concepts that predict strategies agents will select with diverse
assumptions about rationality of agents and knowledge agents have about other agents.
The quasi-linear preferences simplify the utility transfer across agents, via side-payments.
The exchange challenges to achieving desirable properties for full symmetric exchange
mechanisms influences industry exchange e-marketplaces. This is evident in the famous
e-marketplaces as Google, e-Bay, Facebook and Amazon that utilize asymmetric auctions
(i.e., single auction mechanisms) with reserve value of sellers. For instance, in (Mansour
et al., 2012) Google DoubleClick ad exchange uses generalized second price (GSP) and
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optional second price (OSP) auctions for matching (see Figure 1, source: (Mansour et al.,
2012)). The OSP enables advertiser submits mandatory bid
for

and optional bid 0

reserve price to mitigate exposure. The OSP, charges

,0,

.

Figure 1: Google DoubleClick ad exchange OSP auction

1.2 Towards Free Symmetric Exchange of Market Economy
Our work examines the restrictive bidding conduct and inefficiencies of present exchange
e-marketplaces. In that vein, Adam Smith, remarkably, observed that bidders interacting
in free market economy act as if guided by “invisible hand” that leads to desirable market
outcomes. The market economy is the free market in which resources allocated by bidder
buying and selling free decision making, as primarily governed by the opportunity cost,
and influenced by the society (Hall & Lieberman, 2010). The invisible hand aligns the
dynamics of the dual self-interests and essential needs of bidders that allocate the scarce
assets efficiently and works best in economy of perfect competition. The dual dynamics
promote collaborative strategies while discouraging monopolies. In this context, strategic
practices would be the truthful rational reactions to constant learning of e-market
disruptions, particularly, at repetitive trades that must be freely expressed. The flexible
bidding language that is adequate for the free expression of rational conduct would
facilitate, hence, the truthful revelation of the strategic reactions. Following the
microeconomic perspective of free market economy, our work advocate, hence, an
adequate e-marketplace allows for symmetric bidding with flexible expression of free
choices and strategic conduct. The e-marketplace should have, also, an exchange
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mechanism that enables fully symmetric matching trades between e-service providers and
consumers. The exchange e-marketplaces should maintain its position as bidders most
preferred trading platform by providing endlessly growing inventory and information
liquidity with reliable visibility, metrics, and focus targeting. The exchange model should
deliver, also, adequate desirable game-theoretic and computational properties as stable
social efficiency, exchange profitability, and computational efficiency (i.e., tractability).
The fully symmetric exchange would deliver a fair and equal trading flexibility and free
bidding conduct for both buyers, who are currently enjoying much of the allowed trading
flexibility, and sellers, who are most often confined with the reserve value model.
Our work advocates the flexible bidding conduct by introducing the free exchange (FX)
e-marketplace that follows the free market economy (Hall & Lieberman, 2010). The free
market economy has proved to be effective in organizing the economic activities for the
social well-being, despite the self-interested decision making (Mankiw, 2012). The FX
includes a flexible RBBL that empowers bidders to expressing free conduct. Our work
endow the free exchange, also, with a double auction mechanism that improve stable
efficiency. The rule-based bidding language (RBBL) enables free, flexible and concise
expressions of preferences and strategic conduct by bidders using logical rules. The
RBBL message includes distinct attribute-values of e-services and logical rules formulae
that the FX deliberates on for automatic deduction and formation of the e-services and
bids. The FX automatic bidding allows for least preference elicitation and multiple rapid
trades. The RBBL is completely symmetric that enables the rule-based bidding not only
for buyers but also for sellers, often, confined with their reserved values model.
The double auction (DA) exploits the forward and reverse generalized second price
(GSP) auctions for a class of multiple e-services of identical attributes and different
quality levels (Q-levels). The multiple Q-levels GSP based DA matching (GSPM)
motivates truthful bidding and deliver symmetric social efficiency and strategic stability
with constant learning at repetitive trades that deliver the truthful best response strategies
of bidders. The DA heuristics are computationally tractable and secures, also, the FX
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profitability. However, the GSPM social efficiency and e-market profitability is better
realized with market thickness (Roth, 2007). Realizing perfect stable efficiency in
profitable exchanges, however, is unfeasible game-theoretically (Hurwicz, 1975). Our
work establishes, though, that the FX converges to the stable efficiency of the full
information setting with constant learning at repetitive trades. The FX exploits the GSPM
DA to achieving strategic equilibrium of self-interested rational bidders of private
independent information and free strategic conduct. The GSPM takes advantage of the
successes of the efficient, yet simple de facto GSP (Edelman et al., 2007) (Varian, 2007),
and the repeated best response auction (Nisan et al., 2011). The proposed multiple Qlevels, GSPM DA enables tractable and IC exchange that delivers stable efficiency and
profitability. This is evident in the rapid stable convergence of thick e-markets, i.e., large
number bidders and transactions. The desirable properties of the FX free exchange RBBL
rules bidding and GSPM DA is thoroughly verified through experimental analysis.

1.3 Problem Definition Statement
Our work examines the status quo of the restricted bidding conduct and inefficiencies of
present exchange e-marketplaces. An adequate market economy exchange must allow for
symmetric bidding with flexible expression of free choices and strategic conduct. The
exchange should, also, have a symmetric double auction mechanism that enables for fully
matching trades between e-service providers and consumers. The exchange model should
deliver adequate desirable game-theoretic and computational properties like stable social
efficiency, exchange profitability, and computational efficiency (i.e., tractability). Our
work, hence, targets the realization of the following desirable properties in the bidding
language: (1) Expressiveness: ability to flexibly, correctly and completely, represent the
semantics and structure of the bidding preferences and strategic conduct ; (2) Ease-ofuse: ability to express the semantics and structure of the bidding preferences and strategic
conduct in direct and easy manner; (3) Conciseness: ability to express the semantics and
structure of the bidding preferences and strategic conduct compactly with the least use of
notations and structure; (4) Flexibility: ability to extend the bid semantics and structure to
incorporate diverse logical rules formulae; (5) Symmetry: ability to express attributes and
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logical rules formulae of any e-service and request and ask bids in the same bidding
message; (6) Computational efficiency: ability to compute a tractable polynomial time
preference deduction, bid formation and winner determination; (7) Rapid automation:
ability to have command on the bidding lifecycle to delivering to more rapid trades, and
(8) Distributed computation: ability to distribute the computational workload between the
software agents of bidders and exchange for best resource utilization. Our work proposes
that the strategic conduct may be exhibited by logical rule and operator formulae. The
rule-based expressions allow bidders to share part of their problem constraints without
full exposure. Another compelling aspect, is the fact the rule-based expressions expedite
the trades with faster bidding lifecycle due to the automatic deduction and aggregation of
rules of action that. Hence, our work introduces the rule-based bidding language (RBBL)
for the free exchange e-marketplace that enables the flexible expression of strategic rules
of conduct as logical rule and operator formulae in the bidding structure. The RBBL is
fully symmetric that enables a simultaneous rule-based bidding, not only for buyers but
also for sellers and those of mixed roles. The RBBL empowers the free exchange to
deliberate on the logical rules and operators for automatic preference and service
deduction and bid formation that secures rapid trades.
Furthermore, the strategic and computational complexities of the exchange impossibly
theorem (Hurwicz, 1975) have motivated our work to target some relaxed (weaker)
desirable properties for an adequate fully symmetric DA. While Hurwicz strong budgetbalance is often not necessary, we can achieve adequate truthfulness, efficiency and weak
budget balance using market economy settings: (1) Allocative Efficiency (AE): that
maximizes the social utility welfare; the aggregate valuations of all buyers and sellers.
The e-services are allocated to the bidders who value them most highly (2) Incentive
Compatibility (IC): in which bidders maximize their utilities when they truthfully reveal
private information. The truthful attitude of bidders is based on their ex ante expectations,
given the mechanism outcome and their ex-post expectations, given their constant
learning at repetitive trades. In (McAfee, 1992) and (Wurman et al., 1998), however,
there is no DA that is both AE and IC; (3) Weak Budget Balance (BB): in which the total
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payment that bidder agents make is positive so the exchange doesn’t run at deficit, but
secures sufficient profits; The weak BB guarantee a fairly positive e-market profit, at
which no outside subsidy inwards or transfers outwards are required for a deal to be
reached (4) Individuals rationality (IR): in which the agent’s expected utility from using
exchange is more than that of other choices given prior beliefs about preferences of other
agents; The exchange matching do not make any bidder worse off than has the bidder not
participates, (5) Strategic equilibrium: a mechanism implement a social welfare function
at equilibrium with solution concepts that predict strategies agents will select with diverse
assumptions about rationality of agents and knowledge agents have about other agents.;
and (6) Computational tractability: extends to the polynomial time tractable performance
of the RBBL bidding, exchange deduction, bid formation and winner matching heuristics.
Generally, given bidders' preferences, an AE matching is NP-hard (Sandholm, 2008).
In summary, our work targets the stable and socially efficient matching allocation of a
class of decentralized CAP of multiple units of e-services that share identical attributes at
different Q-levels. Our work develops an expressive free exchange e-marketplace using
the RBBL rules bidding that enables the flexible expression of bidding strategic conduct.
Our work empowers the free exchange, also, with the GSPM GSP based multiple Q-level
double auctions that facilitates fully symmetric exchange trades, while delivering social
efficiency, strategic stability, computational tractability and e-market profitability.

1.4 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 presents the formal description, and analysis of the combinatorial allocation
problem. Chapter 3 expands on the related work and fundamentals. Chapter 4 introduces,
describes and analyzes the formal modelling of the rule based bidding language (RBBL)
and the inherent properties, while Chapter 5 introduces and investigates the GSPM,
generalised second price based matching double auction and the inherent economic and
computational properties. Chapter 6 describes, examines, and analyses the experimental
simulation environment and empirical findings. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of
general research issues, contributions, empirical analysis, limitations, and future outlook.
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Chapter 2

2

Problem Modeling, Analysis, and Issues

Our work in this chapter targets the formal problem modeling and analysis of a special
decentralized CAP of e-services that target the socially efficient symmetric allocation
matching of request and ask e-service assets between self-interested rational bidders. The
bidders may have conflicting goals that motivate their strategic conduct as manifested by
their varying preferences for, indeed, maximizing expected utilities, given their beliefs
about other bidder preferences. The decentralised CAP social efficiency optimizes the
aggregate valuations and utilities of request and ask bidders for any discriminatory DA
clearing prices. As the proposed DA matching mechanism is anticipated to incite the
truthful revelation of request and ask bidders as will be proven later on in our work, the
formal described and decentralized CAP assumes a truthful state of choices and rules of
conduct of bidders. Hence, the decentralized CAP may be formally reduced and modeled
as centralized CAP integer program (IP) for the winner determination problem (WDP). In
fact, the DA mechanism selects the payment rule that motivates the IC of IR bidders with
free disposal in which bidders have increasing values for e-services. The DA secures,
also, BB for e-market profitability. The CAP IP is limited, however, by constraints (i.e.,
bids, budgets), local objectives, and the proposed DA rules of encounter.
The modeled CAP targets the efficient matching of multiple units of a particular e-service
that shares identical attributes of varied attribute values and, essentially, different quality
levels (Q-levels). For instance, the e-service commodity of the digital advertising (ad)
CAP is the ad impression, that is a user single viewing of single ad, while the bidders are
the publishers and advertisers. For mobile apps, the e-service is a software application
that delivers certain functionality that run on buyers (consumers) who navigate app stores
for a required app using mobile devices, smart phones or tablet computers. The seller
(provider), however, is typically the application distribution platform such as Apple App
Store, Google Play, and BlackBerry World. With larger number of Q-levels, however, the
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CAP class may also be extended to the matching of multiple units of rather multiple
different e-services. In fact, the multiple Q-levels concept is suites e-services that often
comprise distinct attributes. While there are many e-services that share identical
functionality, it may differ in some functional or nonfunctional (i.e., software quality)
attributes. For instance, similar e-services from multiple sources would differ in their
quality of services or user acceptance or reputation score. Otherwise, some games may
differ in their functional complexity levels. In fact, the more the number of presented Qlevels, the narrower the tactical maneuverability of bidders with a Q-level solution space
that, eventually, incites a rather truthful revelations.

2.1 Combinatorial Allocation Problem Description
,

Considering the time horizon as a set of discrete decision periods

1, … ,

during

which the exchange e-marketplace collects the seller and buyer RBBL messages (i.e., eservice attributes, values, and rules), deduces the request and ask bids of the targeted
multiple e-services to be traded. The FX ranks and sorts the request and ask bids of the
selected e-services based on their valuations and Q-levels. The FX computes, the, the
efficient matching for the multiple winners. Our work assumes bidders act exclusively as
either e-service sellers or buyers, while the CAP allocation and pricing decisions are
taken off-line at the end of decision periods

,

1, … ,

,

periods. The following is a formal description of the CAP at

is number of decision
that manifests a sequence

of events (Mansour et al., 2012) as shown in the matching CAP environment of Figure 2:
1)

,…, ,…,

e-service providers

that include: (1) feature-group attributes set
combinations:
,…,

,…,

of provider

,

,…,

of attributes set

,

,…,

construct ask bids ∐〈
of provider
,

(i.e., value of

,

,

,

,

〉

that form the e-service

, (2) initial true costs set
,

is

) (3) rational rules

that direct the exchange deduction of various e-services and net

valuations of asks, (4) assigned Q-levels

set of the FX deduced ask e-services,
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and (5) expiry times

of the conveyed logical rules. The logical rule formulae

represent the rational rules of action/reaction to the e-market anticipated disruptions.
2) Simultaneously,
bids ∐〈 ,

,

,…,

e-service consumers
,

construct

, 〉 to request e-services that include: (1)
⊆

attributes of requested e-services
service attributes

,…,

attribute-group

; (2) initial true valuations

; (3) rational rules

request

of the e-

that direct the exchange deduction and

aggregation of e-services and their bids; (4) assigned Q-level

set of the FX

of the logical rules.

deduced request e-services; and (5) the expiry times

3) The exchange collects the bidding message requests and asks and exploits the
rational rules

,

FX produces

number of e-services for provider

to deduce the offered and requested e-services. Eventually, the

,…,

related Q-levels
and

,…,

,…,

,…,

levels set
⊆

The e-services
⊆

,…,

,…,

and ask bids
,…,

number of request e-services in set

,…,

,…,

,…,

with related Q,…,

and request bids set

with

,… ,

.

, is a combination of provider feature-group attributes, while

a combination of consumer attributes that are induced by the stored logical

rules, while the ask bid and request bids are the sum of the selected attribute values
and the revised valuation of the FOL active rules. That is, for the deduced request eservice

∈

∑

, the request bid net value

, i.e., the sum of

values of eligible attributes and the value adjustments of the FOL rules. Similarly,
∈

for eligible ask e-services

the ask bid values

∑

.

4) The exchange e-marketplace announces the requested e-services with Q-levels
: ∐〈 ,

and the time horizon

, 〉 to the provider bidders . The exchange also

announces the offered e-services with
,…,

consumers
FOL rules

and

,…,

set and the time horizon

: ∐〈 ,

, 〉 to

. The exchange stores the bidding attribute-values,

and their expiry times

,

while hiding the request and ask
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,

valuations

to mitigate the impact of exposure problem. The exchange signals

consumers and providers, while collecting RBBL messages during
5) At expiry of

, the exchange: (1) deduces all ask

.

and request bids

using the

RBBL attribute-values, Q-levels, logical rules and other constraints; (2) ranks all
request and ask bids based on the Q-levels; (3) sorts all request (ask) bids in
descending (ascending) orders based on their net values; and (4) computes the AE
matching allocations and pricing rules for clearing the exchange.

〉to winning bidders such that
∗

,

∗

∐〈

,

∧

,

〉

. The

are the prices for the matched pairs.
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Figure 2: Combinatorial allocation problem environment of digital services

2.2 Formal Combinatorial Allocation Problem Model
Considering the time horizon as a set of discrete decision periods during which multiple
e-services with the same attributes and different Q- levels are allocated to multiple
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winners, our work assumes the matching allocation and pricing decisions are taken offline at the end of a decision period
to implement a trade

∗

,

1, … ,

for the CAP at period

. Generally, the objective of the FX is
that delivers social efficiency. Our

work defines the social AE as the objective that maximizes the total request and asks
valuations of bidders while securing e-market profitability. Formally, let
∧

if

0, otherwise. For

and

,

the bidders have a quasi-linear utility:
buy the e-services
, ∀

e-services

∈

1

matched pairs,
for consumers who

and
,

∈

for the providers who sell the
(i.e., payments and costs).

Bidders are assumed risk

neutral in the formal model below, who pay as much as expected of an e-service with
, Q, ,

budget bounds ( ). Given instance
trade

∗

at period

maximizes the aggregate values of bids (i.e.,

, then, the CAP AE
and minimizes

) given the multiple Q-levels. That is:

the aggregate values of asks (i.e.,

That is equivalent to

.

Given quasi linear utilities of request and ask bidders :
and

0, then (1) becomes:

=

0
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Hence, the social welfare objective of the CAP in formula (1) transforms to formula (2)
that maximizes the aggregate utilities of the request and ask bidders and maximizes, also,
the net FX e-market profit that should be of a positive value at all situations. In fact, the
∧

eligible criteria of the GSPM matching (i.e.,

is that

. However, as per the GSPM forward GSP for buyers and reverse GSP for sellers the
pricing rules,

for the second bid in rank and

for matching condition, then

. Hence, the GSPM realizes AE while maximizing

the FX profitability that grows with the thick e-market. For an instance
at

,

1, … ,

,

∧

=1 if

,

;

, Q, ,

of

=0 otherwise:
∀

,

0 RBBL valuation model

;
∗

; ∀

,∀

∈

,0

GSPM DA pricing rule

, solves the following IP model of the FX CAP with an objective similar to (1) and (2):
.

. .

1, ∀ ,

1, ∀ ,

∀

∀

,∀

AE, IC

Unique Matching

Unique Matching
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.

∀,

,

Max Budget

.

0 ∀

| |,

,

,

,

∈ 0,1 ∀

,

| |

,

Weak

Cardinality

Integrality

Constraint (9) ensures integrality, while constraints (4) and (5) restrict any winning
request-bid to be assigned at most to one ask-bid of the same unique e-service attributes,
and restrict any wining ask-bid be assigned at most one request-bid of the same attributes.
Hence, the CAP turns into the generalized assignment problem known to be

-Hard;

constraints (6) and (7) ensure the weak budget balance that secures the e-marketplace
profitability, while restricting the budget boundaries (i.e.,

). Constraint (8) imposes the

multiple Q-level cardinality balance of the offered and requested (supply and demand) of
particular e-services by free disposal.

2.3 Combinatorial Allocation Problem Complexity Analysis
The CAP problem at period

, as formulated above is an instance (i.e., reduction) of a

set-packing problem (SPP) (deVries & Vohra, 2003). Given a set of
collection

of subsets with non-negative weights, find the largest weight collection of

subsets that are pairwise disjoints. Formally: let
is selected,

elements and a

0, otherwise. Let

1 if

1 if
subset of

otherwise. Then the SPP model is formulated as followed:

subset of

with weight

contains ∈

,

0,
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max

.

. .

.

∈

1, ∀ ∈

;

AE, IC

spp

Unique Maching

spp

∈

∈ 0,1 ∀

Integrality

spp

The SPP is equivalent to the IP in equations (3), (4), (5) and (9) of the exchange CAP IP
with fewer constraints. Hence, the SPP is a functional reduction of exchange CAP and
could be reduced or transformed in polynomial time (i.e., SPP

CAP). Indeed, the

exchange CAP is an instance of SPP, as noted in (Rothkopf et al., 1998) and (Sandholm,
2002). However, the SPP is, generally, NP-Hard with fairly large number of bidders,
while the recognition version is NP-complete (deVries & Vohra, 2003). Hence, the
exchange CAP is generally NP-hard, in which the computation demanded for solving
practical size problems is usually prohibitive. Hence, the exchange CAP would be
computationally intractable for thicker e-market trades of practical size of bidders and
cannot be solved using the exact approaches like Branch and Bound, Cutting planes, or
Branch and Cut. In addition, the decentralized CAP has other inherent game-theoretic and
computational challenges pertinent to the decentralized distribution of knowledge and
control, quite evident in the bidder’s rationality, strategic conduct, self-interest, decision
making autonomy, and private information and actions. The NP-hard complexity of our
CAP IP model motivates our work, hence, to adopt the rather more natural economic
based approaches for rational bidders. Our proposed mechanism has to motivate, first, the
truthful revelation of preferences and strategic rules of bidders, then computes socially
efficient matching allocations and pricing out of the modeled CAP IP based on the
truthful revelations as detailed in the next chapters. In that vein, our work investigates
how to attract bidders to be strategically truthful, not tactically manipulative, how to
develop a flexible, concise and expressive bidding messaging model that enables the free
expressions of choices and strategic conduct, and how to reach tractable closure with
rapid, efficient and stable allocations, while delivering profitability to the e-marketplace.
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2.4

Research Issues

While the prospects of the digital era are enormous, e-marketplaces are encountering
inherent and persistent game-theoretic and computational complexities that challenge the
strategic and computational efficiencies of the matching mechanisms. In addition to the
computational complexity of the centralized CAP, the distributed knowledge and control
of the decentralized CAP imposes a rather further coordination and mechanism design
complexities. The work in (Kalagnanam & Parkes, 2004) identified four areas of
computational constraints that restrict the solution space of feasible mechanisms,
including strategic, communication, valuation, and winner determination complexities. In
the context of communication complexity, our work examines the limited bidding scope
and trading conduct of e-market mechanisms that often provoke adverse strategies and
lead to e-market failures. In the context of strategic, valuation and winner determination
complexities, our work investigates, also, the inefficiencies of the symmetric exchange
mechanisms with respect to allocation and revenue models. A fundamental challenge is
the fact symmetric exchange models are hard to implement, as per Hurwicz impossibility
theorem (Hurwicz, 1975). In fact, most present exchange e-marketplaces implement a
rather single reserve price auction mechanism with the fixed reserve values of sellers.
The design of an adequate exchange, though, promotes flexible and efficient symmetric
interactions between rational bidders. In that vein, our work presents a realistic view of a
symmetric exchange that delivers stable efficiency while facilitating the flexible choices
and strategic tolerance of rational bidders. The decentralized CAP reveals, however,
some hard game-theoretic and computational complexities as the following explains:
Limited bidding conduct and language complexity: Our work identifies and examines the
potential challenges that initiate from the restricted bidding conduct and trading practices.
While complexities may justify the restrictive bidding practices, the de facto auctions are
often designed for the strategic benefit of revenue maximizing e-marketplaces. The
restrictive bidding practices, however, provokes adverse strategies of bidders that may
lead to digital market failures. Given the complex semantics and structure of interactions
in open systems, preference formation becomes a hard problem, especially if preferences
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are uncorrelated (Dash et al., 2003). The design of flexible bidding language that promote
free strategic conduct has to deliver expressiveness, ease of use, conciseness, flexibility,
and computational efficiency. Generally, the bidding model often confines agents express
preferences that impact the computational e-market model. In (Nisan, 2000), a trade-off
between the compactness and simplicity is analyzed, in which, at one extreme, there are
the bidding programs that provide methods to compute valuations, while at the other far
extreme, there are myopic bids used in iterative auction. A concise and expressive
bidding language mitigates preference elicitation and lets agents convey their valuations
compactly. The CAP would require an agent to specify 2| | – 1 bids, while few may be of
interest. The proposed rules bidding would allow for expressing the logical and operators
rule formula in the bidding structure with distinct attribute level valuations which exposes
new challenges to the bidding complexity. Our work proposes the first order logic (FOL)
for modeling the logical rules formulae. The free exchange smart preference deliberation,
deduction, aggregation and bid formation are other emerging challenges.
Mechanism design (MD) complexity: The inefficiencies of present exchange mechanisms
is understood in the context of Hurwicz impossibility theorem (Hurwicz, 1975) that states
it is impossible to implement an AE, SP and BB social welfare function in DSE in a
simple exchange and quasi-linear preferences. There are limitations related to developing
tractable mechanism design (MD), game-theoretically and computationally, that delivers
stable efficiency. For instance, while GVA is an AE SP mechanism, it is computationally
intractable as it has to solve a complex optimization problem multiple times: once to
determine the optimal matching allocation and once for each agent with its bid removed
to determine the residual payment (Wellman et al., 2001). The agents compute solution
concepts as Nash equilibrium (NE) or DSE, given information about the mechanism and
beliefs about preferences, rationality, and beliefs of other agents. A NE or DSE MD
mitigate the strategy selection problem that results in minimal agent computation (Varian,
1995), however, with limited choice of desired properties. Otherwise, an iterative-MD
(Parkes, 2001) enables bounded agents to play myopic best-response strategy and reason
about one round of the game at a time. Another approach is to select MD with
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polynomial‐time computable equilibrium (Nisan & Ronen, 2000) best‐response that
restricts strategies an agent in computing its best‐response to a knowledge subset of the
strategy space. While our work targets the stable social efficiency as adequacy objectives
for the exchange DA design, our work realizes the particular game-theoretic complexity
of o symmetric exchange in the context of Hurwicz impossibility theorem. In (McAfee,
1992) and (Wurman et al., 1998), there is no DA that is both efficient and IC.
Computational complexity: bounded computational resources impose challenges on the
software agents and the MD that may necessitate explicit approximations and restrictions.
However, approximations can change economic properties. For instance, approximating
VCG auction payment and matching allocation rules break SP. Agents, for instance, are
computationally bounded-rational when resolving the combinatorial complexity of
computing their preferences on all outcomes given other agents strategists. In fact,
solving even typical centralized CAP problems, where the number of possible bids is
exponential as the number of items is most often NP-hard (Sandholm, 2008). Agents may
use indirect iterative mechanisms (Wellman, 1993) (Parkes, 2001) and computing, rather,
a myopic best-response bundle set. Direct MD one-shot agents, however, act in a gametheoretic sense, modeling the expected effect of their actions on other agents’ actions.
Another approach formulates queries about agent valuations that relieve agents from
formulating preferences for all outcomes (Hudson & Sandholm, 2002).
In summary, our work targets a market economy based solution approach for a special
class of decentralised CAP for the matching of multiple units of e-services that may share
identical attributes and differs in quality levels. The game-theoretic and NP-hard
computational complexities of the decentralised CAP between rational self-interested
bidders in addition to the symmetric exchange inherent inefficiencies motivate selecting
the economic based solution approach. Our work targets a fully symmetric exchange emarketplace for the double auction matching of e-services that deliver fairly adequate
properties like truthfulness, social efficiency, strategic stability and market profitability in
a rather weaker sense to relax the symmetric exchange game-theoretic challenges.
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Chapter 3

3

Literature Review

Our approaches to designing adequate free exchange e-marketplace are multidisciplinary
that draw concepts from microeconomics theory that studies impact of market allocations
and pricing decision rules on bidder preferences and rational strategic conducts. Game
theory is an essential mathematical framework for studying the models of conflict and
cooperation among rational bidders. Our work exploits, also, the mechanism design
theory that examines game-theoretic solution concepts for private information settings.
The mechanism design theory uses the framework of non-cooperative games and
incentive engineering to determine how the private preferences can be elicited. The
combinatorial optimization and operation research analyze the problem computationally
and help developing tractable algorithms for the matching CAP. Software engineering is
crucial in the development and implementation of the multiagent based approaches for
the decentralized rationality and interaction. It is a natural framework for realizing agent
collaboration, rational self-interest and autonomy (Jennings, 2001) that map state history
to actions and translate strategies into outcomes. The work in this chapter reviews aspects
of the above mentioned disciplines that are relevant to the proposed free exchange model.

3.1 Bidding Languages
The bidding language relates to the efficient CAP across multiple bidders that requires
the determination of their preferences over the matching allocations and then choosing an
allocation that satisfies certain criteria. Bidders may consider bundles of substitutes or
complements or express complex preferences over combinations of items. Bidders
provide 2| | – 1 bid valuations on

items over bundles that make it a computationally

NP-hard problem (Sandholm, 2000) (Parkes, 2006). Furthermore, the complex semantics
and syntactic structure of the interactions in combinatorial open systems, turn preference
formation into a hard problem especially if preferences are uncorrelated (Dash et al.,
2003). However, combinatorial bids eliminate the “exposure problem” as in SAA
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(Milgrom, 2004). A bid defines values for matching allocations that constrain the spaces
of acceptable matching allocations. However, the bidding language often, confine agents
express preferences that impact properties of the computational e-market model. In fact,
the structure of bids, and the rules specified, often, restricts the choice of bids by bidders.
Bid structure relates closely to e-market structure. Some common bid structures are found
in (Kalagnanam & Parkes, 2004), like divisible and indivisible bids with price‐quantity
pairs, divisible bids with price schedule, , bundled bids with price‐quantity pairs and
configurable bids for multifactor items.
The e-market model has a crucial impact on the bidding language complexity. Agents
trading with iterative mechanism (Parkes, 2001) compute myopic best-response bundles
using simple bidding structure. Another approach is to formulate queries about agent
valuations (Hudson & Sandholm, 2002). Agents act in game-theoretic sense and require a
complex form of bidding to formulate preferences. A concise and expressive bidding
language mitigates preference elicitation problems and let agents communicate their
valuations compactly. The work in (Boutilier & Hoos, 2001) (Boutilier, 2002),
introduced two forms of logical bidding,

and

that allow for logical formulae of

requests and asks where goods present atomic propositions (i.e., substitutes), combined
using logical connective, with a price of formulae. The

logical bidding (Nisan, 2000)

(Sandholm, 2000) uses bundles with related prices as atomic propositions combined
using logical connectives. The additive‐or
bid price is the sum of the bidder bid prices.

has one or more disjoint bids, and the total
, is compact for particular valuations, but

not expressive for general valuations. In exclusive‐or

bids state that at most one bid

can be accepted. The total bid price is the value of the maximal bid price across the
bundles when multiple bundles are accepted. One can also consider nested languages, as
OR‐of‐XORs and XOR‐of‐ORs, and a generalization,

∗

(Nisan, 2006) that supports

constraints using phantoms, dummy goods, within atomic bids to provide more
expressiveness and compactness.
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The TBBL, tree-based bidding language (Cavallo et al., 2005) is a concise and expressive
tree-structured bidding language that uses the interval to choose (IC) logical operator for
internal nodes to combine bundles, while the leafs represent single items, facilitating by
which a symmetric bidding for buyers and sellers. The TBBL allows agents to specify
bounds on their true values for trades, to be refined during bidding. Computationally, the
TBBL can be captured, concisely, in IP for the matching allocation problem. The TBBL
uses IC operators to provide more concise representations than OR∗ or
is equivalent to an AND;

is equivalent to an OR, and

. The

is equivalent to XOR

operator. Computationally, the TBBL can be captured, concisely, in an integer program
(IP) for the CAP. The TBBL has an IC logical operator on internal nodes coupled with
semantics for propagating values within the tree. The TBBL uses IC operators to provide
more concise representations than OR∗ or

(Boutilier & Hoos, 2001) (Nisan, 2006)

(see Figure 3). Leafs of the tree are annotated with traded items and all nodes are
annotated with changes in values. For bid tree
tree, and

∈

with operator
the impression

⊆

the value specified at node . Let

nodes representing leafs of

and

. Each leaf

∈

from bidder , let

⊆

node in the
the subset of

the children of . All nodes are labeled

is labeled as a buy or sell, with units
, ′

associated with leaf , and

,

∈

for

0 otherwise. Same impression j

may simultaneously occur in multiple leafs of the tree, given the semantics of the tree.
, node ( and

are non-negative integers) indicates the bidder is willing to pay

for the satisfaction of at least
multiple parents DAG or using

and at most

of her children. An extended TBBL (i.e.,

operator) subsumes both

∗

and

, and is more

expressive. TBBL can express XOR, OR and XOR/OR languages (Nisan, 2006).
with

children is equivalent to an AND operator;

operator; and
Given a tree

is equivalent to an OR

is equivalent to XOR operator.
, the (change in) value of a trade

is defined as the sum of the values on

all satisfied nodes, where the set of satisfied nodes is chosen to provide the maximal total
value. Let

∈ 0, 1 denote whether node

in tree

of bidder

is satisfied,
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,∀

if
∀ ∈

∈

, is valid for

and trade

∈

,

:

,

\

∈

∈

,

, means the total number of units of each item requested across all

satisfied leafs is no greater than the total number of units awarded in the trade, that is:
,

,

∀ ∈

∈

Given the constraints formulated in above two equations, the total value of trade
bid-tree

given

from bidder , is defined as the solution to an optimization problem:
,

∈

max

,

∈

Figure 3: An OR*, LGB and TBBL bidding instance
In the

requirement bidding (Wang et al., 2009) the atomic propositions attach value to

the job scheduling problem, given a performance requirement is satisfied. With timeline
discretization, agents can express time related scheduling requirements, such as release
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times, due dates, indirectly by attaching values to various time units combinations, that
could be NP‐hard. As shown Figure 4, the

Atomic proposition (root tree nodes)

consists mainly of a requirement (level-1 node) for completing a set of Jobs (level-2
node) according to a Performance in SX (level-2 node) and a Price (level-1 node), an
agent willing to pay for requirement. Performance is defined by a Measure (level-3 node)
and Level (level-3 node). An Atomic proposition is represented by a 4‐tuple leafs
Jobs, Measure, Level, Price

.

Figure 4: Requirement bidding model for job shop scheduling problem

3.2 Game-Theoretic Concepts
Game theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953) (Nash Jr., 1951) is the most reliable
theoretical framework to investigating the states of the self-interested agents in conditions
of strategic interaction. This is in comparison to many robust tools for analyzing decision
making in decentralized systems with multiple autonomous agents. Blending these tools
for computational settings, provide a basis for building multiagent systems (MAS) that
exploits computational mechanism design by applying the microeconomic principles to
computer systems design (Dash et al., 2003). Agents, often, represent distinct bidders
with potentially conflicting goals that seek to maximize own gains, and leads, hence, to
the strategic analysis of uncooperative games, through which a designer can impose only
the protocols of a mechanism but can’t control which strategies agents will implement.
The game theoretic analysis considers the following basic concepts and assumptions: An
agent

∈

holds private information about its preferences of type

types set, determines preference (i.e., agent’s value) for an outcome

∈

of possible
over a set of
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different outcomes of a game. The preferences

are general when they provide a

complete and transitive preference ordering ≻ on outcomes. An ordering is complete if
for all

,

∈ , we have

,

,

∈ , if

all

≻

≻

or

≻

and

≻

then

(or both). An ordering is transitive if for
≻

which there is a discrete set of possible outcomes

. A general environment is one in
and agents have general preferences.

. determines preferences over own strategy and other agent

The agent’s utility

strategies, given its type θ , and expresses utility as

,

∈ ,

for outcome

of the

set of possible outcomes that define payments or costs and matching allocations. Agent
prefers outcome
(i.e.,

≻

∶Θ →

,

iff

,

)

∈

). The strategy of agent

of agent’s possible strategies set given

, is a contingent plan or

decision rule(s) that defines actions an agent will chose for every state of the world. In
∈∆

addition to pure strategy, an agent can have mixed or stochastic strategy

,a

probability distribution over pure strategies. The game (i.e., auction) is a set of actions
(i.e., bids) available to an agent and a mapping from agent strategies to an outcome. An
agent's utility

… ,

,

depends on agent strategies that realize strategic

interdependence. The agent rationality relates to expected utility maximizing at which an
agent selects a strategy that maximizes its expected utility, given the preferences

over

outcomes, beliefs about strategies of other agents, and the structure of the game.
Σ , … , Σ , (.))

The mechanism

Σ,

, is a protocol of social interactions that

defines set of strategies Σ available to each agent, an outcome rule : Σ
and payment rule : Σ

…

Σ →

choice function (SCF)

. The mechanism

,…,

∈

implements a social

if the outcome computed with equilibrium agent strategies is

a solution to the SCF for all possible agent preferences i.e.,
,∀

Σ →

, such that ( ) is the outcome implemented by the
…

mechanism for strategy profile

…

…

, where strategy profile

solution to the game induced by

∗

,…,

∗
∗

,…,

∗

) is an equilibrium

. The mechanism, together with the agent types,

defines a game. Agents are assumed autonomous and economically rational that selects a
best-response strategy to maximize their expected utility in equilibrium with other agents,
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means no agent benefit from unilateral deviation. The mechanism design (MD) problem
is to design a set of possible agent strategies (e.g. bid at least the ask price) and an
outcome rule (e.g. match highest bid with lowest ask) to implement a SCF with desirable
properties based on agent’s strategies. A desirable property is a solution concept as
strong as possible. Dominance is preferred to Bayesian-Nash as it makes less assumption
about agents. Game theory analyzes the outcome of a mechanism. Generally, in auction
theory and MD, agents are risk neutral and have quasi-linear utility functions.
The quasi-linear utility function for agent
∈

Outcome

by the agent. The type
∈

∈

defines a choice

of type

,

is

,

.

from a discrete choice set and a transfer payment

defines valuation function

for choice

∈

. In fact,

transfer payments to the

represent matching allocations (outcomes), and

auctioneer. Risk neutrality states an expected utility maximizing agent pay as much as the
expected value of an item. With quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of a SCF is divided
∈

into a choice
,…,

∀

∀agent , i.e.,

and a transfer

,

…

. The outcome rule,

( ), in a mechanism with quasi-linear agent

preferences, has a selected choice rule,

from the choice set given strategy profile ,

and selected payment rule
Σ ,…,Σ ,

mechanism

for agent given strategy profile . Hence, a quasi-linear
.

Σ ,…,Σ ,

Σ available to each agent; a choice rule : Σ
implemented for strategy profile

,…,

for each agent , to compute her payment

. ,
…

. ,…,

Σ →

.

defines strategy set

, such that

; and transfer rules : Σ

is the choice
…

Σ →

,

. Properties of SCFs implemented by a

mechanism can be stated separately, for both the choice selected and the payments.
,

The SCF

is Allocative-efficient (AE) if ∀

∈

,…,

efficient matching allocation maximizes total value of all agents ∑
∑

,

,∀

∈

. A Mechanism

mechanism selects the choice

is AE if it implements an AE SCF
∈

, an
,
. The

that maximizes total agents value.

Computationally, achieving AE is a hard computational problem (NP-complete). Yet,
there are efficient algorithms that approximate maximum social welfare that gives a SCF
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that approximates social welfare maximization, however, is different from it. A SCF
is Budget-balanced (BB) if ∀

∈

,…,

the system or into the system, i.e., ∑
,…,

, there are no net transfers out of
is weakly BB if ∀

0. A SCF

∈

, a net payment can be made from agents to the mechanism, but no net

payment from the mechanism to the agents, i.e., ∑

0. A Mechanism

is

BB if the equilibrium net transfers to the mechanism are non-negative for all
agent preferences, while

is

BB if the equilibrium net transfers to the

mechanism are balanced in expectation for a distribution over agent preferences. An AE
and BB imply Pareto optimality or Pareto efficiency. Given an initial matching allocation
of items among a set of agents, a change to a different matching allocation that makes at
least one agent better off without making any other agent worse off is a Pareto
improvement. An matching allocation is Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal if no further
Pareto improvements can be made. In other words, a SCF

is Pareto optimal if it

implements outcomes for which no alternative outcome is strongly preferred by at least
one agent, and weakly preferred by other agents ∀
∃ ∈

′,

optimal SCF

,

′

,

,

′,

⟹

. A Pareto optimal mechanism implements a Pareto

. This is ex post Pareto optimality; i.e., the outcome is Pareto optimal

for the specific agent types. At ex ante Pareto optimality is, there is no outcome that at
least one agent strictly prefers and all other agents weakly prefer in expectation.
The Individual-rationality (IR), or “voluntary participation" constraints, allows an agent,
to decide whether or not to participate. It places constraints on the level of expected
utility that an agent receives from participation. A mechanism
∀preferences
,

it implements a SCF
is the expected utility for agent

information about the preferences
for non-participation. A mechanism

with

,

is interim IR if
, where

at the outcome, given distributional

of other agents, and

is the expected utility

, is ex post IR if agent's expected utility from

participation is at least its best outside utility ∀

possible agent types, given prior beliefs

about the preferences of other agents, a more suitable mechanism if agent can withdraw
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once learns the outcome. A mechanism

, is ex ante IR if agent chooses to participate

before it even knows its own preferences; states that agent's expected utility in the
mechanism, averaged over all possible preferences, must be at least its expected utility
without participating, also averaged over all possible preferences (Parkes, 2001).
Weak Monotonicity (WMON): A SCF
′,

satisfies WMON if ∀ , ∀
′

implies that

′

→

,

. If the social choice changes

when a player changes valuation, then player must have increased more his value relative
to his value of the old choice. If a mechanism

,

…

, is IC then

satisfies WMON.

If all domains of preferences

are convex sets then for every SCF that satisfies WMON

∃

is IC. The WMON condition is a local condition for each

…

such that

,

…

player separately and for each
extreme cases: when

separately. For global characterisation, there are two

is unrestricted and when severely restricted as to be essentially

single dimensional. The intermediate range where the

’s are somewhat restricted, a

range in which most computationally interesting problems lie, is still wide open.

3.3 Equilibrium Solution Concepts
A major objective of implementing, economic based MD techniques is to mitigate the
computational limitations. In fact, economics and computations, often, intertwined, in a
way, that facilitates resolving mutual problems. For instance, an economic equilibrium
strategy may lead to intractable computational solution approach. Similarly, an economic
truth-revealing equilibrium MD, may lead to optimal computationally tractable solution.
In fact, the blend of MD economic and computing techniques to developing efficient
mechanisms (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2002) is a potential research space. In that vein, the
game theoretic MD investigates solution concepts for private information games, and
often solved by a truth revealing strategy. A mechanism

,

may implement a

SCF in equilibrium with diverse solution concepts that predicts strategies an agent select.
Each solution concept differs in assumptions about agents’ rationality and knowledge
agents have about other agents. The main solution concepts may be tabled as followed:
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Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE): Each agent has a best-response strategy no matter
what
∀

other
,∀

,∀

∈

. For

,

,

,

,

strategies of player , ∀

and

,

as (1) strict, if
least one

strategies S ∗

agent

,

,

domination is classified

,

;(2) weak if

,

,

and for at

,

; and (3) very weakly if

,

. If

a strategy dominates all others, then it is (strongly, weakly or very weakly) dominant.
The DSE provides a robust solution concept as agents don’t form beliefs about other
agents’ rationality or distribution over other agent types. The single item second price
auction is a DSE implementation, as agents truthfully reveal bid values.
,

Nash equilibrium (NE): (Nash Jr., 1951): A strategy profile

is a best response strategy to other agents, given their types and

all agents ,
strategies

is at NE if, for

∗

:

,

max

,

∗

,∀

,∀

∈

,∀ .

Nash equilibrium is a stable strategy profile: no agent would want to change his strategy
if she knew what strategies the other agents were following. ∀ , ∀ ,
,

strategy profile occurs if,
occurs if

,

,

,

, and

,, a strict Nash

and a weak Nash strategy profile

is not a strict Nash equilibrium. Mixed‐strategy

Nash equilibrium is necessarily always weak, while pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium can
be either strict or weak, depending on the game.
Ex post Nash equilibrium: requires common knowledge about the agents’ rationality but
doesn’t require any knowledge about type distributions. In this sense, ex post Nash has a
no-regret property and an agent doesn’t want to deviate from its strategy even once it
knows the other agents’ types. English auction is an example of ex post Nash
implementation (McAfee & McMillan, 1987), with direct bidding IC strategy of ask price
whenever

for value

, as long as other IC agents are direct. However, direct
…

bidding is not DSE (e.g. with jump bids). Formally, a profile of strategies
post-Nash equilibrium if ∀
full information game. ∀ ,
Ex-post Nash requires

…

…

,
…

, ′:

,

be a best response to

is at ex-

are in Nash equilibrium in the
,

)
∀

,

′

,

).

, without knowing
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but only knowing the forms of the other players’ strategies
Let
′

…

as functions.

be an ex-post-Nash equilibrium of game ∑ . . . ∑ ; Θ … Θ ;
|

∈Θ ,

…

is DSE in game ∑′ . . . ∑′ ; Θ … Θ ;

…

…

. If

.

Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE): Agents select best-response strategies and announce
types

∈ Θ to maximize their expected utility given their beliefs about the common

prior about distributional information of other agent types, and assuming other agents are
following expected-utility best-response maximizing strategies, announced type
not equal true type:

∗

max

,

,

∗

,∀

need
∈

.

BNE is the weakest solution concept adopted in MD. In a BNE, every agent must hold
both beliefs about other agents’ rationality and correct beliefs about the distribution on
types of other agents. An example of BNE implementation is the first price sealed-bid
auction. Comparing BNE with NE, the key difference is that agent ′ strategy
must be a best response to the distribution over strategies of other agents. A refined
solution concept is perfect BNE as applied to dynamic games of incomplete information
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). Strict incomplete information means no probabilistic
information captured in the model, called also “pre-Bayesian”.
Pareto optimality: Strategy profile is Pareto optimal,
does not exist another strategy profile

∈

that Pareto dominates . A Strategy profile

Pareto dominates strategy profile (not action profile)
there exists some

∈

strictly Pareto efficient, if there

for which

if ∀ ∈

,

, and

, means in a given Pareto‐dominated

strategy profile some player can be made better without making any other player worse
off. Every game must have at least one optimum.
Other Solution Concepts (Leyton-Brown & Shoham, 2008): (a) Maxmin: a strategy of
player in an n‐player, general‐sum game that maximizes ’s worst‐case payoff in hostile
situations where all other players play the strategies that cause the greatest harm to . The
maxmin value or security level of the game for player

is max min

,

, that

minimum amount of payoff guaranteed by a maxmin strategy, while the maxmin strategy
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is arg max min

,

; (b) Minmax: A useful strategy when we want to consider

the amount that one player can punish another without regard to his own payoff. the
minmax strategy for player against player
arg min

max

,

is

a mixed‐strategy profile

in the

, where‐j denotes the set players other than . The minmax

value for player j is min

max

,

; (c) Minimax Regret: In settings in which the

other agent is not believed to be malicious, but is entirely unpredictable, it makes sense
for agents to care about minimizing their worst‐case loss, rather than maximizing their

‐Nash; reflects the idea that players might not care about

worst‐case payoff; (d)

changing their strategies to a best response when the amount of utility that they could
gain by doing so is very small. This leads us to the idea of ‐Nash equilibrium: Fix
0. A strategy profile
strategies

is an
,

,

‐Nash equilibrium if, for all agents
,

and for all

; and (e) Evolutionarily stable strategy:

Roughly, a mixed strategy that resists invasion by new strategies.

3.4 Direct Revelation and Incentive Compatibility
The direct revelation makes direct claims about preferences (i.e., reporting types). A
direct-revelation mechanism (DRM) is a mechanism in which the only strategic action of
an agent is to make direct claim
Σ …Σ ,

.

, coordinates amongst agents with strategy sets Σ

outcome rule : Σ
,…,

about preferences. Formally, the DRM

…

Σ → , which selects an outcome

∀ , and delivers
given reported types

. The revelation principle stated under weak conditions any mechanism

can be transformed into an equivalent incentive-compatible (IC) DRM (i.e., the SCF is
IC if it cannot be manipulated), such that it implements the same SCF, a theoretic key
concept for analysis of impossibility and possibility results (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The
revelation principle for DSE implementation states any SCF that is implementable in
DSE is implementable in strategy proof (SP) mechanism, which focuses attention at
DRMs. If

implements SCF . in dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) then

. is

truthfully implementable in DSE, i.e., SP mechanism (i.e., the SCF is SP if it never
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rewards agents for pretending preferences other than true ones). An IC-DRM
strategy-proof (SP) if truth-revelation is DSE. A mechanism

is

is coalition-proof if truth

revelation is a DSE for any coalition of agents, where a coalition is able to make side
payments and re-distribute items after the mechanism terminates. An SP-DRM satisfies
conditions : 1 ∀ , ∀
,

,∃

∈

,

does not depend on

, ∀ ∈ , such that ∀

optimal for each player, ∀ ,

,

, where

implements SCF

, but only on chosen outcome
,

∈

⊆

, is the outcome rule of a mechanism. The
:Α →

is set of possible valuation functions for agent . A DRM

Nash IC (BNE-IC) if truth-revelation is BNE. If a DRM
BNE, then

(2)

. An IC-DRM

preference of each agent is modeled by a valuation function
.

,

→

∈

, where

is Bayesian-

implements the SCF

.

in

. is truthfully implementable in a BNE-IC DRM. In BNE implementation,

though, the distribution over agent types is common knowledge to the DRM, and agents.
The revelation principle was, initially, formulated for DSE (Gibbard, 1973), and later
extended by (Green & Laffont, 1977) (Myerson, 1981). The outcome rule in the SP
mechanism,

∶

…

→ , equal to the SCF

. . DSE revelation principle

suggests that to identify which SCFs are implementable in DSEs, just identify functions
. for which truth-revelation is a DSE for agents in a DRM with outcome rule

.

. . In the absence of dummy bidders (i.e., false naming) or collusion, the second-price
sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction is an SP DRM for the single-item matching allocation
problem. The revelation principle states what can be achieved and what cannot, without
stating the computational structure to achieve a particular set of properties. The IC
captures the essence of MD, to minimizing the impact of agents’ rationality, learning,
tactical and strategic self-interest in order to achieving a stable efficiency at economic
and computational levels, given the bounded-computation and combinatorial complexity.
The SP is a useful game-theoretic and computation property, at which DSE is robust to
assumptions about information and rationality of agents. An agent, also, computes
optimal strategy without modeling preferences and strategies of other agents. The SP-
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DRM Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism is a possibility that maximizes social
welfare. However, the SP-DRMs are often expensive for agents because they place high
demands on information revelation. In fact complete information revelation must be
avoided in solving the combinatorial allocation problem (CAP), because agents often
have hard combinatorial valuation problems to compute their value for any single
outcome, and there are an exponential number of possible outcomes (deVries & Vohra,
2003). Iterative mechanism can sometimes implement DRM but with less information
revelation and agent computation. In fact, computing NE in a game is difficult. It is even
more difficult for BNE across games in which agents, owing to their continuous types,
can play an infinite number of strategies (Nisan, 2000) (Reeves & Wellman, 2003).
Designing IC mechanisms can mitigate strategy selection problem, especially, using DSE
implementations. Other approaches include designing mechanisms using models of
computationally limited agents. In the former model, the DSE MD require minimal agent
computation (Varian, 1995). However, would be a non-realistic solution concept, given
challenges, as rationality, self-interest, strategic qualities.

3.5 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms
The VCG mechanisms (Vickrey, 1961) (Clarke, 1971) (Groves, 1973) are one-shot
DRMs that provide DSE solutions to the CAP. The mechanism aligns the incentives of
bidder agents with the system-wide objective of computing an efficient allocation. In
fact, VCG mechanisms are, also, the only AE and SP mechanisms for agents with quasilinear preferences and general valuation functions, amongst DRMs (Green & Laffont,
1977). The VCG mechanisms however, are not BB and often clear with deficit. In fact,
one impossibility result, the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem (Mas-Colell et al., 1995),
shows no AE and BB mechanism can exist in many settings, including simple exchange.
In special cases, however, VCG mechanisms are IR and satisfy weak BB, as in VCG for
CA. Often, BB is compromised with efficiency loss. Approaches to addressing the BB
problem include adjusting payments to get close to VCG payments but retain BB (Parkes
et al., 2001) and IC. However, the explicit clearing of exchanges sub-optimally sacrifices
some of AE in return for BB (McAfee, 1992). The revelation principle extends this
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uniqueness to general mechanisms, direct or indirect (i.e., iterative). This uniqueness
extends to GSP to achieve AE in DSE implementation must implement a VCG outcome.
Consider a set of possible allocations,
,

,

and

,

,

is her payment given type

and agents with quasi-linear utility functions

,

agent's

∈

that express her valuation function. In a DRM

for quasi-linear preferences, the outcome rule
∶

rule
agent

…

→

max

∈

∑

,…,

;

,

,

is presented in terms of choice
∶

, and payment rule

reports type

∈

value for matching allocation

…

→

, ∀ . In VCG,

. The VCG choice rule

∗

maximizes total reported value over all agents. The VCG
∗

∑

payment rule is defined as

,

:

,

→

is arbitrary

function on the reported types of every agent except i. In fact, different choices of
arbitrary function h make different tradeoffs across BB and IR.
VCG mechanisms are AE and SP for agents with quasi-liner preferences. SP insures DSE
truth-revelation, from which AE follows with
∗

∗

∗

,

∑
∗

,

,

∑

,

∈

,

∗

;

,

∑
,

,

by announcing

to explicitly solve:

∈

is the DSE of agent i, whatever reported types
.

∑

∗

,

solves:

the outcome selected by DRM.
is on , and the agent can maximize

The only effect of the agent's announced type
,

. Then

,

is independent of agent i's reported type; truth-revelation

Since

∗

∈

as then the mechanism computes
,

∑

,

. Truth-revelation

by other agents. The effect of payment

is to “internalize the externality" placed on other agents

by reported preferences of agent , hence aligns incentives with system-wide goal for AE;
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The Pivotal, or Clarke, mechanism (Clarke, 1971) is a VCG mechanism in which the
payment rule

is set to achieve (ex post) IR, and weak BB in an AE SP

mechanism, when choice-set monotonicity, no negative externalities, and no single-agent
effect hold with quasi-linear agent preferences. In fact, the payment rule
∗

∑

∗

,

∈

∑

,

delivers optimal social choice
,

without agent . Then each agent makes payment
,

is total reported value of

∗

\

and

–

–

is total reported value

∗

\

without

agent . The first two terms of the payment align an agent’s incentives with VCG and
make truth-revelation a DSE. In equilibrium, each agent receives as utility the marginal
value it contributes to the system. The Clarke mechanism is Ex post IR when two
(sufficient) conditions hold on agent preferences: (1) Choice set monotonicity: feasible
choice set

(weakly) increases as additional agents are introduced to the system; means

an agent cannot “block" a selection, and (2) No negative externalities: Agent i has non∗

negative value, i.e.,
agent , ∀ and all

,

0 for any optimal solution choice,

∗

without

, means any choice not involving an agent has neutral (or positive)

effect on that agent. Assume truth-revelation in equilibrium, and prove the total transfers
are non-negative, such that the mechanism does not require a subsidy, i.e., ∑
∀ ∈ Θ:
∗

∑

∗

,
∑

,

with agents

∗

∑

,
,

∗

,

∑

0
∗

,

0 is non-negative ∀ , because any choice

is also feasible with all agents (monotonicity), and has just as much

total value (no negative externalities). The Clarke mechanism also achieves weak budgetbalance in special-cases. A sufficient condition is the no single-agent effect: For any
collective choice
max

∈

∑

,

that is optimal in some scenario with all agents, i.e.,
, for some

∈ Θ then for all there must exist another choice

that is feasible without and has as much value to the remaining agents

. In words,

the no single-agent effect condition states that any one agent can be removed from an
optimal system-wide solution without having a negative effect on the best choice
available to the remaining agents. As soon as there are buyers and sellers in a market, we
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very quickly lose even weak BB with Groves-Clarke mechanisms. The BB problem in a
combinatorial exchange is addressed in (Parkes et al., 2001) including a number of
methods to trade-off strategy-proofness and allocative efficiency for budget balance.
The Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) applies the Pivotal mechanism on the CAP.
Let’s allocate set
∅,

⊆

of to

where

is an allocation of a bundle to agent . Given type
,

quasi-linear utility function,
,

Let
∗

.
max

…

The

,

,
AE

∑∈

∩

∩

and payment

the

=∅, ∀

:

, each agent has

for bundle

maximize

s.t.

∗

,…,

agents. The set of choices

total

.

value:

. The Pivotal mechanism

applied to this problem is a sealed-bid CA, often called the GVA. The GVA is AE, SP, IR,
∈

and weak BB for agents with quasi-linear preferences in the CAP. Each agent
submits a (possibly untruthful) valuation function,
rule computes

∗

to the auctioneer. The outcome

, the allocation that maximizes reported value over all agents. In the

GVA, this is equivalent to the auctioneer solving a winner determination problem (WDP)
maximize reported value. Let

∗

∗

∗

to solving the CAP with reported values and computing allocation

…

denote the total value of this allocation. Allocation

∗

) to
∗

is

the allocation implemented by the auctioneer. The payment rule in the Pivotal mechanism
also requires the auctioneer solve the CAP with each agent
compute

∗

, the best allocation without agent . Let

best allocation, and

∗

denote this second-

denote its value. Finally, from Groves-Clarke payment rule
∗

∑
∗

taken out in turn to
∗

,

∑

;

∗
∗

, the auctioneer compute agent 's payment:

,
∑

∗

.

An agent pays the marginal negative effect that its participation has on the (reported)
value of the other agents. Equivalently, the Vickrey payment can be formulated as a
discount ∆
Vickrey discount ∆

∗

from its bid price,
∗

∗

;

∗

∗

i.e.,
∗

∑

∗

∆

for

. AE and SP

follow from the properties of the Groves mechanism. Weak BB holds; given all agents
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pay non-negative amounts to the auctioneer, while IR holds as agents pay no more than
their values for bundles they receive; Alternatively, one can verify that conditions choiceset monotonicity, no negative externalities, and no single-agent effect hold for the CAP.

3.6 Impossibility and Possibility Results
Impossibility theorems sketch the properties that no mechanism can achieve with rational
agents in certain environments. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem
(Gibbard, 1973) (Satterthwaite, 1975) shows for adequate rich preferences on outcomes,
it is impossible to implement a satisfactory non-dictatorial SCF in DSE. A SCF is
dictatorial if one (or more) agents always receive one of its most-preferred outcomes. In
fact, all dictatorial SCFs are SP (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). However, the impossibility
theorem may not hold if there are: (1) additional constraints that relax agent preferences
(e.g. quasi-linear) and reduce the onto (one to one) preference mapping to the outcomes,
or (2) weaker implementation concept as the practical Bayesian Nash implementation. In
fact, the e-market settings make implementation easier.
The Hurwicz impossibility theorem (Hurwicz, 1975) states it is impossible to implement
an AE SP and BB SCF in DSE e-market settings of simple exchange economy with
quasi-linear preferences, even without requiring IR. (Green & Laffont, 1977) demonstrate
no AE and SP mechanism can be safe from manipulation by coalitions, even in quasilinear environments. The general impossibility result follows from (Green & Laffont,
1977) (Hurwicz, 1975) established no member of the Groves family of mechanisms has
BB, and that the Groves family is the unique set of SP implementation rules in a simple
exchange economy. The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem (Myerson, 1983)
strengthens Hurwicz impossibility to include Bayesian-Nash implementation, if interim
IR is required. It states that it is impossible to achieve AE, BB and IR in a BN IC
mechanism, even with quasi-linear utility functions. An immediate consequence of this
result is that we can only hope to achieve at most two of AE, IR and BB in a e-market
with quasi-linear agent preferences, even if we look for BN implementation.
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A positive result is the VCG mechanisms, which are AE (but not BB) SP mechanisms in
quasi-linear domains that clearly exhibit it is possible to implement non-dictatorial SCFs
in more restricted domains of preferences. However, they are not efficient and strong BB.
The possibility results are outlined by agent preferences, the equilibrium solution concept
and the environment or problem domain. Contrary to impossibility results, for possibility
results a strong implementation concept is more useful than a weak implementation, e.g.
dominant is preferred to Bayesian-Nash, and a general environment such as an exchange
is preferred to a more restricted environment such as a combinatorial auction. Groves
mechanisms are consistent with the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem because
agent preferences are not general but quasi-linear; and Groves mechanisms are consistent
with the Hurwicz/Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorems because strong BB does
not hold. Groves’ mechanisms are not strong BB. This failure of strong BB is acceptable
in some domains; e.g., in one-sided combinatorial auctions with single seller and multiple
buyers it may be acceptable to achieve weak BB and transfer net payments to the seller.

3.7 Economic Based Mechanisms
The economic based e-market mechanisms are well rooted in the microeconomics theory,
particularly in general equilibrium theory and mechanism design. The economic activity
takes place in a setting of institutions that range from relatively simple arrangements, to
complex structures (i.e., mechanisms). A mechanism models the institutions (market
rules of encounter) that govern economic activities amongst rational agents with, often,
private information to achieve the desired social goals. In fact, the economic based
mechanisms are natural to respecting autonomy and information decentralization in open
systems. Inherently, while mechanisms of interaction can be imposed from the society,
agents have control over their own actions and chose their own strategies in response to
the mechanism imposed. Hence, the economic theory addresses the strategic implications
of agent’s distributed private information, often manipulated for private advantage, where
a mechanism is modeled as a game form. The desired outcome is given by a social goal
function (SCF). A game form (i.e., mechanism) implements a SCF “rules of a game” if
its equilibrium coincides with outcome (i.e., optimal system-wide solution) specified by
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the SCF in the specified game theoretic solution concept, given the risk of the strategic
manipulation of private information. Theoretically, in microeconomics, there are two
approaches to modeling agent behavior: (1) Game-theoretic mechanism design (MD), in
which agents’ best-response strategy to each other drives equilibrium state, at which
agents cannot benefit from unilateral deviations to alternative strategies. Generally, the
game theoretical MD investigates solution concepts for private information games, in
which the game structure directs the game's outcome. The mechanism design theory uses
the framework of non-cooperative games with incomplete information and investigates
how the private preference information can be elicited. In fact, mechanism design can be
viewed as reverse engineering of games or equivalently as the art of designing the rules
of a game to achieve specific desired outcome. (2) Price-taking-CE, in which agents’
myopic best-response to the current price drives equilibrium state, without modeling
either the strategies of other agents or the effect of its own actions on the future states.
The computational MD (CMD), however, resolves the challenge between game-theoretic
and computational approaches. For instance, some best game-theoretic solutions provide
computational benefits, as in DSE implementation. However, every agent must compute
and reveal its complete preferences over all possible outcomes. While DSE is useful
game-theoretically, it is intractable computationally (Parkes, 2001). In fact, the economic
MD for decentralized optimization problem exposes number of computational problems.
Costly computations at network and distributed processing and inherent combinatorial
complexity can burden implemented game-theoretic mechanisms. Yet, self-interest and
computation interact in non-obvious ways, while approximate solutions can destroy IC
properties of a mechanism, software agent bounded rationality affect MDs that cannot be
manipulated without agent solving an intractable problem (Parkes, 2001). An efficient
mechanism must control the computational costs of the mechanism infrastructure and the
computational costs of the agents, while retaining useful game-theoretic properties that
handle agent self-interest. In (Kalagnanam & Parkes, 2004) the exchange should consider
resources, market structure, preference structure; bid structure matching supply to
demand e-market clearing and information feedback for direct or an indirect mechanisms.
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In (Wellman et al., 2001), for instance, e-market mechanisms solve distributed resource
allocation problems as in market-oriented programming (MOP (Wellman, 1995)). Agents
require and produce resources, for which their decision problem is to evaluate the tradeoffs of acquiring different resources using e-market prices. CMD specifies configuration
of resources traded, and the mechanism that decides prices. Message of bids and prices
are, also, concise between agents and the e-market mechanism. In fact, price systems can
minimize the number of messages required to determine Pareto optimal allocations. Some
mechanisms, furthermore, can elicit the information necessary to achieve Pareto optima
in well-characterized situations, though. For instance, while first and second welfare
theorems (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) secure strong performance of market mechanisms,
results are formally restricted to special cases. Also, scheduling problems often exhibit
complementarities, which violate conditions for welfare theorems or e-market protocols.
The MD sets incentives to induce the actions that deliver specific performance and
economize on resources that operate the institutions (i.e., informationally efficient
mechanisms) (Hurwicz & Reiter, 2006). The incentive theory tackles the private
information problem, either of unobserved agent action, the case of moral hazard or
hidden action; or ignored agent private knowledge, the case of adverse selection or
hidden knowledge (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). The MD determines the economic
incentives to encouraging agent truthful response that leads to best social solutions. The
MD elicits the private information to select a desirable system wide outcome, despite the
self-interested agents, through providing enough structure to enable strong theoretical
claims about strategies agents will select and the optimality properties of final solutions.
In fact, microeconomics, computer science and game theory empower research design of
algorithmic solutions that optimize agent utilities in decentralised strategic settings. The
following is a brief description of some well-known economic based mechanisms:
The Combinatorial Auctions (CA) determine the efficient allocations in settings with
multiple items and agents that wish to express complements and substitutes across items
(i.e.,, “I only want A if I can also get B” or “I only want AB or CD”). CA is implemented
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in many settings, including wireless spectrum rights allocation, takeoff and landing slots
at airports, and multiagent planning (deVries & Vohra, 2003). For allocative efficiency,
the VCG mechanism provides an economic solution to the CA problem (CAP). The
agents must submit bids on all item combinations. The central controller solves, then, a
winner-determination problem (WDP) to determine the allocation that maximizes the
reported value given agent bids. Buyers pay their bid prices for the bundles they receive
in the efficient allocation, minus the Vickrey discount. However, the VCG mechanism
for the CAP has several undesirable computational characteristics. The WDP in CA is
NP-hard and difficult to approximate i.e., equivalent to weighted set-packing problem
(deVries & Vohra, 2003). Furthermore, it is totally centralized, with all agents reporting
their complete and exact valuations to the auctioneer center and the center-solving
| |

1 WDPs to determine the allocation and payments.

The Double Auction (DA) is, often, used for the exchange mechanisms, in application
such as stock markets (i.e., NYSE), commodity markets (i.e., CME), etc. The DA allows
multiple buyers and sellers to trade simultaneously or sequentially at either continuous
(CDA) or periodic (Call) clear e-market (Shubik, 2005). Given the supply and demand of
sellers and buyers, A DA matches request and ask bids and determines a clearing price.
While our work targets desirable e-market adequacy objectives for the DA design of the
FX such as, IC, AE, IR, it is almost impossible for a DA to have them all as per
impossibility results. In (McAfee, 1992) and (Wurman et al., 1998), there is no DA
mechanism that is both efficient and IC. The adoption of exchange DA institution,
however, can be traced to its operational simplicity, efficiency, and agility to varying emarket conditions. Yet, the DA challenge is how to reach e-market equilibrium with AE,
given bidders’ self-interest, rationality, private information, knowledge, strategic choice
and repetitive learning.
The Combinatorial Exchange (CX): combines and the DA and CA mechanisms. While in
DA, multiple buyers and sellers trade units of identical items (McAfee, 1992), in CA, a
single seller has multiple heterogeneous items up for sale (deVries & Vohra, 2003)
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(Cramton et al., 2006). Buyers in CA may have complementarities or substitutabilities
between items, and use expressive bidding languages to describe these preferences. A
common goal in the design of DAs and CAs is to implement efficient matching
allocations that maximize total social welfare. The CX in (Parkes et al., 2001) is a
combinatorial DA (DA) of multiple buyers and sellers trade multiple heterogeneous
items. CXs have been use in many applications like wireless spectrum matching
allocation (Kwerel & Williams, 2002), and airport takeoff and landing slot matching
allocation (Rassenti et al., 1982). CX is used, also, for expressive sourcing by multiple
bid‐takers (Sandholm, 2008) for expressive sourcing using one‐sided CAs. The work in
(Lubin et al., 2008) introduced the iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE) that leverage
their proposed tree-based bidding language (TBBL) to support simultaneously buy and
sell bidders using valuation bounds and interval connect operators. The ICE converges to
efficient trade with truthful bidders using duality theory (i.e., primal-dual) when prices
are sufficiently accurate. Bidders annotate TBBL trees with initial lower and upper
bounds on values of different trades. ICE, then, identifies provisional trade and payments
in each round, and generates provisional clearing price on each item. In each round of
ICE, each bidder tighten bounds on bid to make precise which trade is most preferred
given current prices. When ICE terminates, a payment rule is used to determine the
payments made, and received, by each participant. Since AE together with BB is not
possible in CX due to Myerson‐Satterthwaite impossibility, our work (Parkes et al., 2001)
developed the threshold payment rule for defining final payments, which minimizes the
post regret for truthful bidding across BB payment rules, when holding bids from
other participants fixed; see (Milgrom, 2007). That allows ICE to inherit truthful bidding
(i.e.,, revising TBBL bounds to remain consistent with a bidder’s true valuation) in an
post Nash equilibrium, just as can be achieved in iterative Generalized Vickrey auctions
(Mishra & Parkes, 2007). DAs in which truthful bidding is in DSE are known for unit
demand settings (McAfee, 1992) and also for expressive domains (Chu & Shen, 2008).
The Dynamic Mechanisms handles the coordinated decision making with regard to both
dynamics of internal agent preferences and the external uncertainty about the world, The
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external uncertainties describe decision problems in which uncertain events occur in the
environment. The internal uncertainties, though, describe a decision problem in which
the uncertain events occur within the scope of an bidder agent’s view of the world. The
dynamic mechanisms are quite realistic in their ability to embrace both uncertainty occurs
outside and within bidder agents and coordinate self-learning and deliberation processes
(Parkes, 2007). The IC constraints, however, must hold in every period, so that The
dynamic mechanisms continually provide incentives for the bidders to share their private
type information with the mechanism. The dynamics include arrival and departure of
agents with respect a mechanism’s outcome space, as well as changes to the outcomes
that are available to a mechanism. An agent that arrives must have fixed type, and be able
to report type, truthfully upon arrival. The dynamics are those of information acquisition,
learning, and updates to local goals or preferences, all which trigger changes to an agent’s
preferences. For external uncertainty where agent’s type is static, it is sufficient to align
incentives only until the period in which an agent makes a claim about its type. Internal
and external uncertainty could be combined, as well, (Cavallo et al., 2010). In fact, a
various generalization of second price auction may deliver IC for uncertain environments
with dynamic agents’ population and where agents have general valuation functions on
sequences of actions. In dynamic VCG mechanism, for instance, payments are defined so
agents expected total payment from every period is the expected externality imposed by
agents on the other agents. With external uncertainty, this property on payments needs to
hold at agent’s arrival. For internal uncertainty, this property must hold in every period.
The Dynamic VCG Mechanism is a generalization of the VCG mechanism to dynamic
environments (Parkes, 2003). Payments are collected so each agent’s expected payment
is exactly the expected externality imposed by the agent on other agents upon its arrival.
The expected externality is the difference between the total expected discounted value to
the other agents under optimal policy without agent , and the total expected discounted
value to other agents under the optimal policy with agent . The digital VCG mechanism
aligns incentives of agents with the social objective of following a decision policy that
maximizes the expected total discounted value to all participants. The kind of IC
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achieved by VCG mechanism is weaker than the DSE achieved in the static VCG
mechanism. Rather, truthful reporting is an agent’s best response in expectation, as long
as the probabilistic model of the mechanism is correct and agents in the current and
future periods are truthful. This is a refinement on a BNE, referred to as a within period
ex post NE, because an agent’s best strategy is to report its true type whatever the reports
of other agents up to and including the current period, just as long as other agents follow
the truthful equilibrium in future periods. It is equivalent to DSE in the final period of a
dynamic problem, when digital VCG is equivalent to the static VCG mechanism.

3.8 Double Auction Mechanisms
The double two-sided double auction (DA) is often used for the exchange mechanisms in
applications like stock markets (i.e., NYSE) and commodity markets (i.e., CME). The
DA allows multiple buyers and sellers to trade simultaneously or sequentially at either
continuous (CDA) or periodic (Call) clear e-market (Shubik, 2005). Given the supply and
demand of sellers and buyers, a DA matches request and ask bids and determines a
clearing price. A commonly used sealed bid DA matching method is equilibrium
matching (EM) (Wurman et al., 1998) sealed‐bid DA that is IC, in which the clearing
price does not depend on the matching bidding prices, but rather externalities. The EM
finds a uniform equilibrium price
eligible requests with price

∗

∗

that balances request-bids and ask-bids so that all

and asks with

∗

are matched (Friedman, March

1993). The 4‐Heap EM algorithm (Wurman et al., 1998) implements the incentive
compatible IC

Price auction clearing rule that sets the matching price at the

highest among all bids and the

1

price rule at the (

1 highest among all

bids. However, IC cannot extend to multi‐unit bids, or simultaneously to buyers and
sellers. A uniform price is normally determined by the last matchable or the first
unmatchable pair w.r.t. the matching order. The EM DA, however, can be IC or AE, but
not both, with some special pricing policies (McAfee, 1992) (Wurman et al., 1998). The
adoption of DA, though, can be traced to its operational simplicity, efficiency, and high
agility to varying e-market conditions.
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Delivering AE as the uniform clearing price, however, might prohibit some matchable
bids from being matched. However, IC cannot extend to multi‐unit bids, or
simultaneously to buyers and sellers. To maximize the number of matches, it is essential
to allow different matches to be cleared at different prices (i.e., price discrimination). In
fact, IC is not compatible with most desirable properties and is also hard to achieve,
especially in dynamic/digital double auction (e.g. stock exchanges), where bids are
entering or leaving over time and there is more than one matching to search sequentially
(Blum, 2006) (Parkes, 2007). The work in (Zhao et al., 2010), introduced a maximal
matching (MM) DA algorithm that maximizes market liquidity, share and auctioneer
profit. However, while it delivers social efficiency it cannot guarantee IC. Figure 5
depicts, for visual comparison of matching and pricing, an instance of the EM, MM and
proposed single Q-level GSPM DA models. The GSPM DA is described in chapter 5.

Figure 5: GSPM DA in comparison with other DA models

3.9 Preference Elicitation Models
Privacy is a concern that impact information revelation. Ascending CAs (Wurman &
Wellman, 2000) (Ausubel et al., 2006) (Parkes, 2006) (Ausubel & Milgrom, 2006),
minimize information requirements by posting prices on all bundles for asking bidders to
reveal their demands at the current prices. An elicitor model proposed in (Conen &
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Sandholm, 2001), a preference elicitation model (PEM) alternative, in which bidders
asked for limited, and relevant, information. The PEM in CAs refers to the process, by
which an auctioneer (elicitor) queries bidders for specific valuations, and may decide to
ask further queries, given the sequence of responses to previous queries, or stops to
determine a feasible matching allocation and payments. Using incremental querying, the
auctioneer gradually builds up a partial model of bidder valuations, one that becomes
more refined with each query, until an optimal matching allocation can be determined.
An attribute that distinguishes the PEM is the fact specific information about preferences
of the bidder may be relevant, given preferences of others. Thus, interleaving of queries
among bidders offers potential reduction in elicited information (Conen & Sandholm,
2001). The PEM in CA exploits the general elicitation framework (GEF) (Sandholm &
Boutilier, 2006) in which forms of incremental elicitation can be casted (Conen &
Sandholm, 2001). The GEF for PEM includes: (1) Query types (i.e., Rank, order, bound,
value or demand); (2) Queried information models: relate to query types and structural
assumptions elicitor makes about valuations, since different queries impose different
constraints; and (3) Termination: a critical process at which an elicitor requires enough
information and a certificate to reach effective closure that require IC properties. The
the updated elicitor

algorithmic GEF for PEM may be described as followed: (1) Let
information regarding bidder valuations after iteration .
information available to the auctioneer; (2) Given

, reflects any prior

, either (a) terminate the process, and

determine an matching allocation and payments; or (b) choose a set of queries
bidders; and (3) Update

given response(s) to query set

to form

to ask

, and repeat.

Preference elicitation in ICE is performed by combining two activity rules: (1) modified
revealed preference activity rule (MRPAR) that requires each bidder decide which trade
is most preferred in each round; and (2) delta improvement activity rule (DIAR) that
requires each bidder refine his bid to improve price accuracy or prove no improvement is
possible. ICE mitigates elicitation costs by directing bidders using price discovery and
activity rules. As bidders prefer to reveal information as required to avoid leaks to
competitors, ICE allows bidders specify lower and upper bounds on valuations and refine
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bounds across rounds. Bounds allow price discovery, useful preference elicitation, and
termination with efficient trade despite iterative valuations. ICE proxy model of revealed‐
preference activity rule, coupled with linear prices, ensures incremental progress.
Activity rules are important in practice as they mitigate opportunities for strategic
behavior. In (Milgrom, 2004), the Milgrom‐Wilson activity rule requires a bidder to be
active on a minimum percentage of the quantity of the spectrum for which it is eligible to
bid, is critical component of the auction rules used by FCC for wireless spectrum
auctions. ICE adopts a variation on the clock‐proxy auction’s RPAR.

3.10 Winner Determination Models
The winner determination problem (WDP) is, typically, solved by the central exchange emarketplace from the agents’ reported valuations (bids). The FX e-market computes the
stable socially efficient matching of the denaturalized CAP that, often, involves solving
an NP-hard combinatorial optimization problem (Sandholm, 2008). Some solution
approaches include: (1) Identify and exploit one shot models through identifying
polynomially solvable matched cases of the WDP (deVries & Vohra, 2003) (Nisan,
2000), that are rare to qualify, (2) Use approximations close to the optimal, but easier to
compute that requires validation of the conservation of IC properties; or (3) Use an
indirect iterative mechanisms, however, risk desired economic properties as SP and AE.
Indirect mechanisms requires more time to converge to competitive equilibrium (CE) for
e-market clearing due to the multiple round ascending auction model, though saving in
processing time due to balanced distributed computing. The combinatorial nature of the
problem, however, makes it difficult for two reasons. First, a bidder in an auction has an
exponential number of choices’ combinations that he can express bids on. Consequently,
a bidder may need to submit an exponential number of bids. Second, the WDP is NP-hard
(Sandholm, 2008); meaning rapid solution of large-scale problems is difficult. The WDP
is the problem of determining an efficient trade given bids. The WDP in CAs and CEs is
NP-hard (Rothkopf et al., 1998).
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The work in (Lubin et al., 2008) formulates the ICE WDP as IP, and solve with branchand-cut algorithms (Nemhauser & Wolsey, 1999). A similar approach has proved
successful for solving the WDP in CAs (deVries & Vohra, 2003) (Sandholm & Boutilier,
2006). The work in (Lubin et al., 2008) allow bidder report a lower and upper bound
(
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For instance, Figure 6 portrays a matching allocation problem of two bidder agents,
Bidder1 sells one of his items

or

if he gets Bidder2’s item

at the right price.

Bidder2 is interested in buying either of Bidder l’s items or selling his own items, with no
structural constraints. Efficient trade assumes , transfers to Bidder2, and
While transferring

to Bidder1.

from Bidder2 to Bidder1 may not hurt, and since that trade is a

prerequisite for Bidder1 to sell one of his items, it should executes. Bidders can begin
with loose bounds on valuations, and gradually tighten them in response to pricing
information provided by the mechanism. An interpretation of a revealed-preference
activity rule, coupled with simple linear prices, ensures progress across rounds.

Figure 6: A TBBL matching allocation instance of two bidders
The WDP model ICE in (Lubin et al., 2008), may be modeled as followed: Given a bid
…

,

∈

tree

∈

tree

and matching allocation

a node that satisfies trade λ .Then, the WDP for bids
:
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The decision variables represent the satisfaction of nodes and capture the logic of the
bidding language through linear constraints; a related approach has been considered in
(Boutilier, 2002). The formation determines the trade λ while in

application to

parallel determining the value to all bidders by activating nodes in the bid trees. Given
…

reported valuation functions
,
∗

, is the efficient trade,

the VCG collects the following payments:
∗

,

is the reported value of this trade and

is the reported

value of the efficient trade in the economy without bidder . Let’s refer to ∆

,

, as the VCG discount. The problem with the VCG mechanism in the
context of a CE is that it may run at a budget deficit with the total payments negative. An
alternative payment method is the Threshold rule of (Parkes et al., 2001):
∗

∆

,

subject to ∆

,

, ∆
∆

,
,

, is selected to minmax regret

∀ and ∑ ∆

,

∆

,

,

∆

,

. Threshold payments are BB and

minimize the max deviation from VCG outcome across all balanced rules.
Example Consider possible trade of the two bidders in Figure 2: If Bidder 1 trades A for
C he gets $2 and Bidder 2 gets $7. If Bidder 1 trades B for C he gets $-2 and Bidder 2
gets $2. If no trade occurs both bidders get $0 value. Therefore the efficient trade is to
swap A for C. Because the efficient trade creates a surplus of $9 and removing either
bidder results in the null trade, both bidders have a Vickrey discount of $9. Thus if we use
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VCG payments, Bidder 1 pays $2-$9=$-7 and Bidder 2 pays $7-$9=$-2 and the exchange
runs at a deficit. The Threshold payment rule chooses payments that minimally deviate
from VCG while maintaining BB. This minimization reduces the discounts to $4.50, and
thus Bidder 1 pays $2-$4.50=$-2.50 and Bidder 2 pays $7-$4.50=$2.50.

3.11 Digital Advertising e-Marketplaces
The digital advertising (ad) online and mobile e-markets are a bold manifestation of the
digital era. The ad value chain (Thomas, 2008) includes advertisers, publishers, media
agencies, ad networks (adnet) of demand and supply side platforms, and ad exchanges
(adx). The ad inventory is the supply of potential impressions to display to the right users
at the right times in the right digital medium. As many publishers can't afford to maintain
sales force, they sell ad inventory through adnets or adxs. Publishers maximize revenues
by selling inventory at highest average price possible, due to the fact that ad inventory is
perishable and finite. The adnet e-marketplaces create efficiency by providing targeting
capabilities. There are vertical adnets which focus on a particular industry and contextual
adnets that provide e-marketplace for selling keyword-based ads (i.e., Google AdSense).
As it is complex for Adnets to forge many cross relationships, to manage the supplydemand unbalances, the ad adx would be the right answer, where adnets would have just
one trading relationship, and one ‘hop’ away from each other (see Figure 7). In fact, adxs
bring more transparency and simplify trading Ads. Nevertheless, the adx is poised to
have a transformative effect on the digital era. While adnets will likely see better margins
by going through the adx for inventory they can’t clear themselves; the adx will level the
playing field in terms of inventory access.
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Figure 7: Ad Networks and ad Exchanges
The digital ad auction serves various forms like web TV ads (i.e., Google TV), contextual
ads on search engine results pages (i.e., Google AdWords) banner ads, social networking
Ads (i.e., Facebook Ads). The Google TV (Google, 2013) is an open smart platform that
extends the computing capabilities and interactive user experience of any TV. In (N.
Nisan et al., 2009), the Google TV uses simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) subject to
over demand (Demange et al., 1986) (Cramton et al., 2006) (Milgrom, 2004) for
Walrasian competitive equilibrium (CE) price and efficient matching allocation of TV ad
spots. Advertisers bid their max daily budget and cost-per-view ads on target attributes
that influence bid valuation. Pursuing tradeoff among cost minimizing advertisers and
revenue maximizing publishers, the work in (N. Nisan et al., 2009) proposed an auction
matching allocation at Walrasian minimum CE prices that is Pareto optimal and IC.
While auction increases publisher revenues by exhausting winner budgets, advertisers are
efficiently allocated set of ads at minimum price to win with little strategic incentive to
reduce bids. However, while IC is realized for trivial case of Walrasian CE (Demange et
al., 1986), no Pareto optimal auction is IC with budget limits (Dobzinski et al., 2008).
Computing demand and matching allocations is also NP-hard (i.e., knapsack problem).
The AdWords (Google, 2013) utilizes the GSP auction. Every time a user searches on
Google, AdWords run GSP auction and ads of relevant keywords are shown as sponsored
links on search result page. Advertisers select keywords that trigger their ads, bid and
PPC, however, the pay value of advertiser below them in ranking. To meet requirements,
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the quality score (QS) measures the relevance of keywords to ad text and to a search
query. Ads, ultimately, are ranked by max CPC-Bids× QS; the minimum advertisers pay
to hold position

⟹

=0 min

payment). Furthermore, the higher the QS, the higher ad rank is, the lower CPC payment
is and the better ad position. However, in the GSP auction, advertisers do not necessarily
fare best when they truthfully reveal any private information asked for by the ad auction.
Hence, Google’s suggested CPC bidding strategies (i.e., cost per acquisition (CPA)).
Compared to VCG, the GSP is not proof efficient and has no equilibrium in DSE. The
equivalent one-shot complete information game, however, proved to converge to “locally
envy-free” equilibrium, at which the payoffs of the players are the same as in DSE of
VCG auction, even though bids and payment rules are different. (Edelman et al., 2007),
analyzed the generalized English auction (GEA) that depicts GSP to capture convergence
of bidding behavior to static equilibrium. GEA is similar to English auction except
bidders are assigned to slots in the order they drop out of the auction. Let
valuations drawn from a continuous distribution
and

. Let

, ,

where , is no. of remaining bidders

known ∀ ,

. The user knows own valuation
), the price at which user
,...,

drops out,

is the history of bidders. For

dynamic GSP, if bids can change iteratively, agents eventually learn information about
other agents that implies equilibrium is robust independent of the underlying distribution
an ex post BNE strategy profiles for any set of distributions of advertisers’ private values.
(Varian, 2007), analyzed the ad position auction with complete information, based on the
two-sided matching assignment game (Shapley & Shubik, 1972) (Demange et al., 1986),
and (Roth & Sotomayor, 1992). The work of (Shapley & Shubik, 1972) showed
properties of the two-sided markets are robust to generalizations of the two-sided labour
markets model. The ad positions (i.e., slot-s) in a web page are traded amongst
advertisers (i.e., agent ) of valuations
CTR. Ad agents simultaneously decide bids

,

is expected profit PPC and

, is

, while each agent charged, if users click
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on an ad slot, the bid value of agent below him in the ranking. The auction settles with
Nash equilibrium. that is

→

∀ , other slots.

The digital ad auction model is evolving to an exchange matching model that cross trade
e-market visibility intelligence and liquidity for the efficient matching allocation of
digital media assets. The combinatorial exchange (CX) matching trade problem is
tackled, for instance, in the ICE proxy architecture of (Cavallo et al., 2005), in which
bidders submit and refine bounds on TBBL bids directly to the CX that drive price
dynamics and ultimately clear the CX. The TBBL leads to a concise formation of the
efficient trade problem as an IP. In fact, linear prices
if there is a feasible trade λ ∈
∀

∈

x

are CE prices for the CX problem,

with prices :

,∀ that makes λ of CE

prices an efficient trade (Bikhchandani &

Ostroy, 2002). Algorithmically, the bid tree and TBBL calculate, iteratively, based on
myopic best response iterative auction an optimal primal and optimal dual solution to
solve for efficient matching allocation and price 〈 , 〉 in a CX. The ICE iterative model,
however, would enforce activity rules to guide preference elicitation in each round,
ensure incremental progress and prevent free‐riding that reduce the CX to a sealed‐bid
auction and lose desirable properties. The ICE allows bidders specify lower and upper
bounds on valuations and refine bounds across rounds that allow price discovery, useful
preference elicitation, and termination with efficient trade despite iterative model. While
there are no truthful MD solutions for AE, and BB sealed bid CXs due to impossibility
results (Myerson & Satterthwaite, 1983), any payment rule can be leveraged and would
allow ICE to inherit truthful bidding in an

post Nash equilibrium, just as can be

achieved in iterative GVA (Mishra & Parkes, 2007). The DAs in which truthful bidding
is in DSE are known for unit demand settings (McAfee, 1992) and also for more
expressive domains (Chu & Shen, 2008). The free exchange (FX) secures AE and IC best
response trade as based on the GSP matching and pricing models that maximizes the FX
exchange revenue, rather than leaving it on deficit; as in Parkes, iterative GVA (Parkes,
2001) that adds further steps to enforce IC, while applying payment rules as Threshold
payment rule on final payments to resolve BB problem (Parkes et al., 2001).
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Chapter 4

4

RBBL: Rule Based Bidding Language

An inspiring motivation to conveying the rule-based bidding strategies with the attributevalues of e-services is to facilitating the free market economy natural conduct of bidders.
Our work follows this inherent microeconomic market concept based on the shared facts
below. As a matter of fact, the constant learning of rational bidders at repetitive trades is
what motivates realizing the truthful strategic behaviour of bidders using the rule-based
bidding language. The RBBL would, also, facilitates multiple trading transactions of
rather rapid response without scarifying privacy. This is due to the automatic deduction
and aggregation of bidding rules and attribute-values of elicited e-services that facilitates
bid formation by the free exchange platform for rather multiple automatic transactions of
more rapid trades. In that vein, our work presents and examines the concept of bidding
lifecycle in the current trading mechanisms. Our work facilitates the flexible bidding
strategic conduct using the logical rules formula as presented in the RBBL model. An
example elaborates on the application of the RBBL messaging by bidders and the free
exchange deliberation and formation of elicited e-services and related bids. The desirable
properties of the RBBL is examined and theoretically verified at the end of this chapter.

4.1 Market Economy: Insights from Microeconomics Theory
Generally, the resource matching allocation problem amongst societies relied, primarily,
on three institutional economies (mechanisms) (Hall & Lieberman, 2010): (1) Traditional
economy: A fair e-market that allocates resources according to traditional practices that
govern the fair distribution of goods and e-services. Though, predictable and stable;
traditional markets, often, lack innovation and growth, hence, likely converge to stagnant
economies; (2) Command economy: a central authority that plans and allocates resources
according to explicit enforced rules; and (3) Market economy: A free market in which
resources allocated by bidder buying and selling decision making, primarily governed by
opportunity cost, as influenced, most often, by the society. Adam Smith, remarkably,
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observed bidders interacting in free markets act as if guided by “invisible hand” that leads
to desirable e-market outcomes: “[The trader] neither intends to promote the public
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it... he intends only his own gain, and he is
in this… led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of his intention”.
Prices are the instrument of invisible hand in directing economic activities, reflecting
both value of goods to a society and cost to society of making goods that, in many cases,
maximize the welfare of society. The invisible hand, though, is less able to ensure
economic prosperity is distributed fairly (Mankiw, 2012). Free markets reward people as
per their ability to produce goods other people are willing to pay for. While public
policies, as welfare, attempt to achieve fair distribution of economic well-being, the
invisible hand leads free markets to allocate resources efficiently, works best in economy
of perfect competition. The invisible hand is , also, not invincible to e-market failure due
to either externalities or monopolistic power. Nevertheless, Smith’s insight ensures free
market invisible hand of competition is better than fair e-market regulation or
government ruled economy. The activities of buyers and sellers automatically push emarket price for a good towards equilibrium at which buyers and sellers are satisfied, and
there is no upward or downward pressure on prices as supply and demand for the good is
in balance (i.e., law of supply and demand).
Economists often advocate free markets as the best way to organize economic activities.
After all, in free market economy, no one is looking out for the economic well-being of
society as a whole. Despite the decentralized and self-interested decision making, the free
market economies have proven remarkably successful in organizing economic activities
in a way that promotes overall economic well-being (Mankiw, 2012). However, caution
must be taken at microeconomic and computational levels to realizing and eradicating the
adverse strategies of e-market participants as fraud, deception, adverse selection (of
buyers of partial information) and hidden actions (i.e., moral hazard), that often, harm the
social welfare efficiency and result in e-market failures. The mechanism design (MD)
theory perceives an agent might unilaterally seek to manipulate an outcome. For instance,
in Vickrey auction, if agents having the highest and second-highest valuations collude,
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then these agents can benefit. Also, there might be bidding across mechanisms, making
collusion harder to detect. Other strategic behaviors are snipping (submitting bids near to
auction closing) and free riding (submitting overvalued bids with no financial shield) and
shading. Our work advocates free e-market economy and establishes that free strategic
conduct would eradicate, eventually, the adverse strategies driven by restrictions.

4.2 Strategic Impact of Constant Learning
The rationale of advocating free strategic conduct is particularly inspired by the impact of
constant learning at repetitive trades. The learning process motivates bidders to deliberate
about e-market disruptions and, hence, change their preferences and strategies. This type
of strategic adjustment is perceived as a truthful and rational reaction due to learning new
facts. The truthful strategic reaction is also driven by the invisible dynamics of the free
market economy that stabilize the self-interest and essential needs of bidders to scarce
assets. The free market economy draws, eventually, a rationally collaborative bidders
response that delivers stable efficiency. The free expression of rational conduct would,
hence, facilitate the truthful revelation of strategic conduct. Another compelling byproduct is that the bidding automation allow for more rapid trades. The restricted bidding
conduct would, otherwise, provoke deceitful tactics and adverse strategies that result in emarket failures. Our work proposes, hence, the free exchange that follows the free market
economy that proved effective in organizing economic activities for the social well-being
despite the self-interest of bidders. However, the free exchange stable efficiency would,
often be better realized with thicker e-markets, uncongested interaction, and safe privacy
(Roth, 2007). Another crucial factor is implementing fair mechanisms of no monopolies.
The limited bidding scope to free choices may be traced to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
(VCG) mechanisms (Vickrey, 1961) (Clarke, 1971) (Groves, 1973) that penalize
(internalize) bidders externality levies for reporting untrue strategic preferences, to align
payoffs with the social welfare, rather than the desirable self-prosperity. Evidently, the
fact e-markets penalize or inhibit strategizing incites adverse reactions that lead to emarket failure due to incomplete or false information revelation. The adverse strategies
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may be manifested by fraud, deception, collusion, shilling, free riding, shading, snipping
or hidden actions. The e-markets are, mostly, more vulnerable to adverse strategies than
classic markets. The virtual bidders may use agents to collude, form coalitions or unleash
agents of multiple identities for false name bidding.
The strategic aspect of natural interactions in mechanisms has an incident in the Boston
public school (BPS) choice under “Boston Mechanism” (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2011),
where smart parents strategized and gained preferred seats, the reason why it switched to
a deferred acceptance, Stagey Proof (SP) mechanism that, literally, disables the strategic
choices, through less intense preference elicitation, in this case, for a better social welfare
outcome and , of course, to avoid lawsuits by unsatisfied parents. While equity is justified
at school choice level, e-market fairness is not a natural attribute of the decentralized
matching allocation problem. In fact, our work takes notice, not of the solution, but a
comment by one affected parent “I’m troubled that you’re considering a system that takes
away the little power that parents have to prioritize... what you call this strategizing as if
strategizing is a dirty word...” (Recording from BPS Public Hearing; 05-11-04).
The strategic impact of the repeated trades and constant learning is empirically observed
in the first-price auction as examined by (Edelman & Ostrovsky, 2007) on Yahoo!. The
first price auction is found unstable as bidders shade true valuations and adjust bids
frequently in response to others in a cycling behavior strategy as shown in Figure 8
(source: (Zhang, 2005)). The cyclic behaviour often results in slower trades and a
potential revenue loss. The empirical evidence of bid and ranking fluctuations in the
generalized second price auction (GSP) auction established history dependent strategies
motivate such fluctuations. The work of (Zeithammer, 2006) analyzed eBay auctions
using real data and observed that forward-looking bidders change strategies and actions
once having information about future auctions. Zeithammer argued bidding true valuation
would be too high, as it exposes the bidder to winning immediately, while losing the
opportunity for a better price for the same item on future trades. Instead, bidders bid less
than their valuations, a strategy referred to as “shading”. The key prediction of the theory
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of “forward‐looking” is bidders should shade more when there are more items coming up
for auction and when more of those items are desirable to the bidders. Such findings
would impact, also, seller strategies, raising the question of whether eBay auction limits
the potential of trading institutions. In fact, allowing strategic selling may change the
bidder’s strategy. That, of course, raises the question whether current auction models are
strategically sustainable
In (Nisan et al., 2011), the convergence of the GSP to VCG AE outcome is due to best
response strategies that transform partial information to complete information models at
repeated trades. Incidentally, our work takes note of Nisan’s remark “It is quite an
embarrassment that the pricing rule used in ad auctions, almost universally is GSP,
rather than the more theoretically motivated VCG which mechanism design (MD) theory
would suggest”. While (Nisan et al., 2011) recognized the value of GSP cognitive and
computational simplicity over VCG, yet, the theoretical analysis relate GSP stable
efficiency to the fact GSP auction converges from uncompleted information trading
model a complete information IC trading by implementing repeated best response truthful
direct strategies with, indeed, continuously repeated trades. In particular, showing that
VCG prices are equilibrium of GSP auction does not address the question of how the
bidders may reach equilibrium without having the required information. This issue was
also addressed by (Cary et al., 2007), who show that the GSP auction of bidders with
repeated best response strategies, would converge to the VCG equilibrium. The work in
(Varian, 2007) empirically analyzed the GSP data of Google and reported similar results
to (Edelman et al., 2007) where the complete information locally envy-free equilibrium
of the simultaneous-move game is observed in Google ad auction fairly accurately. The
GSP, however, limits bidder choices. For any keyword, advertisers submit single bids;
given different ad positions that may not sufficiently convey preferences of bidders..
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Figure 8: First price auction cyclic behaviors

4.3 Bidding Lifecycle: Bidding Automation for Rapid Trades
The time wasted in the bidding processes at de facto e-marketplaces is rather an annoying
user experience. For instance, a bidding process may take hours or days for an e-Bay or
Amazon auction. Our work examines the “bidding lifecycle” that relates to the processes
of creation, dispatch, and expiry of the bidding process. While the bidder agents manage
their local problems and the formation of their RBBL messages, the FX deduces and
aggregates the bidding rules to elicit preferences, generate the requests and asks and
computes winning matches. Hence, the bidding lifecycle would have substantial
influence on designing mechanisms. The following is an analysis of the bidding
lifecycles in various e-trading mechanisms:
Iterative Bidding: commonly used in partial revelation indirect mechanisms (i.e.,
English auction, Dutch clock auction, SAA (Cramton, 2006), iBundle (Parkes, 2006)) and
has a simple bidding structure and semantics. The bidding lifecycle expires at every
round of a single trade and requires manual setups and bid formations. The iterative
biddings and indirect mechanisms distribute the computational workload between agents
and the exchange. The manual updates, however, require excessive setup times. The
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clock auction reduces the bidding delays by enforcing a timeout constraint to promoting
faster trades. Figure 9 depicts the iterative bidding for the free exchange e-marketplace.

Figure 9: Iterative bidding
Proxy Iterative Bidding: extends bidding lifecycle until e-market clears in the price
taking model for a single trade as shown Figure 10, using proxy agents (i.e., iBundle Tree
based bidding language (TBBL) (Parkes, 2006), Ascending proxy auction (Ausubel &
Milgrom, 2006)) with valuation bounds (i.e., budget constraints) and provisional
allocation. The proxy iterative bidding is computationally distributed with extended
bidding lifecycle, however, for single trades. The bidders must set the valuation bounds at
each trade and update proxy agents.

Figure 10: Proxy iterative bidding
Bidding programs: the complete problem model is sent to the exchange (see Figure 11)
in the form of complex bid structure that includes the formal local problem objectives and
constrains (Nisan, 2000). In fact, it is the other extreme of information revelation bidding
compared to the simple iterative bidding in which the bidding lifecycle extends until the
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problem is fully solved. However, there are inherent critical issues as found in (Parkes,
2001) like the privacy exposure problem that makes the bidding model impractical.

Figure 11: Bidding programs
One Shot Bidding: commonly used for complete information direct mechanisms (i.e.,
First and Second sealed bid auctions, GSP, VCG). The auctioneer collects single shot
bids in sealed auction, and computes the winner determination. The bidding lifecycle is
rapid for single trades. However, it requires setup at each trade. The computation model
is distributed. Agents work on valuation and bid formation; while exchange computes
winner determination allocation and pricing outcomes (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: One shot bidding

4.4 Rule Based Biding Language (RBBL) Model
The RBBL is an expressive bidding language that has a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
structure. Our work combines the expressive and structural attributes of the tree based
bidding language (TBBL) in (Cavallo et al., 2005) with those of logical languages
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and

,

in (Boutilier & Hoos, 2001) that include

,

and

∗

. In fact, the

RBBL subsumes the expressive and structural attributes of the TBBL in (Cavallo et al.,
2005) and the logical languages

,

,

,

,

and

∗

in (Boutilier & Hoos,

2001) using the logical rule and operators formulae in the bid DAG structure and
semantics. Our work exploits the FOL to model the rules, formulae and other attributes
like Q-levels and budget bounds. As shown in Figure 13, the RBBL symmetric DAG
bidding structure consists of two segments, the attribute-values segment and the logical
rules segment. The iconic attribute of the RBBL, however, is the addition of the logical
rule formulae to the bid DAG message, which are simple rules that attribute to the local
constraints of bidders, while preserving their privacy, contrary to the exposure problem of
the bidding programs in (Nisan, 2000). The RBBL enables the repetitive adjustments of
the preferences in response to constant learning at repetitive trade disruptions. The RBBL
logical rule formulae enable bidders to expressing their free strategic conduct. The RBBL
is symmetric model that allows for bidding requests and asks in a single DAG structure
that may exploit diverse models of the rule formulae. For instance, our work uses the first
FOL to model rule formulae and other bounding attributes like Q-levels and budget.
The RBBL semantics and structure outlines the blueprint for the deduction and formation
of diverse e-services and bid combinations by the free exchange. The RBBL message
comprises (1) the attribute-value segment of factor-group-value leafs. The attribute-value
includes the attribute short description, the group identifier and initial values of attributes.
For instance, as shown in Figure 13 the attribute-value leaf ( .Cap:
: capability feature of, particular group
programming problem with assigned value

:QP,

) designates

: optimization solver of a quadratic
by the bidder; (2) the logical rules internal

control nodes that may include logical operator and logical rule formulae (i.e., FOL
rules). The rules presents the control nodes of the RBBL DAG structure with often no
values but rules applied on values. The FOL logical rules often update the values of the
attributes or combinations following strategic aspects of bidders and the outcome of the
constant learning at repeated trades. For instance, the FOL rule ( Win_Before⇒
,

,

∨

,

means, if the bidder has not won before, increase the value
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that is the sum of the selected combined attributes by factor
as

for next trade, as long

. Evidently, the node rules often change the initial true attribute or combined

attributes values. The selected Q-levels and max budgets may be presented explicitly as
an attribute or implicitly as a rule.
As shown in Figure 13, the RBBL symmetric DAG bidding structure consists of two
segments, the attributes segment and the logical rules segment.

The RBBL model

outlines the blueprint for inferring the diverse bid combinations by the exchange emarket: (1) the attributes segment comprises the feature-group-value leafs of the DAG
structure. The attributes include the attribute short description, group identifier and initial
true values of the feature. For instant, the feature leave ( .Cap:
capability feature
problem

:QP,

) valuates the

of the optimization solver to compute a quadratic programming

for value

; (2) the logical rules internal control nodes that may include

logical operator and logical rule formulae (i.e., FOL rules). The rules presents the control
nodes of the RBBL DAG structure with, often, no values but rules applied on values. The
rules often update the values of the attributes or combinations following some strategic
aspects being the outcome of constant learning and repeated trade disruptions. For
instance, the FOL rule ( Win_Before⇒
bidder has not won before, increase the value
attributes by factor

for next trade, as long as

,

,

∨

,

means if the

that is the sum of the selected combined
. Evidently, the node rules, often,

change the initial true attribute or combined attributes values. The selected Q-levels and
maximums budgets may be presented explicitly as an attribute or implicitly as rules.
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f1.Cat:g1.Optimal
Solution Solver:v1

≥ (Qlevel ,Qx)=>
Request Bid

f2.ID:g1.IBM Cplex
Optimizer:v2

Win_Before =>
=(+(vx , vx ≤(vx,Ux)
XOR

f2.ID:g2.Gurobi
Optimizer:v3

AND

Request
Bidding

≤(tactive, texpiry)
=> Request Bid

ecik,Qcik,bcik
•••

TSX=>Bid(QP)
TSX=> AND

≥(Wins, 2) =>
=(-(vx , vx ≥(vx,Ly)

AND

=(f2,Cplex)=>
=(+(vx , vx ≤(vx,Ux)

f4.Sup:
g1.Matlab:v6

eci1,Qcj1,bci1
•••

f3.Cap:g1.MILP:v4
f3.Cap:g2.QP:v5

≤(BBudget,Bmax)=>
Request Bid

ecic,Qcik,bcic

epj1,Qpj1,bpj1

f4.Sup:g2.Java:v6

f3.Cap:g2.QP:v5
f1.Cat:
g2.Simulation:v6
f2.ID:g3.Matlab
Stock Market:v7

=(f5,Cloud_Proc)=>
=(-(vx , vx ≤(vx,Lw)
AND

Ask
Bidding
AND

≤(tactive, texpiry)
≥(Qp ,Qx)
=> Ask Bid

≤(f6,Parallel_Proc )=>
=(+(vx , vx ≤(vx,Uz)

•••

epjq,Qpjq,bpjq
•••

epjp,Qpjp,bpjp

The RBBL symmetric bid structure Ц fp/ci/j vp/ci/j rp/ci/j
of attribute-values
fp/ci/j vp/ci/j , bidding rules rp/ci/j and activity period .
The FX deliberates on the RBBL FOL rules and attribute-values to deduce the selected digital
services and formulate the request and ask bids

Figure 13: RBBL bid symmetric DAG structure
The FX collects the RBBL DAG messages and implements the automatic preference
deduction algorithms (not covered) on rules and attributes sets to generate the
combinations of requests and asks rather than solving a bidding program (Nisan, 2000).
In fact, the rules act as filters (i.e., bid constraints) to reducing the complexity of the
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feasible solution space. The RBBL internal logical rule formulae nodes compute the new
attribute valuations and propagate the updated values within the DAG. The logical
operators (i.e.,

,

,

, etc.), otherwise, combine the attributes and their current

values for the next stage. The RBBL is expressive with more flexibility and conciseness
that reduces the complexity of preferences to sets of attributes and rules.
Compared with the bidding lifecycles of other mechanisms presented in literature review,
the RBBL enables more rapid bidding lifecycle for multiple trades and hence expedites
trades. The free exchange collects the bidding attribute-values and logical rules formulae
to automatically deduce preferences, form bids, and computes winner determination with
minimal preference elicitation. The RBBL facilitates, also, distributed computation, in
which the request and ask bidders as well as the free exchange e-marketplace contribute,
equally, in the computation and fulfillment of the social objective (see Figure 14).

Figure 14: Rule based bidding
The RBBL exploits the logical rule and operator formulae, concisely, while delivering the
expressive semantics and structural attributes of other logical bidding languages. i.e.,
,

,

,

,

, OR‐ of‐ XORs, XOR‐ of‐ ORs,

∗

. and TBBL languages.

The RBBL bidding process: This example illustrates the process of RBBL flexible
bidding and the free exchange deduction and aggregation of attribute-values and logical
rules to forming targeted e-services and associated bids. As shown in Figure 15, there are
two levels in the automatic construction of request and ask bids by the free exchange:
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1) Bidder action: A consumer works on mathematical modeling and simulation wishes
to bid for any commercial optimization solver e-service with a particular preference to
either Gurobi or IBM Cplex Optimiser solutions. For simplicity, consider the part of
the RBBL message instance in Figure 15 that includes only two attribute-values of the
: ) and (2) Source ID feature (

e-service: (1) category feature (
consumer would pay

for any solver:

:

:

.

Gurobi Optimizer that is

:

:

). The
:

if the solver is a component of IBM Cplex or

and would add more
for a Q-level

.

:

:

).

)

if it is part of

The bidder is looking
. The bidder has

for any solver with limited budget

a strategy, if he couldn’t win a specific trade then he would increase the bid valuation
by

in the next repetitive trade on the same e-service subject to a limited upper

bound

∈

,

is total attribute values that fan-in to the FOL rule. The

bidder forms flexibly and concisely the RBBL message that include his preferences on
requested e-services in the form of attribute-values and his bidding strategies in the
form of FOL rules as shown in a part of Figure 15 then send it to the free exchange.
2) FX action: The FX receives the bidder RBBL message and stores it in the database.
The FX and bidders share common semantics repository of feature-group attributes.
The FX identifies an offer from Gurobi for a solver. The FX searches for request
matches and identifies our consumer as an eligible buyer. The FX aggregation might
consider, for instance, the matching of max budgets and min costs for qualifying
eligibility before constructing bids. The FX then, automatically deliberates on the
:

RBBL message and examines

:

) and

:

:

) attributes-values to form the

requested e-services and bids. As shown in Figure 15, the red arrows indicate the
transition state and activity flow of the logical operators on the attributes. The FX
:

queries the attribute-value
indicate eligibility. The
FOL rule (

,

:

:

⇒

:

being offered by seller(s) and tags it as true to
attribute-value state transitions next to the Q-level

that inspect the min required Q-level. If

true, the active flow branches to the max budget FOL (
also to bidding path of attribute

,

,

,

⇒

. For the first bidding path, if

and
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,

the “true” flow, steps to the bidding expiry rule: (
_

. If

,
,

:

,

∨

:

:

:

. The FX inspects the FOL rule ( Win_Before⇒

request bid for e-service
=

,

the FX forms

⇒

,

in the other bidding path that combines attribute-value

attribute

:

:

:

. The FOL rule inspects the bidder

winning status at repetitive trades and implements reactive strategy. The FOL rule
increases the bid valuation
(i.e.,

=

by

) is total attribute values that fan-in to the FOL rule. The FX
,

constructs, then, a second request bid
after validating
,

,

:

,

,

:

:

as shown above. The FX generates, eventually,

two request bids for the e-services
,

∈

in the next trade subject to upper bound

:

and

:

,

:

:

and

.

Figure 15: A sample instance of a RBBL bid structure and preference deduction

4.5 RBBL Theoretical and Computational Properties
Proposition 1: The RBBL logical rules and operator formulae expedites e-market trades.
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Our work introduced and analyzed the bidding lifecycle concept that relates to the
processes of creation (i.e., bidding), dispatch (i.e., execution) and termination (i.e.,
expiry) of bids. The bidding lifecycle captures the flow and duration of the trades. The
RBBL logical rules and operators expedite the bidding lifecycle for multiple trades due to
the automatic deduction and aggregation of logical rules and operators and the formation
of the request and ask bids inside the FX system. Our work demonstrates empirically the
performance benefits of the rules aggregation in the experimental analysis.
,

Proposition 2: The RBBL subsumes the logical bidding languages (i.e.,
,

,

∗

,,

) and the tree based bidding languages (i.e., TBBL).

The RBBL exploits the DAG model and enables

,

(Cavallo et al., 2005) semantics. For instance, the TBBL
RBBL rule (i.e.,

1:

Active_Attributes,

RBBL, otherwise, subsumes

,

,

,

∨
∗

,

,

∗

and TBBL

operator is presented as an

Active_Attribute,

⇒ Bid. The

, as shown Figure 13, where the logical

operators are utilized concisely. As for the bidding lifecycle, the RBBL lifecycle extend
to multiple trades. The TBBL works for single trade; once

is selected for a choice

with bounds (Lubin et al., 2008) it cannot change unless reconfigured for new trade.
Proposition 3: The RBBL facilitates direct and indirect mechanisms in a single message
structure.
The RBBL logical rule formulae may serve for single shot bidding, otherwise for rulebased iterative or incremental. Both scenarios are shown in a single RBBL bidding
instance in Figure 13. For the iterative bidding, the bid value is incremented or
decremented subject to diverse rule-based inspected situations.
Proposition 4: The RBBL allows for capturing the CAP as an integer program (IP).
Proof: The work in (Boutilier, 2002) defines an IP formation for winner determination
using

and provides positive empirical performance results using a commercial solver.

The RBBL enable the free exchange to deliberate on the FOL bidding rules and attribute-
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values of the e-services to deduce the e-services and preferences and formulate the
request and ask bids. The FX problem model would then reduce to a form that is similar
to the

IP in (Boutilier, 2002) as shown in Figure 13 andFigure 15. Chapter 2 expands

on the IP formal modeling. Hence, the computational feasibility translates to the RBBL.
Formally, given a request bid RBBL instance of consumer c as shown in Figure 15, the
RBBL bid model is ∐ 〈 ,

,

,

, 〉 where the notations are defined in the problem
,

description. The FX may then deduce the (
particular Q-level

,

for a selected e-service

and compute the total bid value
,

sum of attribute value RBBL leafs

of a trade

that is the true

and bid value revisions as applied by the

active rules of the RBBL internal control nodes
∑

of a

before expiry

(i.e.,

. The AE allocative efficiency indicates the set of selected satisfied

attribute and control rules provide a max true total bid valuation. Given an RBBL
message, ∐ 〈. 〉 and a bid-value

(

for e-service

in trade

, let

0, 1 denote if the attribute-value leaf or the active rule internal control node
RBBL bid of consumer c i. e. , ∐ 〈. 〉 is satisfied with if
For

to be eligible for bid, ∀ ∐ 〈. 〉 , ∀

⇒

∈

∈
in the

, ∀ ∈ ∐ 〈. 〉 .
∐ 〈. 〉 ,

means a

given request (ask) is matched. The total value is the solution to the IP problem:
〈. 〉 ,

〈. 〉 ,

∐ 〈.〉,

∈

∈

∐ 〈.〉,

∈∐ 〈.〉

∈∐ 〈.〉

This formation is equivalent to the IP mode of the original problem model in chapter 2∎.
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Figure 16: RBBL bid instance for IP analysis
This chapter presents the RBBL modeling and analysis, The RBBL model exploits the
logical rules and operators formulae on the internal control nodes coupled with the
semantics for propagating attribute-values leafs within the RBBL DAG structure. The
RBBL is inspired by the constant learning of rational bidders throughout their repetitive
e-trades. The RBBL facilitates conveying the free bidding strategic conduct using the
logical rules and operators formulae. The logical rules expedite e-market trades due to
automatic deduction of the rules, operators and attribute-values to construct the selected
e-services and to form the relevant request and ask bids. The RBBL allows for symmetric
bidding of consumers and providers with unique valuations of factor-group e-service
attributes that include multiple Q-levels. For an ad problem, the attribute may be an age
group, location or interest.

For a software app, the attribute can be e-service ID,

capability, category, etc. The RBBL subsumes other logical bidding languages and is
suitable for direct and indirect mechanisms. It allows, also, for capturing the CAP as an
integer program (IP) for winner determination problem.
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Chapter 5

5

GSPM Double Auction Mechanism

Our work targets a tractable GSP based DA approach that delivers truthful, efficient and
stable matching with the proposed free exchange e-marketplace profitability. The GSPM
DA exploits the multiple Q-levels cross-matching heuristics for a class of decentralised
CAP of multiple units of a single e-service of distinct attribute-values and multiple Qlevels. The RBBL allows for a unique valuation of each attribute while conveying the
logical rules in the bidding structure. The free exchange employs the rules deduction,
aggregation and formation on the stored attribute-value attributes of the RBBL to
generate the multiple request and ask bids for a specific trade. Our work is motivated by
the fact while GSP is not IC, the GSP repeated best response strategies (BBS) always
converge to NE with VCG AE IC outcomes and payments, as analyzed and validated in
(Edelman & Ostrovsky, 2007) (Varian, 2007) and (Nisan et al., 2011). The GSPM
exploits the efficient GSP auction and the Nash stability of GSP repeated best response
auction. The GSPM is tractable of polynomial time complexity. In fact, the best response
strategy is, evidently, the rational strategic reaction to constant learning at repetitive
trades that transform private settings to complete information stability.
The GSPM DA follows the EM for single Q-level matching allocation while it applies the
GSP discriminatory DA price matching model that exploits the forward and reverse GSP
auctions as described in later sections. The GSPM pricing model narrows down the
valuation preferencing space of request (ask) bidders to the second price in descending
(ascending) order that results in AE, particularly, in thick e-market repetitive trades,
while securing e-market profitability. However, while the single Q-level GSPM DA is
AE, it might not be IC for multiple units of single items (McAfee, 1992) (Wurman et al.,
1998). The IC challenge of single Q-level GSPM DA inspires designing the multiple Qlevel mechanism that motivates the IC of bidders through their desire to be winners in the
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narrower, more competitive Q-levels, in addition to the prospect that their true valuations
might win them a higher Q-level e-service item in the multiple Q-level cross-matching.
This chapter presents the different single Q-level and multiple Q-levels GSPM and EM
DA algorithms. The chapter covers also the game-theoretic and computational properties
of the GSPM DA mechanisms as well as the simulation algorithmic structure.

5.1 Exchange Mechanisms
The exchange mechanisms are emerging e-trading models for e-marketplaces that enable
consumers to target potential users for, often, spontaneous impact throughout interactive
user engagement and rational configuration. The exchange brings efficiency by eliciting
prices, aggregating information, matching trades, and generating capital. The Facebook
FBX, Google DoubleClick, Yahoo RMX, and Microsoft ad Exchange are few examples
of the exchange e-marketplaces. The objective of the exchange mechanism is the stable
and socially efficient matching allocation and pricing of the e-services. That, often,
involves the rational self-interested agents of both providers and consumers (bidders).
The bidders interact and collaborate probably at real-time given, often, their competitive
local objectives to accept at equilibrium a system-wide outcome that satisfies them. The
decentralized collaboration cannot, however, be modeled and implemented using the
centralized models. This is due to the inherent challenges that tackle the decentralized
and often conflicting local objectives of rational bidders, their constraints, preferences
and valuations, decision making, self-interest, truth revelation and strategic conduct.
Building an efficient exchange, hence, is a daunting task. The large number of e-service
providers and consumers that bid for the e-services at real-time by interacting with is a
key challenge that strains, considerably, the computational resources of e-marketplaces.
The present exchange e-marketplaces would, often, tackle those challenges, for bounded
rational agents in rather constrained non-strategic settings. However, the e-marketplaces
are typically challenged with issues related to the decentralized game-theoretic stability
and social efficiency amongst rational bidders on top of the computational efficiency.
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5.2 GSPM and EM Double Auction Mechanisms
As shown Figure 17 and Figure

18, the GSPM DA allocation rule follows the

Equilibrium Matching (EM) (Wurman et al., 1998) for single Q-level and multiple Qlevels settings. Hence, our work examines the single Q-level EM DA (see Figure 19).
The proposed Single Q-level GSPM DA pricing rule exploits the GSP forward auction
for buyers (Varian, 2007) (Edelman et al., 2007) and reverse-GSP auction for sellers. The
forward and reverse GSP DA narrows down the pricing tolerance of request and ask
bidders to the second price in rank that improves stable efficiency, particularly, in thicker
e-markers, while securing e-market profitability. The fact while the single Q-level GSPM
and EM DA mechanisms are AE, it might not be IC for multiple units of single items,
inspires designing the multiple Q-level GSPM and EM DA mechanisms for the class of
multiple units of multiple Q-level items that motivates IC. The bidders IC is motivated by
their desire to be winners in the narrower Q-level category, in addition to the prospect
their true valuations might win bidders even a higher Q-level item in the cross-matching
phase. Our work maintains, though, that the partial information revelation of bidders
converge to complete information settings at best response strategist to repetitive trades
that translates eventually, to a stable efficiency for all mechanisms subject to the best
rational reaction of bidders to their dynamic states. This is formally analyzed in (Nisan et
al., 2011). It is, also, validated through our experimental analysis. Figure 18 and Figure
20 presents the multiple Q-level GSPM and EM DA mechanisms.

5.2.1 Single Q-level GSPM Double Auction Mechanism
The single Q-level GSPM DA follows the EM DA (Wurman et al., 1998) in computing
the matching allocations. However, our work proposes a forward-GSP auction pricing
rule for buyers, and a reverse-GSP auction pricing rule for sellers for the multiple units of
a single-item of multiple attributes as shown in Figure 17, steps are as follows:
1) Qualify request and ask bids’ eligibility by fetching and grouping bids of identical eservice attributes (i.e.,
2) Sort the eligible asks

=

.

in ascending order for forward-GSP auction and sort the
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eligible bids
in descending order for reverse-GSP auction with respect to request
and ask values.
3) Matching: start at the top, add ask‐request pairs to the matched list, if request-bid price
ask-bid price.
4) Compute the GSPM allocations and assign matched pairs
buyers

,

to the winning

∈

, 0 . Every bid

and sellers .

5) Assign prices such that

,

∀

,

winner pays the second price below him in the bids ordered list, while every ask
winner collects the second price below him in ordered list. For the last pair, if
matched:

,

. Ask or bid bidders pays his bid or collects his ask.

Figure 17: Single Q-level GSPM DA mechanism

5.2.2 Multiple Q-levels GSPM Double Auction Mechanism
The multiple Q-levels GSPM DA computes the allocation and pricing rules for multiple
units of a single-item of multiple attributes, and multiple Q-levels. While the ask bidders
offers the same particular e-service item, items are distinct in the assigned Q-levels. The
bid bidders request the same e-service item, however, they are different in their minimum
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requested Q-levels. The multiple Q-level GSPM sorts the Q-levels and applies a
multilevel cross-matching allocation as shown Figure 18:
1) Sort Q-levels in descending order starting with the highest.
2) Group the request and ask bids based on sorted Q-levels such that∀
,
;∀
.
3) For each Q-level, qualify the item eligibility by identifying and grouping the eligible
requests and asks of identical e-service item attributes (i.e.,
4) For each Q-level, sort the eligible asks

.

in ascending order for forward-GSP

in descending order for reverse-GSP auction.
auction and the eligible bids
5) Start at the top of first highest Q-level list in rank (i.e.,
. Add the
ask‐bid pairs to the matched list if

∧

.
. Consider the unmatched

6) Step to the next lowest Q-level in rank
asks

of the same or higher Q-levels from previous steps (i.e.,

the ask‐bid pairs to the matched list if

∧

). Add

.

7) The chance of winning higher Q-level e-services motivates the IC truthful revelation
of the consumers. The providers’ IC is driven by getting more prospective consumers.
8) Compute the matching allocations and assign the matched pairs
9) At each Q-level, apply the GSPM pricing rule, as in single Q-level
,
,

to the

sellers .

winning buyers
∀

,

∈
=

,

, 0 , ∀ . For the last pair in each Q-level, if matched, then
. every bidder pays his bid or collects his ask.
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Figure 18: Multiple Q-level GSPM double auction

5.2.3 Single Q-level EM Double Auction Mechanism
The single Q-level Mth EM DA follows (Wurman et al., 1998) in computing the
matching allocation and the Mth pricing (last matched ask price) rule (see Figure 19) for
multiple units of a single-item of multiple attributes of a single Q-level. The work use this
base models for the proposed multiple Q-level, EM DA. The following steps describe the
single Q-level Mth EM DA:
1) Qualify the eligibility by identifying and grouping the request and ask of identical e.
service item attributes (i.e.,
2) Sort the eligible asks
in ascending order and sort bids
in descending order.
3) Process the matching: start at the top, add the ask‐request pairs to the matched list, if
the bid price
more or equal the ask price for the eligible pairs.
,
to the
4) Compute the matching allocation list and assign matched pairs
winning buyers and sellers .
5) Compute the EM Mth equilibrium pricing rule
as the last matched ask price (i.e.,
). Assign prices such that

∀

,∀

∈

,0 .
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Figure 19: Single Q-level Mth EM double auction

5.2.4 Multiple Q-level Mth EM Double Auction Mechanism
Our work extends the single Q-level Mth EM and proposes a multiple Q-level EM DA
that exploits a multiple EM points for the multiple Q-levels in computing the allocations
and the pricing. The multiple Q-level, Mth EM DA follows the matching allocation of the
multiple Q-level, GSPM DA. The multiple Q-level Mth EM DA applies a multiple crosslevel matching allocation as described below and shown in Figure

20. The following

steps describe the subject multiple Q-level Mth EM DA mechanism:
1) Sort the Q-levels in descending order.
2) Group all request and ask bids based on the sorted Q-levels such that ∀
,
;∀
.
3) For each Q-level, qualify the eligibility by identifying and grouping the eligible
requests and asks of identical e-service item attributes (i.e.,
4) For each Q-level, sort the eligible asks

in an ascending order and the eligible bids

in a descending order.
5) Start at the top of the highest Q-level in rank (
matched list if

∧

.

. Add the ask‐bid pairs to the
.
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6) Step to the next lower Q-level in rank (

). Consider all unmatched asks

of the same or higher Q-levels (from pervious steps) (i.e.,
∧

bid pairs to the matched list if

). Add the ask‐
.

7) Compute the matching allocations and assign the matched pairs
winning buyers

and sellers

,

to the

.

level, apply the Mth price rule (last matched ask price) such

8) Within each

∀

that

,∀

∈

. The Mth

,0 , ∀

, is the last matched ask price. For instance, as shown in Figure
multiple EM points (i.e.,

,

),

,

,
,

that the matching occurs at multiple Q-levels (i.e.,
apply the multiple Q-level cross matching allocation
matching price of

,

), (

and

. .

price

20, there are
)). In the case
,

), then

that is the Mth

level.

Figure 20: Multiple Q-level Mth EM double auction

5.3 GSPM Economic and Computational Properties
Definition 1: [GSPM and EM allocation rule]: Let
and ask bidders

∩

∪ , the set of exclusive request

∅ as per the problem model assumption. Let

∪

the
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∈

set of eligible provider asks

descending order and group bids

and asks

∀

,

of the same offered

) except for their Q-levels. Sort Q-levels in

and requested e-service (i.e.,

∀

∈

and consumer bids

based on the sorted Q-levels such that,

(i.e.,

. Then sort bids

(asks) in descending (ascending) order within each Q-level. Start at the top of the list of
the highest Q-level (i.e.,
matched list

. Add the ask‐bid pairs to a particular Q-level
∧

if

). Consider unmatched asks

. Step to the next Q-level (i.e.,
of the same or higher Q-levels (i.e.,
∧

if

Add the ask‐bid pairs to the matched list

).
and so on

until all eligible bids are matched.
∈ 1…

Definition 2: [GSPM pricing rule]: the seller ask price for
,

pair within any particular Q-level is
lower seller ask in rank

. The buyer bid price for a matched pair is

,

Definition 3: [Single Q-Levels EM Mth Pricing Rule]: the ask-bidder price for

∈

,

; and

and

sellers

. For the last match in a
and

ask

buyers

,

request

1…

Q-level

matched

, the price of the second

, the price of second lower buyer bid in rank
particular

1<

,

pay

,

pair is

=

exact

).

,

matched pair within a particular Q-level is

of the last matched pair

their

, the ask price

within the Q-level. The request-bidder price for a matched
, the ask-price of the last matched pair

within the Q-

level.
Definition 4: [Multiple Q-Levels EM Mth Pricing Rule]: the ask-bidder price for
∈ 1…

matched pair within a particular Q-level (i.e.,

, the ask price of the last matched pair
request-bidder price for a matched pair is
matched pair

within

,

within
=

) is

,
Q-level. The

, the ask-price of the last

Q-level. For the multiple Q-levels cross-matching
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,

cases (i.e., (

,

,

,

,

are integers.

,

the ask price of the last matched pairs of the higher Q-level

for requests

and asks.
Theorem 1: The VCG mechanisms (Vickrey, 1961) (Clarke, 1971) (Groves, 1973) are
the only AE and SP mechanisms for bidder agents with quasi-linear preferences and
general valuation functions amongst direct revelation mechanisms.
Theorem 2: The GSPM DA mechanism is allocative efficient (AE). The GSPM DA
maximizes the aggregate utilities of request and ask bidders by maximizing the aggregate
bid values of buyers and minimizing the aggregate ask values of sellers.
Proof: Consider a set of matching allocations
,

utility

,

,

∈

allocation

;∀

is buyer

, ,

,

is seller

,

,

:

…

→

.

is buyer

payment given type

0; ∀

collection given type

outcome
rule

≥ 0; ∀

for buyer agents of quasi-linear

.
∈

is seller

bid value for the matching
∈

. Let seller agents utility

ask value for allocation

, and reported types
,

∈

∗
∈

, ∀

. Then, the social choice exchange mechanism
…

is AE, ∀matching rule :

∗

∈

…

, ∀pricing

:
,

∈

,

→

,

∀ ∈

,∀

∈

Following the above analysis, and as presented in chapter 2, given an instance
, Q, ,

at period

values of buyers (i.e.,
sellers(i.e.,

, then the GSPM AE

∗

trade maximizes the collective bid

), and minimizes the collective ask values of
) at multiple Q-levels. The above equations are equivalent to
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equation (2) as shown in chapter 2. The AE social welfare objective of the CAP in (2)
maps, hence, to maximizing the total utilities the net FX e-market profit.
Forward-GSP auction max bid valuations: A max buyer bid is her true value for a
matching allocation. The buyer often strategizes by shading (lowering) her true bid value
to increase utility. Consider the case of a unit-demand forward-GSP auction of a single
Q-level e-service (i.e., similar factor-groups, from multiple sellers), then under the GSP
auction rule, the best-response strategies of bidders converge to VCG efficient outcome,
which is the only AE SP for agents with quasi-linear preferences (Edelman et al., 2007)
(Varian, 2007) (Nisan et al., 2011)(see Theorem 1). The best-response true bids guarantee
higher positions in the matched list that allow for the best wining chance while paying a
lower second bid price in order. Also, bidders may risk losing possible matching
allocation if they lower prices below the lowest matched pair. Furthermore, in the
multiple Q-level matching, bidders would have a chance to win a better e-service item of
higher Q-level using the multiple Q-levels cross-matching. In Definition 2, the
highest buyer bid
utility

and charged

∗

incentive if the

for a winning match. Her
0 since

.

There

is

also

no

bidder switches bids with the one above her in rank
0

. Hence, the GSPM achieves maximum (max) true

bids for buyers at best response strategies.
Reverse GSP auction minimum ask valuations: a min seller ask is her true cost for a
matching allocation. The seller often strategizes by shading (rising) her true cost value to
increase utility. The AE Reverse GSP auction of the min ask bidders is equivalent to the
AE Forward GSP auction of the max bid bidders as presented in chapter 2. hence the
same argument of the forward GSP auction is applied. The best-response true asks
guarantee higher positions in the matched list that allow for best winning chance, while
collecting a higher second ask price in order. Also, the ask sellers may risk losing
possible matching allocation if they raise prices higher than the highest matched pair.
Moreover, in the multiple Q-level matching, the sellers would have a better chance to win
a buyer from the lower Q-levels using the multiple Q-levels cross-matching∎.
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Definition 5: [Nash Equilibrium (NE)]: the NE “Symmetric NE (Varian, 2007)” of the
simultaneous move game induced by the GSP auction is locally envy-free if an ask or bid
bidder cannot improve her payoff by exchanging bids or asks with the bidder ranked one
position above her” (Edelman et al., 2007).
Theorem 3: The GSPM DA has NE with VCG AE outcomes in IC manner with repeated
best response.
Proof: consider the forward and reverse unit-demand GSP auctions for AE max bid
buyers and min ask sellers. Using the analysis of (Edelman et al., 2007) for envy-free
Nash equilibrium that is equivalent to the “Symmetric NE” (Varian, 2007) and the
analysis in (Nisan et al., 2011), though IC is not dominant strategy under GSP, the full
information GSP auction of the locally envy-free bidders and repeated best response
strategies converges to NE with VCG AE outcomes in IC manner. In the GSP auction,
there is no strategy profile from which all players but one do not wish to deviate and that
strictly prefers to NE reached if all players follow the repeated best‐response strategies, a
necessary argument to establish the IC of best‐response GSP auctions (i.e.,∄ state
,…,

∈ , and player ∈

and

such that ∀

,

is a best‐response to

. In fact, unstable bidders would pay a price as high as the payment

of the bidder who gets it in the VCG outcome, and thus, the unstable bidder would prefer
to be allocated it in the VCG outcomes that require the IC of players. In GSPM DA if any
buyer or seller agent

maximizes expected utility with strategy , given its preferences
,…,

and strategy of other agents then the strategy profile
Jr., 1951), at which

,

,

,

is at NE state (Nash
,

,∀

. NE in

GSPM requires every agent have perfect information about preferences of every other
agent, agent rationality, and agents must all select the same Nash equilibrium∎.
Definition 6: [budget-balance (BB)] A social choice matching function
,

is FX post BB if ∀preferences

…

:∑

0; no into or

out transfers to the exchange. The AE and BB imply Pareto optimality. The
post weak BB if∀ : ∑

0;

is FX
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Theorem 4: The GSPM DA is weak BB that secures e-market profitability and grows
with thick trades.
Proof: In theorem 1, the AE social matching objective of the GSPM DA in of equation
(2) maps to maximizing the net FX e-market profit
0 that

∑

∑

∑

is always positive, as the GSPM DA requires that

∑

as a condition for

matching. As per Definition 1, the eligible criteria of the GSPM matching (i.e.,
∧

is that

2:

≥

. However, as per the GSPM pricing rules of Definition

for second bid in rank and

for

. Hence, the GSPM DA maximizes the e-market

matching state, then

profitability that grows thicker e-market trades. As

based on the matching

rule requirement, the e-market profit is ∑
last match

0, ∀ . For the

, the buyer (seller) pays (collects) his bid (ask).∎

Definition 6 [Bidder Rationality (IR)]: A mechanism
implements a SCF
utility for agent
distribution

and

with

,

is IR if for all preferences
,

,

it

, is the expected

at outcome, given prior beliefs about others preferences
is the expected utility for non-participation.

is ex post IR

if an agent can withdraw once learns the outcome, in which expected utility from
participation must be at least its best outside utility for all possible types of agent.
Theorem 5: The GSPM DA is ex-post Bidder Rational (IR), VCG AE and SP with quasilinear agent preferences monotonic choice-set and no negative externalities.
Proof: The GSPM, VCG based exchange is IR when two sufficient conditions hold on
agent preferences (Parkes, 2001): (1) Choice set monotonicity: feasible choice set
increases as more agents introduced; means an agent cannot “block" a selection, and (2)
No negative externalities: Agent

has non-negative value, i.e.,

∗

,

0, means

any choice not involving an agent has a neutral (or positive) effect on that agent. To show
ex post IR, the utility to agent

in the VCG equilibrium outcome of the GSPM must

always be non-negative, given IC in equilibrium. The utility to agent with type

is:
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∗

,
,
∗

∗

∗

,
∗

,

∗

,
∗

∗

is non-negative because the value of the AE solution without agent ,

cannot be greater than the value of the AE solution with agent
agents

∗

,

,

∗

, as any choice with

is also feasible with all agents (monotonicity), and has just as much total

value (no negative externalities).∎

5.4 GSPM and EM Algorithmic Structure
The GSPM Algorithms follow the free market economy model and compute different
cost or payment prices for the matched winners. The multiple Q-levels e-services CAP
extends the complexity of the multiple-unit auction, as the cross-matching are dependent.
The bidders might be assigned an e-service of the same Q-level or higher contrary to the
independent multiple unit demand auctions. The simulation model allows for repetitive
trades, in which the FX applies the stored RBBL logical rules and operators for
preference deduction and request and ask bid formation at each trade to capture the
bidder dynamic reactions to disruptions at constant learning. Request and ask bids are
either bounded by the min/max true attribute valuations or unbounded.
The implemented algorithms and the activity flow structure of the simulated GSPM and
EM double auction mechanisms includes: (1) initial non repetitive setting stage that
instantiates the simulation code variables, generates the random true and first traded
requests and asks with random Q-levels, and implements the GSPM/EM e-trading
algorithms for the non-repetitive stage, and (2) repetitive e-trading stage that revaluates
the requests and asks based on the same instance of logical bidding rules of bidders. The
rules examine the current and previous win and lose states of all bidders and compute
accordingly the next move of request and ask revaluation. The stage implements, then,
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the GSPM/ EM e-trading algorithms, repetitively until the last preset trades (i.e., twenty
trades). The outline of the algorithmic flow model of the two stages is tabled as followed:
I.

The Initial Settings Stage


Generate the initial true ask and request bid valuations. (All Algorithms)



Generate the initial random traded bids. (All Algorithms)



Generate the random Q-levels for all bids. (Multiple Q-level Algorithms)



Generate the random Q-levels for all bids. (Single Q-level Algorithms)



Sort Q-levels in descend order. Group, then, the true and traded requests and asks
of each Q-level according to the sorted Q-levels. (All Algorithms)



Sort the true and traded requests and asks of each Q-level group. (All Algorithms)



Matching allocation for true and traded requests and asks. (All Algorithms)



GSPM Pricing and Metrics of true bids without learning.



EM Pricing and metrics for true bids without learning.

II.

The Repetitive e-Trading Stage with RBBL and GSPM Simulated Dynamics:


GSPM Pricing and Metrics of Single/Multiple Q-level bids and Learning.



EM M Pricing and Metrics of Single/Multiple Q-level bids and Learning.



Scenario#1: local rules inside FX update bids. (Unbounded Algorithms)



Scenario#1: local rules inside FX update bids. (Bounded Algorithms)



Scenario#2: bidders’ remote rules update bids. (Unbounded Algorithms)



Scenario#2: bidders’ remote rules update bids. (Bounded Algorithms)



Scenario#3: FX aggregated rules update bids. (Unbounded Algorithms)



Scenario#3: FX aggregated rules update bids. (Bounded Algorithms)



Sort Request and ask of each Q-level Group. (All Algorithms)



Matching allocation algorithm for true and traded bids. (All Algorithms)



Table winners and losers status change for next trades. (All Algorithms)
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The GSPM DA implements the SORT() algorithm in Appendix A on randomly generated
true initial requests and asks and randomly generated traded requests and asks, derived
from the true requests and asks. There are also the related randomly generated Q-levels.
The SORT() algorithm: (1) sort Q-levels in descending order, (2) group true and traded
requests and asks based on sorted Q-levels, and (3) sort true and traded bids (asks) within
each Q-level in ascending (descending) orders. While the Q-levels is not effective in the
single Q-level models, the SORT () algorithm, however, applies all GSPM and EM DA.
The MATCHING-ALLOCATION-RULE () algorithm in Appendix A, applies to all
GSPM and EM DA mechanisms. All GSPM and EM matching allocations apply
definition 1 for the matching allocations. The single Q-level GSPM pricing rule applies
the GSPM-PRICING-RULE () algorithm in Appendix A. The pricing rule works for all
GSPM DA mechanisms. All GSPM mechanisms apply definition 2 for the pricing rule of
the winning bidders of the matched pairs of request and ask. The bounded GSPM,
applies the BOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE () algorithm in Appendix A that models the
constant learning reaction at repetitive trades. The algorithm inspects the win and loses
states of all bidders at the current and previous trades and computes then the request and
asks adjustments for next repetitive trade based on the conveyed RBBL bounded
revaluation rules. The BOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE () constrains the revaluation
bounds to a maximum of the true initial bid valuations and to a minimum of the true
initial ask valuations. This reactive learning scheme is applied to all Bounded GSPM and
EM mechanisms. The EXAMINE-CHANGE-OF-STATES () algorithm examines the
winning and losing change of states of all bidders at the current and previous trades.
The single Q-level unbounded GSPM DA mechanism follows the bounded GSPM in
applying the same algorithms of the matching allocation and pricing rules. However, the
unbounded GSPM and EM apply the UNBOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE () algorithm in
Appendix A that liberates the bounds of the rule-based adjustments due constant learning
at repetitive trades. The UNBOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE () frees all rule-based bounds.
This reactive learning scheme works for all unbounded mechanisms. The single Q-level
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Mth EM pricing rule applies the EM-PRICING-SINGLE-Q () algorithm shown in
Appendix A. The pricing rule works for only single Q-level bounded and unbounded EM
mechanisms. It is presented for demonstration, analysis and comparison. The multiple Qlevel Mth EM pricing rule applies the EM-PRICING-MULTIPLE-Q () algorithm shown
in Appendix A. The pricing rule works for multiple Q-level bounded and unbounded EM
mechanisms. It follows definition 4.
This chapter covers the modeling and analysis of the proposed multiple Q-level GSPM
DA mechanism. Our work presents the single Q-level GSPM and EM DA mechanisms as
a reference DA mechanisms for developing the matching allocation and pricing rules of
the multiple Q-level GSPM and EM DA mechanisms. In that vein, the work introduces
the multiple Q-levels EM DA mechanism that extends the single Q-level EM to multiple
equilibrium price points for rather multiple trades. The multiple Q-levels of the EM DA
work as multiple EM trades that clear at different EM prices. While the single Q-level
GSPM and EM DA are AE they are not IC. Hence, the multiple Q-level GSPM and EM
DA is introduced to improve IC using the multiple Q-levels cross-matching. The multiple
Q-level, EM DA is compared with the multiple Q-level, GSPM DA for the gametheoretic and computational properties, as presented in the experimental analysis of next
chapter. The GSPM DA heuristics are polynomial time tractable and deliver social
efficiency, strategic stability and weak budget balance that secures exchange profitability.
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Chapter 6

6

Experimental Results and Analysis

The work here analyses the experimental findings of implementing the RBBL, rulesbased bidding language and the GSPM DA matching heuristics for the FX e-marketplace.
The FX targets, particularly, the stable and efficient matching allocation of the request
and ask bids on the e-services that the FX deduces and form out of the RBBL conveyed
attribute-values, logical rules formulae, and multiple e-service Q-levels. This chapter
tables the experimental simulation models and the implemented DA heuristics. The work
derives, also the experimental findings and the conclusions out of the empirical analysis.

6.1

RBBL Rule-based Bidding Experimental Model

The RBBL is a promising flexible and concise expressive language model that may find
applications in a wide scope of e-services, particularly, the e-marketplaces. The fact that
the RBBL bidding messages convey the logical rules and operators with rather multiple
attributes, attribute values, Q-levels and other constraining attributes, require that the FX
e-market system to have functional units that descript the logical rule and operator
formulae, deduce and aggregate the preferences of bidders out of the logical rules, and
generate the attribute combinations of the requested bids and offered asks. Our work,
however, doesn’t cover the scope of reasoning and deduction of the rule and operator
formulae. The presented experimental validation examines, nevertheless, the proof of
concept and verifies the performance advantage of using rules aggregation. Our work
uses MATLAB toolboxes to simulate the ask and request bidding behavior of a number
of bidders with the assumption that bidders apply self-learning abilities at repetitive
trades that translate to logical rules conveyed to the FX e-marketplace
The presented RBBL experimental validation examines the proof of concept and verifies
the performance advantage of using the RBBL rules aggregation. Our work uses the
MATLAB to simulate the RBBL bidding model and the rule-based dynamic behavior of
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the number of bidders with at repetitive trades. The simulation creates multiple Q-levels
as attributes (i.e.,
. .,

,

,

) with random initial values for a e-service request or ask

. The simulation correlates the attribute-values with the Q-level (i.e.,

generate higher random values for higher Q-level). The random request and ask bids are
then deduced by the exchange out of the multiple Q-level attribute-values and logical
rules formulae. There is also a random variation between bids and true values. The FX
collects the multiple Q-level attribute-values and the FOL rational rule formulae as
shown in Figure 21. The depicted RBBL FOL rules instruct the free exchange to
increment the attribute-values or combinations (i.e.,

∗ … if the consumer is

not a winner. Otherwise, at loss the request and ask bids stay as is or decrement attributevalues (i.e.,

∗… .

Figure 21: Attribute-values and rational rules of the RBBL validation
The simulations work for three scenarios: (1) execute the RBBL rules inside the bidder
agents; (2) execute the RBBL rule inside the FX with no aggregation to inspect the
communication cost; and (3) execute the RBBL rule inside the FX with simple
aggregation of bidder rules. The exchange applies two aggregation rules: (a) group and
sort request and ask bids inside the FX according to the multiple Q-levels, rather than
every trade inside the bidder agents; and (b) stop updating all request and ask bids that
reach the upper or lower bounds for the next stage (i.e., for bounded mechanisms). For
instance, the bounded GSPM applies a heuristic that inspects the win and lose states of all

90

bidders at the current and previous trades and computes the bid value adjustments for the
next repetitive trade based on the RBBL rules. Another heuristic constrains the request
and ask bid adjustment bounds to the maximum of the true initial request values and to
the minimum of the true initial ask values. Figure 22 shows the rules processing times of
twenty repetitive trades that use the bounded and unbounded multiple Q-levels GSPM
and EM heuristics for one thousand request and one thousand ask bidders. The simulation
applies the three rule based update scenarios mentioned above. The results of repeated
experiments show similar performance patterns for any number of bidders.

Figure 22: Rules processing times of twenty repetitive trades using the bounded and
unbounded multiple Q-level GSPM and EM for two thousand bidders.
Figure 23 shows the rules processing times for different number of bidders. The rules
aggregation inside the FX saved roughly half of the average relative processing times of
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all bidder agents that are locally simulated inside the FX. Also, the rules aggregation
inside the FX saved almost two third of the average processing times of remote bidder
agents (i.e., over local network). The performance advantage would be significant with
thicker e-market trades of much larger number of bidders and transactions over best
effort internet due to high communication cost and effective aggregations. Obviously,
even a simple aggregation of the RBBL rules inside e-exchange would deliver more rapid
response and, hence, faster trades. It is also evident that the higher the number of bidders
(i.e., thicker e-markets), the more effective the RBBL aggregation process. Of course, the
communication cost would make the RBBL more desirable, particularly, in thicker emarkets with a large number of online bidders. Our work, anticipate, also the preference
elicitation deduction (not implemented) would have a more substantial impact.

Figure 23: Rules processing times vs. number of bidders for the bounded and
unbounded multiple Q-levels GSPM and EM trades
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6.2 GSPM and EM Experimental Matching Models
The GSPM DA matching is another prospective venue for the FX e-marketplace. The FX
applies the GSPM DA heuristics on the generated requests and asks to compute efficient
and stable matching allocation and pricing outcomes. A key theme in the GSPM is the
fact it motivates the strategic IC of bidders while narrowing down the tactical scope using
the second price in rank without blocking the rational free choice. The FX achieves
truthful interactions by implementing an AE DA matching that exploits both the GSP and
revere GSP for trading e-services of identical attributes and multiple Q-levels. For
instance, a request bidder would be better off if she conveys a truthful valuation on an the
e-service of particular Q-level, as it would minimize the risk of losing to others in the
matched list at that Q-level, while having an incentive for a chance to be awarded an eservice of rather higher Q-level using the GSPM multiple Q-level cross-matching
heuristics. Another key aspect is that GSPM DA guarantees e-market profitability that
grows with the rapid stable convergence of the thick e-markets. The GSPM ensures,
hence, the stable social efficiency of the FX e-marketplace, while securing sufficient emarket profitability that grow with number of satisfied bidders.
The simulation work in this section targets the comparative analysis between the GSPM
and EM (Wurman et al., 1998) DAs. The reason for choosing the EM for comparison is
due to the fact while the GSPM is discriminatory pricing for symmetric DA the EM is
uniform clearing pricing for symmetric DA. The EM computes the market competitive
equilibrium of supply and demand and work efficiently at perfect competition of free
market economy. The EM is, also, desirable for its efficiency and tractability, hence,
widely used in diverse market auctions (i.e., energy market auction). The simulation
implements, examines and reports the experimental results and findings of the eight
GSPM and EM double auction mechanisms that exploits the conveyed RBBL instance
message of as described in the previous section, for up to 2000 request and ask bidders
that dictates their constant learning and reactive model: (1) Single Q-level bounded
GSPM DA, a base model for the multiple Q-levels GSPM DA, (2) Single Q-level
unbounded GSPM DA for testing impact of free unconstrained strategies, (3) Multiple Q-
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levels bounded GSPM DA, the core model,(4) Multiple Q-levels Unbounded GSPM DA,
the core unbounded extension, (5) Single Q-level Bounded EM DA (Wurman et al.,
1998), (6) Single Q-level Unbounded EM DA, (7) Multiple Q-levels bounded EM DA, a
new proposed extension of (5) for comparative analysis, and (8) Multiple Q-levels
unbounded EM DA. The simulation implements, examines and reports the experimental
results and findings of the four comparative analysis between GSPM and EM DA
mechanisms that exploits also the conveyed RBBL instance as described above for 2000
request and ask bidders that dictates the constant learning and reactive model.

6.3 Bounded GSPM Double auction Mechanisms
The matching allocation of the single Q-level and multiple Q-levels bounded GSPM DA
mechanisms follow the GSPM matching allocation rule in definition 1. While definitions
1 exploits, to some extent, the equilibrium matching (EM) allocation (Wurman et al.,
1998), it extends the matching allocations to the multiple Q-level cross-matching that
motivates the IC. The pricing rules, however, follows our proposed GSPM pricing rule in
definitions 2 for the requests and asks. One of the challenges that multiple Q-level GSPM
mechanisms encounter is the instability of both AE and IC properties. This means there is
no incentive for bidders to reveal their true valuations if they can reduce their traded bids
and still win. As such our work extend the CAP model to include multiple Q-level items
and introduce the multiple Q-level GSPM mechanisms that improve incentive compatible
due to multiple Q-levels cross-matching. The cross-matching allows for matching bids of
a particular Q-level and asks of the same or high Q-levels. The more the number of Qlevels, the narrower the tactical maneuverability space of bidders. A consumer may bid
for an e-service of certain functionality at a minimum Q-level. The e-service providers
may offer similar e-services of rather different Q-levels. Then the multiple Q-level
GSPM DA implements the MATCHING-ALLOCATION-RULE () for cross- matching
that allows winners to win an item of targeted Q-level or higher. Hence, the consumer
would have an incentive to reveal truthful requests and asks to guarantee place in the
winning list or increase chances to win an even higher Q-level e-service with the same
bid. The same applies to ask bidders, where they increase also chances to win a place in
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the matched list and give a higher chances to match with higher request bid bidders for
lower Q-level e-services. This section describes and examines the main implemented
algorithms and repots on the experimental findings.

6.3.1 Experimental Bounded GSPM Description
Table 1 depicts a GSPM requests and asks processing instance of twenty bidders at the
first and twentieth repetitive trades with constant learning and strategic rule-based
revaluations. The first two tables depicts the processing of the requests and asks through
different algorithmic stages of the GSPM DA at first trade: (1) twenty sorted initial true
requests and asks of single and multiple Q-level, (2) twenty generated random requests
and asks that is purposely deviated at random from the initial true requests and asks
(without learning and revaluation of rules), and (3) GSPM requests and asks matching
allocations with applied GSPM pricing rule (i.e., payments and costs). The second table
depicts the processing of the requests and asks through the algorithmic stages of the
GSPM DA at the twentieth trade: (4) the same twenty sorted initial true requests and asks
of single Q-level, (5) the twenty generated random requests and asks using RBBL logical
rules, (6) the GSPM requests and asks matching with applied GSPM pricing rule.
Apparently, the expected number of matched-pairs increases at repetitive trades due to
the constant learning and rational reactions of bidders that adapts with the winning and
losing states and prospects as described in the rules revaluation algorithms. The other
observation relates to the constant fall of the variance between the requests and asks
throughout the repetitive e-trading process until it reaches the stability of second prices or
EM price or true setting bounds. In fact, this is a natural reaction of bid (ask) winners
who attempt to lower (raise) valuations at constant learning of repetitive trade disruptions
for achieving higher utilities. Bid (Ask) Losers, however, attempt to rise (lower)
valuations for having a rather better chance to be in the winner matched list. The outcome
as observed in the Table 1 and Figure 24 is an initial rapid drop of variance between
requests and asks and an increasing number of matched pairs. Variance converges to
stability as matched pairs converge to maximum matching or that of true settings. For
multiple Q-level, it is observed that the matched list per Q-level grows with repetitive
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trades with some requests and asks Q-level cross-matched. The allocation and pricing
rules of single Q-level GSPM is applied for multiple Q-levels with rather cross-matching.
Table 1: Sample results of first and twentieth single Q-level (left set) and multiple Qlevels (right set) bounded GSPM repetitive trades of twenty request and ask bidders

6.3.2 Analysis of Bounded GSPM Trades
The first set of Figure 24 depicts the constant learning trend as exploited by the RBBL
rule instance of 200 request and ask bidders in the first and twentieth trades. Obviously,
the second graph of the first set shows the rapid fall of the variance between requests and
asks and the growing size of the matched list. In fact the final matched list is similar to
that the initial true matched list shown in light colors. The losing bidders demonstrate the
bounded aggressive corrective moves to increasing (lowering) their bids (asks) for a
better winning chance that results in a more matched pairs. However, the winning bidders
demonstrate a bounded conservative moves to decreasing (increasing) their bids (asks)
that increases their utilities within their bounds and results in the fast drop of bids/asks
variance. The second set demonstrates the impact of thicker e-markets (i.e., 200 request
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and ask bidders). Obviously, the more the thicker e-markets is the more stable and rapid
it converges to social efficiency due the converging very small difference between
bid/ask and payment/cost values being the second prices as realized by (Roth, 2007).

Figure 24: Traded vs. initial true matched pairs of the first and twentieth trades of
the bounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-levels (lower set) GSPM
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6.3.3 Analysis of Bounded GSPM Metrics
Figure 25 depicts the metrics of two instances of 200 and 1000 single Q-level and
multiple Q-levels request and ask bidders in the bounded GSPM e-market. The follwoing
are the experimental findings:
1. The U-Welfare of fixed initial values (fixed U-Welfare) is the utility social welfare
that aggregates the utilities of bidders in reference to their fixed initial true
requests and asks (i.e., sum (Initial true bids - current payments)+ sum (current
costs- Initial true asks )). The fixed U-Welfare converges rapidly to a maximum
stable AE bounds compared to the initial true welfare (i.e., green line) as request
and ask utilities increase due to the rule based adjustments driven by constant
learning at repetitive trades. That results in a rising asks/costs and falling
bids/payment until they reach the stable bounds of the second price limits. The
thick e-market increases the fixed U-Welfare significantly in reference to the true
initial settings at thicker e-market trades.
2. The U-Welfare of dynamic (current) values (moving Welfare) is the moving utility
social welfare that aggregates the utilities of bidders in reference to the current
trade true requests and asks (i.e., sum (current bids - current payments)+ sum
(current costs-current asks)). The moving U-Welfare converges to a low stable
utility welfare that is close to max item value. This is due to the sharp fall of
differences between current bids (asks) and second price payments (costs) at
repetitive trades. The thick e-markets have no effect on the converged utility
value, but delivers instant convergence due to the faster stability of requests and
asks at thicker repetitive trades.
3. The V-Welfare is the valuation social welfare that correlates with the e-market
profit. The V-Welfare is equal to the moving U-Welfare and the e-market profit.
Hence, the V-Welfare converges to the e-market profit as the moving U-Welfare
converges to a stable low value at thicker trades. The V-Welfare totals the
maximum bid and minimum ask values or equivalently the maximum bid minus
maximum ask values which at thicker trades converges to the maximum payment
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minus maximum cost values, or the FX e-market profit. The V-Welfare and emarket profitability of bounded GSPM converge to stable positive value that is
lower than that of initial settings due to the rule based adjustment that direct the
convergence to lower value bids and higher value asks at constant leaning of
repetitive trades. In fact, the winners maintain a bounded conservative moves to
increase utilities while losers takes a bounded aggressive moves to join in the
matched list until they reach the bounded true values. This is the free natural
reaction of bidders that directs the V-Welfare stability as it balances the rising
asks and the falling bids and converge to the second prices payment/cost or true
bounds. The thicker e-market deliver higher, stable and more rapid instant
convergence as the variance drops considerably. The GSPM DA guarantees, also,
the e-market converge rapidly to a stable profitability that grow, also, with the
economy of scale of thicker e-market trades.
4. The bounded GSPM converges rapidly after few trades to the maximum number
of the matched pairs of the true initial value settings shown in green line. This is
due to the initial rapid and aggressive incremental fall of bids and rise of asks of
the losing bidders to gain a winning seat in the matched list. The winners then
takes a conservative moves close to the second prices to gain better utilities.
5. The variance of bounded GSPM drops rapidly at the first initial trades to
optimizing the random initial settings with larger delta adjustments of the requests
and asks then it stabilizes with smaller changes as values get closer to the second
price bounds. The variance converges, then, to a stable low value outcome due
rather to the narrowing differences between the rising asks and the falling bids.
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Figure 25: Metrics of the bounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-level
(lower set) GSPM of 200 and 1000 request and ask bidders
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6.4 Unbounded GSPM Double Auction Mechanisms
6.4.1 Experimental Unbounded GSPM Description
The instance in Table 2: follows the same settings of the Table 1. However, it is obvious
that the unbounded GSPM DA allows losers to play rather more aggressive corrective
moves and break risk neutrality for better winning chance within and across the multiple
Q-levels. Hence, the unbounded GSPM matched list converges to complete matched list
at repetitive trades with most losers turn into winners while narrows down the bids/ asks
variance. The violation of the risk neutrality of allows losers an unbounded free choice
and conduct. The first and final trades in Table 2: demonstrate how unbounded losers
converge to winners through aggressive lowering (raising) of their bids (asks) in a way
that breach risk neutrality. Winners, however, apply conservative moves to narrow down
variance between requests and ask to increase their utilities. The multiple Q-level
unbounded GSPM motivation follows the one of bounded GSPM in the previous section.
Table 2: Sample results of first and twentieth single Q-level (left set) and multiple
Q-levels (right set) unbounded GSPM trades of twenty request and ask bidders
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6.4.2 Analysis of Unbounded GSPM Trades
Figure 26 shows the constant learning trend of 200 request and ask bidders in the first and
twentieth trades. The second graph show an almost complete matched list that include all
bidders with constant drop of the bid/ask variance similar to the bounded GSPM. The
lower graph set shows the multiple Q-level matched list with some cross-matched pairs.
The narrowing gap between requests and asks (falling variance) at each Q-level is
obvious, as well. In fact, the losers demonstrate a rather unbounded aggressive corrective
moves by breaching risk neutrality for a winning chance (i.e., often found in classic
markets for clearing of slow moving items) by increasing (lowering) bids(asks) beyond
initial true bounds (i.e., see the curve extension into the losers zone). The results exhibits
the rapid convergence of thick e-market risk neutral winners to stable efficiency at each
Q-level while the unbounded risk unneutral losers become winners at repetitive trades
with the bounded conservative moves of winners within the initial winning space and the
unbounded aggressive moves of losing bidders beyond the initial winning space to
become winners. That result is a complete cross-matched list and lower variance.

6.4.3 Analysis of Unbounded GSPM Metrics
Figure 27 depicts the metrics of the Single Q-level and multiple Q-levels Unbounded
GSPM DA mechanism. The analysis emphasizes the following experimental findings:
1. The U-Welfare of fixed values keeps falling to the negative quadrant at repetitive
trades and also with thicker e-markets of more bidders compared to that of the
initial true settings due to, primarily, the violation of risk neutrality of losers.
2. The moving U-Welfare of dynamic values converges to a stable low utility welfare
that is close to max item value at thicker trades. This is due to the sharp fall of
differences between current bids (asks) and second price payments (costs) at
repetitive trades. The thick e-markets have no effect on the converged utility, but
keep decreasing and converge to a stable low welfare at repetitive trades.
3. The V-Welfare and e-market profitability keep increasing to values beyond that of
the initial true settings due to the rule-based aggressive adjustments that direct the
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unbounded convergence of the risk unneutral higher value bids and lower value
asks of the losing bidders at constant leaning of repetitive trades. In fact, the
winners maintain bounded conservative moves to second prices to increase
utilities while the losing bidders take unbounded aggressive moves to join in the
matched list. The V-Welfare and e-market profitability converge to stability when
all requests and asks of now all joining winners get closer to the second prices.
The V-Welfare and e-market profitability grow for all trades and thicker markets.

Figure 26: Traded vs. initial true matched pairs of the first and twentieth trades of
the unbounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-levels (lower set) GSPM
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Figure 27: Metrics of unbounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-level
(lower set) GSPM of 200 and 1000 request and ask bidders
4. The unbounded GSPM e-market converges to the maximum complete matched
pair that covers almost all ask-bid pairs at repetitive trades. This is a result of the
unbounded reactions of bidders that disregard risk neutrality for a wining seat.
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5. The variance drops rapidly at the initial trades due to the large delta adjustments
of the requests and asks of losers. The variance converges, then, to stable low
value due to the narrowing difference between the rising asks and the falling bids.

6.5 Bounded Mth EM Double Auction Mechanisms
The bounded Mth EM mechanism applies the matching allocation and Mth pricing rule of
(Wurman et al., 1998), however, for single Q-level requests and asks. This Mth EM is
described in chapter 4 while the pricing rule is based on definition 3.

6.5.1 Bounded Mth EM DA Description
The data Table 3 depicts the EM requests and asks processing of twenty bidders at the
first and twentieth repetitive trades with constant learning and rule-based adjustments. It
follows data Table 1 in structure. As in other DA mechanisms the repetitive trades
increase the number of matched pairs. The other observation relates to the converging of
requests and asks to almost same valuation in the twentieth trade with rather a minor
change in the EM equilibrium price. In fact, this is a natural reaction of bid (ask) winners
who attempt to lower (raise) their valuation for achieving higher utilities. Bid (Ask)
Losers, however, attempt to raise (lower) their valuations for better winning chances. As
mentioned in chapter 4, our work, inspired by the theoretical model and the experimental
finding of the multiple Q-level GSPM DA, proposes a generalized multiple Q-level Mth
EM DA mechanism that exploits a multiple equilibrium matching points for the multiple
Q-levels in computing the matching allocation and pricing rules for multiple units of a
single-item of multiple attributes, and multiple Q-levels. The proposed multiple Q-level
Mth EM DA follows the matching allocation of the proposed multiple Q-level GSPM
mechanism. The multiple Q-level Mth EM DA sorts the Q-levels, with asks of same Qlevels and bids of same min Q-levels, and apply a multilevel cross- matching allocation
as shown in Figure 20. The multiple Q-level Mth EM DA pricing rule, however, follows
definition 4. The following steps describe the multiple Q-level Mth EM mechanism. The
multiple Q-level cross-matching allows for matching between bids of a particular Q-level
and asks from the same or high Q-levels. The multiple Q-level EM DA implements the
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matching allocation algorithm#2 as d in definition 3 and the following multiple Q-level
Mth EM pricing algorithm#8 as stated in definition 4.
Table 3: Sample results of first and twentieth single Q-level (left set) and multiple Qlevels (right set) unbounded EM trades of twenty request and ask bidders

6.5.2 Analysis of Bounded Mth EM DA Trades
Figure 28 shows the constant learning trend as exploited by the RBBL rule instance of
200 bidders in the first and twentieth trades. Both repetitive trades converge each Q-level
to the Mth equilibrium price (i.e., the last matched ask price in a Q-level) that bid (ask)
winning bidders have to pay(collect). In fact the final matched list is quite similar to the
initial true valuation matched list as shown in light colors of the second graph of both
sets. The losers demonstrate a bounded aggressive moves to increasing (lowering) their
bids (asks) for a winning chance while the winners demonstrate a conservative moves to
decreasing (increasing) bids(asks) their utilities that narrows down bids/asks variance.
The second set reveals the insignificant impact of the thicker e-market on EM contrary to
the GSPM. The observed outcome of repetitive trades is the very low variance of the
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converging requests and asks and also the no e-market profits. In fact, EM e-markets
profit is most often equal to zero, in which the GSPM DA find an inherent competitive
advantage over EM DA.

Figure 28: Traded vs. initial true matched pairs of the first and twentieth trades of
the bounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-levels (lower set) EM DA
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6.5.3 Analysis of Bounded Mth EM DA Metrics
Figure 29, depicts the metrics of two instances of request and ask bidders in single and
multiple Q-levels bounded EM DA. The following are the experimental findings:
1. The fixed U-Welfare converges rapidly to the stable bounds of initial U-Welfare
values (i.e., green line) for single Q-level model as request and ask fixed utilities
keep increasing and converges to the EM price at repetitive trades that is close the
mean of initial EM prices as shown in Table 3. The fixed U-Welfare of multiple
Q-levels EM converges to a higher stable bounds, however, with respect to initial
U-Welfare based on the rather more fuzzy means of the initial multiple Q-level
EM prices, as shown in Table 3. Another reason is the cross matching effect. The
thick e-markets increase the U-Welfare significantly with respect initial settings
due to increasing number of trades. This is due to the constant rising of asks/costs
and falling of bids/payment until they reach the stable bound of initial true values.
2. The moving U-Welfare converges to a stable low utility welfare. This is due to
the sharp fall of differences between current bids (asks) and Mth EM payments
(costs) at repetitive trades. The thick e-markets, while it have no effect on the
converged welfare value it delivers rapid convergence as the bids (asks) variance
drops with thick e-market trades.
3. moving U-Welfare keeps decreasing and converges to small value at constant
learning of repetitive trades as the current bids/payments and current asks/costs
converge to the same EM e-market Mth equilibrium price value with low variance.
4. The V-Welfare falls rapidly and converges to stable low value with respect to the
initial true V-Welfare. This is due to the large incremental valuation drops of
initial winning bids and losing asks that stabilizes with smaller increments as
requests and asks get closer to the EM pricing bounds. However, the losers keep
bounded aggressive moves to join in the matched list, while winners maintain
conservative moves to increase utility. The thicker e-market, while it increases the
V-Welfare, it delivers instant convergence as the variance drops rapidly with
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thicker trades. The e-market profitability, however, maintains a zero value for all
trade as the ask/bid bidders collect/pay the same Mth EM price.

Figure 29: Metrics of bounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-level,
(lower set) EM DA, of 200 and 1000 request and ask bidders
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5. The bounded EM DA converges to the maximum number of true matched pairs at
repetitive trades (i.e., light green) . This due to the fewer bidders at each Q-level
and the corrective style of losers to join the matched list.
6. The variance drops rapidly at the initial trades due to the large delta adjustments
of losers. The variance converges, then, to stable low value due to the narrowing
difference between the rising asks and the falling bids close to the EM Mth price.

6.6 Unbounded Mth EM Double Auction Mechanisms
The Single Q-level Unbounded EM DA mechanism follows the bounded Single Q-level
EM in the matching allocation and pricing rules. However, the unbounded EM applies
the UNBOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE () algorithm that liberates bounds of the constant
learning reaction at repetitive trades. The UNBOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE frees all
rule-based bounds. This reactive learning scheme works on unbounded DA mechanisms.
The Multiple Q-level Unbounded EM DA model follows the Multiple Q-level Bounded
EM model in previous section. This section examines the unbounded choices of bidders.

6.6.1 Unbounded Mth EM DA Description
The data in Table 4 follows the same setting of the Table 3. However, it is obvious that
the unbounded EM DA allows losers to play rather more aggressive corrective moves and
break risk neutrality for better winning chance. Hence, the unbounded GSPM matching
list converges to full list of all trades while reducing the bid/ask variance. The violation
of the risk neutrality of allows bidders an unbounded free choice and conduct. The first
and final trades demonstrate how unbounded losers may converge to be winners and
impact the matched list through lowering (raising), freely, their bids (asks) and how
winners narrow request and ask variance to increase their utilities.
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Table 4: Sample results of first and twentieth single Q-level (left set) and multiple Qlevels (right set) unbounded EM trades of twenty request and ask bidders

6.6.2 Analysis of Unbounded Mth EM DA Trades
Figure 30 shows the constant learning trend of 200 request and ask bidders in the first and
twentieth trades. The second right graphs show an almost full matched list that include all
bidders with constant drop of the bid/ask variance. In fact, the losers demonstrate a rather
unbounded aggressive corrective moves and break risk neutrality for a winning chance
by increasing (lowering) bids(asks) beyond initial true bounds (i.e., see the curve
extension into the losers zone). The loser/winning dynamics results in a full matching and
reduction of bid/ask variance. The lower set exhibits the rapid convergence of thicker emarket to stable efficiency while unbounded losers become winner at repetitive trades.
That attributes to the extension of the matching curve in the losers space as shown below.
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Figure 30: : Traded vs. initial true matched pairs of the first and twentieth trades of
the unbounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-levels (lower set) EM DA

6.6.3 Analysis of Unbounded Mth EM DA Metrics
Figure 31 depicts the metrics of the Single Q-level Unbounded EM DA mechanism. The
analysis emphasizes the following experimental findings:
1. The fixed U-Welfare falls rapidly from values close to the initial true welfare
value shown in light green to rather lower positive values that converge to zero U-
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Welfare at repetitive trades. This is due to the violation of the risk neutrality that
motivates losers to overbid by decreasing (increasing) their bids (asks) over true
bounds that generates negatives utilities and force welfare to decrease gradually
until all requests and asks matched at EM price and zero welfare.
2. The moving U-Welfare keeps decreasing and converges to stable lower values at
repetitive trades as the current bids/payments and current asks/costs converge to
the EM e-market Mth equilibrium price value.
3.

The V-Welfare and e-market profitability falls rapidly and converges to stable
lower value with respect to the initial true V-Welfare. This is due to the large
incremental valuation drops of initial winning bids and losing asks that converges
to more stable smaller increments as requests and asks get closer to EM pricing
bounds. This V-Welfare stability is due the balancing effect of the rising asks and
the falling bids that converge to the Mth pricings. The EM delivers almost no (i.e.,
zero) e-market profitability as the ask/bid bidders collect/pay the same EM price.
Also, thick e-markets increase the V-Welfare and deliver instant convergence.

4. The EM e-market converges slowly to the a full matched pairs list for single and
multiple Q-levels that include all bidders (i.e., initial winners and losers) after few
trades (see the green line for initial requests and asks valuation matched list) at
repetitive trades. This due to the fewer bidders at each Q-level and the aggressive
corrective style of losers to join the matched list.
5. The variance drops slowly at the initial trades due to the large delta adjustments of
losers. The variance converges, then, to stable low value due to the narrowing
difference between the rising ask bids and the falling request bids close to the EM
Mth price.
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Figure 31: Metrics of the unbounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-level,
(lower set) EM DA of 200 and 1000 request and ask bidders

6.7 The GSPM and EM Comparative Analysis
This section summarizes the comparative experimental findings between the GSPM and
EM DA mechanisms for the single Q-level and multiple Q-levels requests and asks. Our
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work here investigates, also, the bounded and unbounded bidder reactions due to their
constant learning of e-market dynamics at repetitive trades.

6.7.1 Single and Multiple Q-level(s) Bounded GSPM and EM DAs
Experimental Matching Behaviour: Figure 32 depicts the matching patterns of the
GSPM and EM DA mechanisms for bounded request and ask bidders of a single Q-level
(left set) and multiple Q-levels (right set) e-service at the first and twentieth repetitive
trades. The GSPM and EM DA exhibit a gradual reduction of the request/ask bids
variance with the increasing matched list that converges to the initial true matched list.
The GSPM thicker trades converge rapidly to stable efficiency as request and ask bids
converge to the second prices. The Mth EM thick trades, however, have no effect. The
losers demonstrates a bounded aggressive corrective actions by increasing (lowering)
their request (ask) bids for a winning chance. The winners demonstrate conservative
actions to improve their utilities. That results in reducing the request/ask bids variance.
The EM repetitive trades converge to the Mth equilibrium prices.
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Figure 32: Single Q-level (lefts set) and multiple Q-levels (right set) bounded GSPM
and EM DA matching patterns at first and twentieth trades
Experimental Metrics: Figure 33, depicts sample metrics of the GSPM and EM DA
mechanisms of a two thousand bounded request and ask bidders of multiple Q-levels eservices during twenty repetitive trades. The analysis extends to single Q-level models.
1) The fixed U-Welfare of the GSPM or EM DA converges rapidly to a maximum stable
AE bounds compared to the initial true welfare (i.e., green line) as ask and request bid
utilities increase due to the rule adjustments driven by constant learning at repetitive
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trades. The EM converges to higher welfare values compared to GSPM as the rising
asks/costs and falling bids/payments of the GSPM converge to the stable bounds of the
closer second prices, while the EM converges to the stable bounds of the rather distant
EM price. Else, the thicker e-markets increase the fixed U-Welfare significantly.
2) The moving U-Welfare of the GSPM and EM converge to a low stable utility. This is
due to the rapid fall of differences between current request (ask) bids and GSPM
second price payments (costs) or the Mth equilibrium price value at repetitive trades.
The thick e-markets have no effect on the converged utility, but deliver instant GSPM
convergence and faster EM convergence (slower in base) due to the faster converging
stability of the bids and ask at thicker trades.
3) The V-Welfare and e-market profitability converge to stable positive value that is
lower than that of initial settings due to the rule based adjustment that direct the
convergence to lower value bids and higher value asks at constant leaning of repetitive
trades. The winners maintain bounded conservative moves to increase utilities while
losers take bounded aggressive moves to join in the matched list until they reach the
bounded true values. The thicker e-market deliver higher, stable and more rapid
instant. The GSPM DA guarantees, also, the e-market converge rapidly to a stable
profitability close to the V-Welfare that grow, also, with the economy of scale of
thicker e-market trades. The V-Welfare of the EM DA, however, falls rapidly and
converges to stable low value close to zero with respect to the initial utility. This is
due to the large increments of initial request and asks bids that stabilize with smaller
increments as request and ask bids get closer to the EM pricing bounds. However, the
EM profitability maintains a zero value as ask/bid bidders collect/pay the EM price.
4) The bounded GSPM and EM DA converge to the maximum number of matched pairs
close to the true value matched pairs (shown in green). This is the natural matching
progress of the bounded learners (bidders) at repetitive trades.
5) The variance of the GSPM and EM DA drops rapidly at the initial trades due to the
large delta adjustments of the request and ask bids of the losers. The variance then
converges with smaller adjustments to a stable low value as the falling bids and the
rising asks get closer to the GSPM second price or the EM Mth price bounds.
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Figure 33: Sample metrics of the bounded multiple Q-level GSPM DA and EM DA
for two thousand request and ask bidders during twenty repetitive trades
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6.7.2 Single and Multiple Q-level(s) Unbounded GSPM and EM DAs
Experimental Matching Behaviour: Figure 34 depicts the matching patterns of the
GSPM and EM DA of unbounded request and ask bidders of single Q-level and multiple
Q-levels e-service at the first and twentieth repetitive trades. Both unbounded DA deliver
a full matched list of all bidders (i.e., initial winners and losers). The losers demonstrate a
rather unbounded aggressive corrective move and break risk neutrality for a winning seat
by increasing (lowering) request (ask) bids beyond initial true bounds (i.e., see the curve
extensions into the losers zone). The thicker DA e-market trades deliver a rapid stable
efficiency of winners while losers join in winners at repetitive trades.
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Figure 34: Single Q-level (left set) and multiple Q-levels (right set) unbounded
GSPM and EM DA matching patterns at first and twentieth trades
Experimental Metrics: Figure 35 depicts sample metrics of the GSPM and EM DA
mechanisms of two thousand unbounded request and ask bidders of multiple Q-levels eservices during twenty repetitive trades. The analysis extends to single Q-level models.
1) The fixed U-Welfare of the unbounded GSPM DA keeps falling to the negative
quadrant at repetitive trades, while the fixed U-Welfare of the unbounded EM keeps
falling to rather positive lower values. The thicker e-market trades intensify the
impact. This is due to the violation of the risk neutrality that motivates losing bidders
to overbid by decreasing (increasing) their bids (asks) over true bounds that generate
negatives utilities. The GSPM fixed U-Welfare drops to a negative zone as its bounded
fixed U-Welfare shown in previous section get overrun by the negative utilities. The
EM fixed U-Welfare drops to lower positive value, though, due to its higher bounded
EM fixed U-Welfare. This pattern of tactical trading actions is often found in
conventional markets or e-market, where there are some bidders who are stuck with
their non-moving or slow-moving items. It also observed in markets where bidders
might need a critical item or tactically inspecting the e-market valuation for an items.
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2) The moving U-Welfare of the unbounded GSPM and EM DA keep decreasing and
converges to a stable low welfare at repetitive trades. This correlates with the constant
fall of differences between the current bids (asks) and the GSPM second price
payments (costs) or the EM Mth equilibrium price at repetitive trades. The thick emarkets have no effect, but delivers instant GSPM convergence, while keeps falling
for EM until it converges to a stable low utility.
3) The V-Welfare and e-market profitability of GSPM DA keep increasing to values
beyond that of the initial true setting due to the unbounded aggressive adjustments that
direct the unbounded convergence of the risk unneutral higher value bids and lower
asks of the losers at constant leaning of repetitive trades. However, the winners
maintain bounded conservative moves to second prices to increase utilities. The
GSPM V-Welfare and e-market profitability converge to stability when all request and
ask bids of now all joining winners get closer to the second prices. The V-Welfare and
e-market profitability grow for all trades and thicker markets. The V-Welfare and emarket profitability of the EM DA, however, keep falling and converge to stable lower
value with respect to the initial true V-Welfare. These is due to the larger increments
of request and ask bids that stabilize with smaller increments as request and ask bids
get closer to the EM price. The EM delivers zero profitability as the request/ask
bidders collect/pay the same EM price.
4) The unbounded GSPM and EM converge to the maximum full matched pairs that
covers almost all request-ask pairs at repetitive trades. This is a result of the
unbounded reactions of bidders that scarify risk neutrality for a wining match.
5) The variance drops rapidly at the initial trades due to the large delta adjustments of the
request and ask bids of losers. The variance converges to stable low value due to the
narrowing difference between the rising asks and falling bids.
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Figure 35: Sample metrics of the unbounded multiple Q-level, GSPM DA vs. EM
DA for two thousand request and ask bidders during twenty repetitive trades
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6.8 Complexity Analysis of the GSPM and EM Mechanisms
Our work examines the execution runtimes for all matching codes using the MATLAB
tic-toc. A similar pattern of processing times is observed for GSPM and EM DAs at
various trade settings. In fact, the most demanding function is the SORT () function that
all DA mechanisms share for grouping, sorting and indexing. The blue curve in Figure 36
depicts the average absolute processing runtimes of all DA allocation and pricing
algorithms for up to 10000 ask or request bidders. Figure 36 shows also the asymptotic
log

upper bound curve in green of the

that our work derived

for the complexity of the experimental data pattern of the processing runtimes at different
trades. The experimental results pattern is common between all DA mechanisms. The
yellow curves are sample functions (i.e.,

that present an upper and lower

bounds for the experimental data results, It designates a tighter bounds
Θ

log

Θ

log

. However, our work maintains the upper bound complexity
as the worst case runtime of all algorithms.
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Figure 36 Complexity analysis of GSPM and EM algorithms
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Chapter 7

7

Conclusions and Future work

Our work contemplates on the profoundly changing landscapes of e-marketplaces due to
the massive growth and interactive marketing of e-services. While the prospects of the
digital era are enormous, e-marketplaces are encountering inherent and persistent gametheoretic and computational complexities that challenge the strategic and computational
efficiencies of the matching mechanisms. In fact, the mounting complexities are inciting
the industry to pursue more resilient delivery and revenue ecosystem friendly e-market
mechanisms (Moore, 1996). Our work examines the limited bidding scope and strategic
trading conduct of e-market mechanisms that often provoke adverse strategies and lead to
e-market failures. The market economy of free rational conduct would, however, enable
stable social efficiency by equalizing the dual self-interest and essential needs of bidders
to the scarce assets. The dual dynamics inspire the collaborative strategies that discourage
monopolies. The constant learning at repetitive trades motivates bidders to reason about
e-market disruptions and adjusts preferences and strategic conduct in a rational manner.
This type of strategic conduct is a truthful rational reaction that must be freely expressed.
Our work targets the solution approach of a rather truthful, efficient and stable problem
models of a class of CAP for multiple units of a single-item (i.e., e-service or app) of
multiple-attributes, attribute-values and, particularly, multiple Q-levels that extend to the
CAP of multiple units of multiple attribute items (i.e., multiple e-services).
Our work introduces the free exchange by endowing it with the RBBL that enables the
flexible and symmetric expression of free choice and strategic conduct. The RBBL
structure includes multiple distinct attribute-values of various digital and the logical rule
formulae. The RBBL bidding model enables a graph-based expressions of the multiple
distinct attribute-values of various e-services, and also the expressions of applied logical
rule formulae. The RBBL enables the free exchange to reasoning about the attributevalues using logical rules deduction for a rapid automatic construction of e-services and
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bid formations. Hence, the RBBL enables a rapid exchange clearing. Our work presents
the formal model of the e-services CAP and expanded on how the RBBL allows for
capturing the CAP as a formal IP for the stable and efficient winner matching allocation.
However, our work does not expand on the smart aspect of the free exchange. Our work
uses MATLAB to simulate the request and ask bidding behaviour and self-learning at
repetitive trades that maps to logical rules conveyed to the exchange e-marketplace.
Our work investigates, also, the inefficiencies of the exchange mechanisms with respect
to allocation and revenue models. A fundamental challenge is the fact exchange models
are hard to implement, as per Hurwicz impossibility theorem (Hurwicz, 1975) that states
it is impossible to implement an AE, IC and BB social welfare function in a DSE settings
even for simple exchange (Parkes, 2001) and quasi-linear preferences. This is also the
case even without requiring IR. The work in (Green & Laffont, 1977) demonstrates no
DSE AE and IC mechanism can be safe from manipulation by coalitions, even in quasilinear settings. Our work endows the free exchange, also, with the GSPM, GSP DA
matching. The formal problem model captures the CAP as a IP for the socially efficient
matching allocation. The free exchange deliberates on the logical rules for preference
deduction and winner matching. The free exchange applies the GSPM matching on the
induced request and ask-bids to compute an efficient and stable matching. The GSPM
DA uniquely exploits the tractable forward and reverse-GSP auction heuristics that
improve the truthful, efficient, stable, profitable, and tractable FX matching. The FX
GSPM targets the symmetric, efficient an stable matching between multiple buyers and
sellers of a class of multiple units of a particular e-service of multiple Q-levels.
The free exchange improves truthfulness by implementing a multiple Q-levels GSPM.
The request bidder would be better off if it bid truthfully on a e-service of a particular Qlevel, as it would minimize the risk of losing to others at that Q-level, while having an
incentive to win a e-service of higher quality. The GSPM also secures e-market
profitability that grows with thick trades and makes it lucrative to e-markets.
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Given, the complexity of exchange impossibility theory (Hurwicz, 1975), our work
proposes an exchange model that exploits the relaxed (weaker) properties of the eservices CAP that translates to the multiple unit-demand matching with multiple Q-levels
to improve the symmetric DA properties. Our model suggest also the application of
constant learning at repetitive trades in rather thicker markets that transform efficiently
the private information model to full information settings using our proposed FX model.

7.1 Experimental Findings and Comparative Analysis
The experimental analysis targets the algorithmic simulation and comparison between the
GSPM and EM for the matching allocation and pricing outcomes of the CAP class of
multiple units DA of a single-item (i.e., e-service). The single items (e-services) may be
constructed from multiple attributes and multiple Q-levels using the RBBL tree based
bidding attribute-values and logical rule and operators formulae. The simulation allows
for repetitive trades. Requests and asks bids are either bounded or unbounded by the
Min/Max request and ask bid limits. The simulation implements, analyses and reports the
algorithms and the experimental findings of the presented GSPM and EM DA
mechanisms that serve either bounded or unbounded bidders of single or multiple Q-level
request and ask bids. The DA mechanisms exploit the conveyed RBBL instance of the
bidders that dictates their rational reactions at constant learning.
The experimental scenarios examines the performance advantage of using only the rules
aggregation for a number of request and ask bidders with the assumption that bidders
apply self-learning abilities at repetitive trades that maps to logical rules and conveyed to
the FX. The RBBL rules aggregation inside the free exchange reduces the relative
processing time of the remote (i.e., over local networks) bidder agents processing time in
multiple folds. Furthermore, the reduction of processing time by the aggregation of rules
increases significantly with thicker e-market trades over best effort internet. In addition,
our work assumes that the smart deduction and minimal elicitation, that is to be explored
in future work, would have a substantial performance improvement for more rapid trades.
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The FX applies the GSPM matching on the induced and generated e-services and
requests and asks bids to find an efficient and stable matching allocation and pricing
outcomes. The FX e-marketplace facilitates truthful interactions by implementing the
GSPM double auction matching that exploits the multiple Q-level forward and reverse
GSP double auctions for e-trading e-services. The GSPM DA delivers stable social
efficiency quite rapidly at the first trades with fairly thick e-market trades (i.e., more than
100 bidders). However, the EM DA keeps unstable social efficiency for most repetitive
trades. The GSPM stable efficiency is due to the pricing rule that narrows down the
tactical maneuverability, the multiple Q-level cross-matching and the best response at
repetitive trades. In fact, the rational reaction of bidders at constant learning of the emarket dynamics drives both the GSPM and EM to converge to stable efficiency. The
process transforms the exchange e-market from incomplete information to complete
information truthful settings. However, there is no guarantee the EM DA would converge
in a lower number of rounds due to the EM pricing model that allows for aggressive
tactical moves of losers throughout repetitive trades until they converge to the EM prices.
The GSPM DA secures the e-market profitability that grows with thicker trades. This is
an inherent attribute of the GSPM DA matching. However, the EM DA mechanism
delivers no profitability. The e-market profitability is lucrative to e-marketplaces that
deliver the liquidity and the computational e-services. The bounded GSPM and EM DA
converge to the maximum number of matched pairs close to the true value matched pairs.
This is the natural matching progress of the bounded bidders at repetitive trades. The
unbounded GSPM and EM DA converge, however, to the maximum full matched pairs
that cover almost all ask-bid pairs at repetitive trades. This is a result of the unbounded
reactions of bidders that scarify risk neutrality for a wining match. The unbounded GSPM
DA and EM DA allows for negative utilities due to the unbounded aggressive
adjustments of losers that direct the convergence of the risk unneutral higher value
request bids and lower ask bids of the losers until they turn into winners. This is due to
the violation of the risk neutrality by the losers over true bounds. Otherwise, the bounded
conservative conduct of winners targets utility maximization. Our work examines the
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unbounded model to investigate bidder’s behaviours at GSPM thicker and/or repetitive
trades. An interesting observation is that GSPM DA delivers stable AE social efficiency
for bidders of bounded GSPM trades and also for winners of unbounded GSPM trades.
The losers of unbounded GSPM trades destabilises their allocation region due to their
unbounded aggressive moves that breaks risk neutrality.
It is also observed the variance of both GSPM and EM DA requests and asks drops
rapidly at the initial trades due to the bounded or unbounded large delta adjustments of
the requests and asks of losers aggressive moves. The variance converges, then, with
rather the smaller adjustments of winners conservative moves to a stable low value as
bidders hit their true valuation bounds or as the difference between the falling bids and
the rising asks narrows down until they get closer to the GSPM second prices in order or
the EM Mth price bounds.
The complexity analysis of the diverse GSPM DA mechanisms examines the processing
runtimes at diverse GSPM and EM trades. Our work observed there is at no extra
computational cost in implementing the GSPM algorithmic heuristics compared to the
EM DA counterpart. In fact, the GSPM mechanisms utilize the EM algorithms for the
sorting, grouping, indexing and the allocation matching that often demands the highest
computation cost while applying linear pricing models. Hence, the GSPM DA would
deliver better economic properties such as stable efficiency and e-market profitability for
the same computational cost.

7.2

Future Outlook

This is ongoing research with promising prospects. The free exchange is an attempt to
liberalize the e-market mechanisms that would drive their resilience through free, rapid
and stable trades, social efficiency, self-prosperity, and e-markets profitability. However,
there are potential aspects to be furthered such as how the free exchange smart engine can
be computationally effective for the automatic deduction of the bidding rules and the
formation of request and ask bids. There is also the scalability impact of thick e-market
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trades and real-time performance. Another issue has to do with how the bidders may
effectively generate the suitable strategic rules that deliver to their local constraints and
objectives without exposure. The solution approaches in this research are anticipated to
open new horizons for ecosystem friendly and computationally tractable mechanisms.
The proposed free exchange facilitates the free rational strategic conduct that equalizes
the conflicting forces of the essential needs to the scarce resources and the self-interested
local objectives and local feasibility constraints. The free exchange with the flexible
strategic conduct of bidders would eventually deliver a socially efficient and strategically
stable and profitable e-marketplace. In fact, the free rational conduct is still an
overlooked encounter in the digital era and mobile influence where bidders are the targets
and are the real-time commodity. The desirable properties of the FX e-market is verified
through the experimental analysis of proposed FX model. Figure 37 outlines the FX
trading platform with the proposed RBBL model and GSPM double auction mechanism.

Figure 37: Free exchange e-marketplace trading platform
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Appendices
Appendix A: GSPM and EM MATLAB Simulation Algorithms
SORT (Bids, Asks, BidQS, AskQS) % Sort Q-levels and Request and Ask Bids
% Bids is set of all request bids.
% BidQS is set of all Q-levels of request bids.
% Asks is set of all ask bids.
% AskQS is set of all Q-level of ask bids.
% (1) Sort all Q-levels in descend order.
% (2) Group request and ask bids according to Q-level ranks.
[sBidQS, sBidQSX] = sort (BidQS, ‘descend');
[sAskQS, sAskQSX] = sort (AskQS, ‘descend');
% sBidQS is set of sorted Q-levels of request bids. sBidQSX is sort index.
% AskQS is set of sorted Q-levels of ask bidders. sAskQSX is sort index.
% (3) Group Request and ask bids based on the sorted Q-levels.
For j=1:1: buyers % Rearrange Request and ask based on sorted Q-levels
QBid (j) = int16 (Bids (sBidQSX (j))); %group traded requests based on Q-level
QTruBid (j) = BidTruVals (sBidQSX (j)); %group True request based on Q-levels
End
For j=1:1: sellers
QAsk (j) = int16 (Asks (sAskQSX (j)));
%group traded Asks based on Q-levels
QTruAsk (j) = AskTruVals (sAskQSX (j)); % group True Asks based on Q-levels.
End
For i=1:1: QS
For j=1:1: buyers % Count Number of Bids in each Q-level group
If (i==sBidQS (j))
BidQS_size (i) =BidQS_size (i) +1; % Number of request Bids in Q-level=i
End
End
End
For i=1:1: QS
For j=1:1: sellers % Count Number of Asks in each Q-level group
If (i==sAskQS (j))
AskQS_size (i) =AskQS_size (i) +1; % Number of Ask Bids in Q-level=i
End
End
End
% (4) Sort the true and traded request and ask bids for each Q-level
% sQBid and sQAsk are the sorted Requests and asks bids based on Q-levels.
buyPointer =1; % Points to the start of each Q-level in bid list
sellPointer =1; % Points to the start of each Q-level in Ask list
For i=QS:-1:1
[B,X]= sort (QBid (buyPointer: buyPointer +BidQS_size (i)-1),'descend');
Bt= sort (QTruBid (buyPointer: buyPointer +BidQS_size (i)-1),'descend');
sQBid (buyPointer: buyPointer +BidQS_size(i)-1) = B;% Sorted Bids in Q-level
sQBidX (buyPointer: buyPointer +BidQS_size(i)-1)= X;% Sorted Index
% Sort True item Bid valuations to follow sorted Bids
sQTruBid (buyPointer :buyPointer +BidQS_size(i)-1) =Bt;
[B, X]= sort (QAsk(sellPointer :sellPointer +AskQS_size(i)-1),'ascend');
Bt= sort (QTruAsk (sellPointer :sellPointer +AskQS_size(i)-1),'ascend');
sQAsk (sellPointer: sellPointer +AskQS_size (i)-1) =B;%Sorted Asks in Q-level
sQAskX (sellPointer: sellPointer +AskQS_size (i)-1)=X; % Sorted Index
% Sort True item Ask Valuations to follow sorted Asks
sQTruAsk (sellPointer :sellPointer+ AskQS_size(i)-1)= Bt;
buyPointer =
buyPointer +BidQS_size(i);% Step to next Q-level Bid list
sellPointer =
sellPointer+ AskQS_size(i);% Step to next Q-level ask list
End
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MATCHING-ALLOCATION-RULE (sQBid, sQAsk, BidQS_size, AskQS_size) % Match
Request and Ask Bids and Allocate Winners (Same for all DA mechanisms)
%sQBid/sQAsk: sorted request/ask bids.
%BidQS_size/AskQS_size: number of request/ask bids in each Q-level.
n = min (sQBid, sQAsk); %n is minimum size of sorted Requests and asks
matched = 0; % Initial number of qualified matches
msQBid = zeros(1,n); % Initial sorted match list of request bids.
msQAsk = zeros(1,n); % Initial sorted match list of ask bids.
sQAskT = sQAsk; %
buyPointer
= 1; % Bid Start Pointer
sellPointerS = 1; % Ask start pointer
sellPointerE = 1;
For i =Q-level:-1:1 % Inspect matching allocation For each Q-level
For j= buyPointer to buyPointer + BidQS_size(i)-1
For k=sellPointerS:1:sellPointerE+AskQS_size(i)-1
flag = 0;
If (sQBid(j) >= sQAskT(k))% sorted bid is more of equal ask?
msQBid(j) = sQBid(j); % Select sorted Bid for match list
msQAsk(k) = sQAsk(k); % Select sorted ask for match list
sQAskT(k) = Big-M;% Big-M is very high to drop matched ask
matched
= matched+1; % Set number of matches in Q-level =i
flag= 1;
End
If (flag == 1)
Break% Start with new bid and compare it with sQAskT asks
End
End
End
% Done with one Q-level? Then increment to next Q-level
buyPointer= buyPointer + BidQS_size(i);%BidQS_size no of bids in Q-level=i
sellPointerE=sellPointerE+ AskQS_size(i));%AskQS_size of asks in Q-level=i
End

GSPM-PRICING-RULE (msQBid, msQAsk, sBidQS, sAskQS, matched)%GSPM Pricing
Rule for any Q-level ( Same for all GSPM DA mechanisms).
% msQBid/ msQAsk: matched and sorted bid/ask sets,
% sBidQS/sAskQS: bid/ask Q-levels,
% matched: numbers matched bid/ask pairs for any Q-level.
n
= min (sQBid, sQAsk); %n is minimum size of sorted Requests and asks
Cost
= zeros (1, n);
Payment = zeros (1, n);
For i=1:1: matched-1;
If and(msQAsk(i)> 0,sAskQS(i)== sAskQS(i+1)) % sQAsk has same Q-level?
Cost (i) = sQAsk (i+1); % Ask value within Q-level group
Elseif and (msQAsk (i)> 0, sAskQS (i)> sAskQS (i+1))
Cost (i) = sQAsk (i); % sQAsk is at the end of Q-level group
End
If and (msQBid (i)> 0, sBidQS (i) == sBidQS (i+1))
Payment (i)= sQBid(i+1); % Bid Value within Q-level group
Elseif and (msQBid (i)> 0, sBidQS (i)> sBidQS (i+1))
Payment (i) = sQBid (i); % Bid Value at the end of Q-level group
End
End
If and (msQAsk (matched)> 0, msQBid (matched)> 0) % Matching of the last pair
Cost (matched)= sQAsk(matched);
Payment (matched) = sQBid (matched);
End
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EM-PRICING-SINGLE-QS (msQBid, msQAsk, SQAsk, sBidQS, sAskQS, matched)%EM
Pricing Rule for Single Q-level EM DA Mechanism.
% msQBid/ msQAsk: matched and sorted bid/ask sets,
% sBidQS/sAskQS: bid/ask Q-levels,
% matched: numbers matched bid/ask pairs for single Q-level
n
= min (sQBid, sQAsk); %n is minimum size of sorted Requests and asks
Cost
= zeros (1,n);
Payment = zeros (1,n);
For i=1:1: matched-1;
if and(msQAsk(i)> 0,sAskQS(i)== sAskQS(i+1)) % sQAsk has same Q-level?
Cost (i) = sQAsk (matched); % Ask value within Q-level group
Elseif and (msQAsk (i)> 0, sAskQS (i)> sAskQS (i+1))
Cost (i)= sQAsk(matched); % sQAsk is at the end of Q-level group
End
If and (msQBid (i)> 0, sBidQS (i) == sBidQS (i+1))
Payment (i) = sQAsk (matched); % Bid Value within Q-level group
Elseif and (msQBid (i)> 0, sBidQS (i)> sBidQS (i+1))
Payment (i) = sQAsk (matched); % Bid Value at the end if Q-level group
End
End
If and(msQAsk(matched)> 0,msQBid(matched)> 0) % EM matching for last pair
Cost (matched)= sQAsk(matched);
Payment (matched) = sQAsk (matched);
End

EM-PRICING-Multiple-QS(msQBid, msQAsk, sQAsk, sBidQS, sAskQS,
AskQS_size, BidQS_size) %EM Pricing Rule for Multiple Q-levels EM DA.
% msQBid/ msQAsk: matched and sorted bid/ask sets,
% sBidQS/sAskQS: bid/ask Q-levels,
% matched: numbers matched bid/ask pairs for single Q-level
n
= min (sQBid, sQAsk); %n is minimum size of sorted Requests and asks
Cost
= zeros (1,n);
Payment = zeros (1,n);
sellPointer =1;
lastmsQAsk = zeros(QS);
For i=QS:-1:1 % Set M Equilibrium Pricing for each Q-level
For k=sellPointer :1:sellPointer +AskQS_size(i)-1
if (msQAsk(k)> 0) % Does sQAsk has same Q-level?
lastmsQAsk (i) = k;
End
End
sellPointer = sellPointer + AskQS_size(i);
End
buyPointer
= 1;
sellPointerS = 1; % Ask start pointer
sellPointerE = 1;
sQAskT = sQAsk;
For i=QS:-1:1
For j=buyPointer :1: buyPointer+ BidQS_size(i)-1
For k=sellPointerS:1:sellPointerE+AskQS_size(i)-1
flag=0;
if (msQBid(j) >= sQAskT(k))
if(k<= lastmsQAsk(i))
Cost(k)= sQAsk(lastmsQAsk(i));% M-Pricing
Payment(j)= sQAsk(lastmsQAsk(i)); % Value within Q-level
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End
sQAskT(k)= 99999;
flag= 1;
End
if(flag == 1)
break
End
End
End
buyPointer = buyPointer + BidQS_size(i);
sellPointerE= sellPointerE+ AskQS_size(i);
End

BOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE (BidWinnersNow, AskWinnersNow, sQAsk, sQBid,
sQTruBid, sQTruAsk, delta_win, delta_loss, Bid_switch, Ask_switch)
% Bid_switch and Ask_switch hold change of state of bidders.
% Min and Max is for bounded adjustments of RBBL rules inside exchange
For j=1:1:n
winnerNow = BidWinnersNew (j);% Recall current winners list
If (sQBid (j) >= sQTruBid(j))% Stop bidders at true valuation threshold
sQBid (j) = sQTruBid(j);
Elseif and ( winnerNow, not(Bid_switch(j)))% Buyers wins and still wins
sQBid (j) = sQBid(j)- delta_win*rand(1)*(sQBid(j)-Payment(j));
Elseif and(not( winnerNow),not (Bid_switch(j)))% Buyer is still a loser
sQBid (j) = min(sQBid(j)+ delta_loss*rand(1)*sQBid(j),sQTruBid(j));
Elseif and( winnerNow, Bid_switch(j)) % Buyer wins after losing
sQBid (j) = sQBid(j);
Elseif and(not( winnerNow),Bid_switch(j))% Buyers loses after winning
sQBid (j) = min(sQBid(j)+ delta_loss*rand(1)*sQBid(j),sQTruBid(j));
End
winnerNow =AskWinnersNew (j);
If (sQAsk(j) <= sQTruAsk(j))
sQAsk(j) = sQTruAsk(j);
Elseif and( winnerNow, not(Ask_switch(j))) % Seller is still winner
sQAsk(j) = sQAsk(j)+ delta_win*rand(1)*(Cost(j)-sQAsk(j));
Elseif and(not( winnerNow),not (Ask_switch(j)))%Seller is still a loser
sQAsk(j) = max(sQAsk(j)- delta_loss*rand(1)*sQAsk(j), sQTruAsk(j));
Elseif and( winnerNow, Ask_switch(j)) ))% Seller wins after losing
sQAsk(j) = sQAsk(j);
Elseif and(not(winnerNow),Ask_switch(j))% Seller loses after winning
sQAsk(j) = max(sQAsk(j)- delta_loss*rand(1)*sQAsk(j),sQTruAsk(j));
End
End

UNBOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE (BidWinnersNow, AskWinnersNow, sQAsk, sQBid,
sQTruBid, sQTruAsk, delta_win, delta_loss, Bid_switch, Ask_switch)
% Bid_switch and Ask_switch hold change of state of bidders.
% Min and Max is for unbounded adjustments of RBBL rules inside exchange
For j=1:1:n
winnerNow = BidWinnersNow (j);% Recall current winners list
If and( winnerNow, not(Bid_switch(j)))% Buyers wins and still wins
sQBid(j) = sQBid(j)- delta_win*rand(1)*(sQBid(j)-Payment(j));
Elseif and(not( winnerNow),not (Bid_switch(j)))% Buyers is still loser
sQBid(j) = sQBid(j)+ delta_loss*rand(1)*sQBid(j);
Elseif and( winnerNow, Bid_switch(j)) % Buyer wins after losing
sQBid(j) = sQBid(j);
Elseif and(not( winnerNow),Bid_switch(j))% Buyers loses after winning
sQBid(j) = sQBid(j)+ delta_loss*rand(1)*sQBid(j;
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End
winnerNow =AskWinnersNow (j);
If and( winnerNow, not(Ask_switch(j))) % Seller is still winner
sQAsk(j) = sQAsk(j)+ delta_win*rand(1)*(Cost(j)-sQAsk(j));
Elseif and(not( winnerNow),not (Ask_switch(j)))%Seller is still loser
sQAsk(j) = sQAsk(j)- delta_loss*rand(1)*sQAsk(j);
Elseif and( winnerNow, Ask_switch(j)) ))% Seller wins after losing
sQAsk (j) = sQAsk(j);
Elseif and(not(winnerNow),Ask_switch(j))% Seller loses after winning
sQAsk (j) = sQAsk (j)- delta_loss*rand(1)*sQAsk(j);
End
End

EXAMINE-CHANGE-OF-STATES (BidWinnersOld, BidWinnersNow, AskWinnersOld,
AskWinnersNow) %Examine Request and ask bidders New/Old Winning States.
Status_changes = 0;
Bid_switch = zeros (1, buyers);
Ask_switch = zeros (1, sellers);
For j=1:1: n
winner_before = BidWinnersOld (j); % Set win/lose state history
If xor (winner_before, BidWinnersNow (j)) % Inspect win/lose switching
Bid_switch (j) =1; % Set to one if state changes only.
Status_changes = Status_changes +1; % Set number of state changes
BidWinnersOld (j) = BidWinnersNow (j); % Save state for next trade
End
winner_before = AskWinnersOld (j);
If xor (winner_before, AskWinnersNew (j))
Ask_switch (j)
=1;
Status_changes
= Status_changes +1;
AskWinnersOld (j) = AskWinnersNew (j);
End
End
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